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Abstract  
This thesis explores the potential that lies in the engagement of critical theory and 
theology. Rather than a mere demonstration of how theology can be used in the service 
of critical theory, its original contribution is in the demonstration of theological self-
reflective criticality that this engagement brings about. It therefore represents an attempt 
to further develop the potential of this engagement, by showing how critical theory can 
function as a resource for theological self-reflection. This is achieved through 
exploration of the method, function and effect of Slavoj Žižek’s materialist 
appropriation of theology for political thought. The resulting struggling universality of 
abandonment and its ethic of indifference challenging any notion of identity is then 
applied in examination of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s own social theology of a transcendental 
personalist community of saints and its ethic of universal love in Sanctorum Communio. 
Žižek’s community, grounded in the absence of God, draws attention to the theological 
character as never submitting to an identity but rather blurring the hypostasized 
boundaries between them irrevocably. It challenges Bonhoeffer’s community, grounded 
in and by God, as abstracting and suspending identities only through the creation of a 
new one. The thesis thus draws attention to and clarifies the full dimensionality of the 
necessary critical character of theology.
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Introduction  
 
Aim  
This thesis is a functional examination of theology’s engagement with critical theory. It 
represents an attempt to further the engagement beyond any mere demonstration of 
theology’s socio-political potential, and instead appropriates critical theory in 
theology’s understanding of self. Grounded in the conception of theology as a critical 
intellectual reflection on the act, content and implication of the Christian faith, the thesis 
presents theology’s engagement with critical theory as intrinsic to fulfilling its own 
distinctly critical character. The thesis demonstrates this with reference to the critical 
theorist Slavoj Žižek’s utilisation of theology for political thought. His materialist 
appropriation is explored and applied in a critical reading of the modern theologian 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s own theological social philosophy of Sanctorum Communio. This 
is in order to demonstrate how theological engagement with critical theory, besides 
displaying theology’s distinctly critical sociological potential, is of utmost import for 
the propaedeutic role of theological reflection.  
The Object of Analysis: The Social Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
The thought of Dietrich Bonhoeffer is varied despite the brevity of his life (1906-1945). 
As a modern theologian his contemplation of theological concepts was directed at their 
social and ethical dimension or application. His interconnected ideas of Christ the 
vicarious representative, Christ existing as church community, discipleship, cheap-grace 
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and a call for a religionless interpretation of Christianity, continue to permeate 
theological academia and there have been numerous attempts to summarise his thought.1 
Yet all of those concepts, as Clifford J. Green (1999) convincingly argues, reflect 
Bonhoeffer as a theologian of sociality. The foundations of his theology with a distinct 
sociological orientation were laid during his theological education in Berlin and found 
their original expression in his first thesis, Sanctorum Communio. In this work, where 
Bonhoeffer employed social philosophy and sociology in the service of theology, he 
clearly expressed his conviction about ‘the social intention of all fundamental Christian 
concepts’ which appear ‘fully understandable only in relation to sociality’ (DBWE 1: p. 
23[5]).2 This thesis undertakes to examine Bonhoeffer’s sociological claims made in 
Sanctorum Communio.  
The examination or analysis will be carried out from the perspective of another 
discipline, for the conviction that theology carries sociological potential is not restricted 
to the sphere of public or political theology but is shared by its numerous dialogue 
partners across academic disciplines. Some of these are more surprising than others, 
such as many non-religious, Marxist-inspired political thinkers who explore theological 
resources as a conceptual resource facilitating and grounding critique. Examples of this 
type are Alain Badiou (2003), Giorgio Agamben (1998), Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri (2000). One of these is the Slovenian post-Marxist critical theorist Slavoj Žižek, a 
dialectical materialist who describes himself as a fighting atheist. Nonetheless, Žižek is 
                                                 
1
 Some examples: Bethge (1967); Dramm (2001); de Gruchy (1999); Feil (1991); Plant (2004); Dumas 
(1971); Busch Nielsen, Nissen and Tietz (eds.) (2007).  
2
 This is the reference for footnote 5 on page 23 of the first volume in the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works 
collection (DBWE). According to Richard Roberts, this also qualifies Sanctorum Communio as a classic 
illuminating the relation between theology and the social sciences. See Roberts (2005), pp. 375-377.  
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convinced of the absolute necessity of Christian theology for the development of his 
political thought and the outcome thereof – a radical universalism grounded in 
materialism which is distinctly theological in experience and form and continues to 
address core theological issues.3 Indeed, for Žižek, theology forms one of the most 
complex ways of speaking about radical political change. It is thus through 
Bonhoeffer’s and Žižek’s mutual conviction about the sociological potential of theology 
that the point of contact for this interdisciplinary research is established.4  
Religionless Christianity and the Death of God? 
Proposing an inter-reading of the thought of Žižek and Bonhoeffer perhaps raises 
expectation that this will be undertaken within the paradigms of the Death of God 
theology. Indeed, Žižek’s critical insistence on the meaninglessness in the Judeo-
Christian tradition and his characterisation of God as suffering, placed alongside with 
Bonhoeffer’s thoughts from The Letters, might well lead to such an expectation. An 
explanation is therefore in order as to why this thesis will not be conducted within the 
paradigms of the Death of God theology.  
In The Parallax View (2006b), Žižek’s insistence on the meaninglessness of 
Christianity leads him to question the range of Badiou’s definition of religion as the 
equation of truth and meaning. In the section entitled ‘When God Comes Around’ (pp. 
182-1κ7), he comments on Badiou’s suggestion in an interview from 2004 that the 
                                                 
3
 This is seen in ‘Building Blocks for a Materialist Theology’ in The Parallax View, where Žižek not only 
carries forward the major conclusions concerning Christianity reached in his earlier works, but expresses 
new developments of ideological critique in theological terms (Žižek, 2006b, pp. 6κ-113).  
4
 As will become clear in the thesis, another contact point between them is the impact of and engagement 
with the social philosophy of the German idealist Georg Hegel.  
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simplest definition of religion is the idea that truth and meaning are identical, asking 
whether this is true of all religion:  
The key question about religion today is: can all religious experiences 
and practices in fact be contained within this dimension of the 
conjunction of truth and meaning? Does not Judaism, with its imposition 
of a traumatic Law, adumbrate a dimension of truth outside meaning 
(which is why Judaism is the mortal enemy of any Gnostic 
obscurantism)? And, at a different level, does not the same go for Saint 
Paul himself? (ibid., p. 182)  
 
In Žižek’s view, the best way to clarify this question would be through examination of a 
situation in which religion itself faces ‘a shock which dissolves the link between truth 
and meaning, a truth so traumatic that it resists integration into the universe of Meaning’ 
(ibid.). The paradigmatic example of such a situation is of course when theology faces 
the problem of evil, the question of how to reconcile the existence of God with the fact 
of the phenomena of excessive evil such as the Holocaust. According to Žižek, the 
traditional theological responses based upon an insistence on the omnipotence of God 
are basically the following: evil as God’s punishment, evil as a trial of faith or evil as 
the inscrutability of God’s ways. However, there is another theological answer to this 
problem, Žižek argues, which refers to a God who himself suffers. He then extrapolates 
this notion of a suffering God in the following manner:  
God’s suffering implies that he is involved in history, affected by it, not 
just a transcendent Master pulling the strings from above: God’s 
suffering means that human history is not just a theatre of shadows but 
the place of real struggle, the struggle in which the Absolute itself is 
involved, and its fate is decided (ibid., p. 184).  
 
With this characterization of God as ‘suffering’, Žižek joins the company of 
some of the most important theologians of the 20th century for whom the issue 
  5 
 
of God’s passibility has been absolutely fundamental.5 It seems Žižek himself is 
not entirely, or mostly, aware of this context, yet he nevertheless immediately 
after the passage quoted above explicitly refers to Bonhoeffer’s ‘profound 
insight’ that ‘after the Shoah only a suffering God can help us’ (ibid.).6 Yet there 
were many others across the theological traditions.  
The theological discussion of God’s passability came to the foreground in the 
20th century and occupied some of its most important theologians.7 However, the 
movement that came to be known as ‘Death of God’ began to emerge in the 1λ50’s 
predominantly in the United States of America and Germany.8 These thinkers tried to 
account for the rise of secularism and abandonment of traditional beliefs in God in light 
                                                 
5
 Indeed, the above quote sets him fully on par with Moltmann who argues that ‘a theology after 
Auschwitz would be impossible […] were not God himself in Auschwitz, suffering with the martyred and 
the murdered. Every other answer would be blasphemy. An absolute God would make us indifferent’ 
(Moltmann, 1984, p. 10).  
6
 However, the reference reveals he is merely producing a quote from a Holocaust Reader. 
7
 Such as: John Kenneth Mozley’s The Impassibility of God (1926), Miguel de Unamuno’s Tragic Sense 
of Life (1954), Nicolas Berdyaev’s The Meaning of History (1939) and Kazoh Kitamori’s Theology of the 
Pain of God (1965) published in 1λ46. For James Cone’s black theology, God’s suffering is a necessary 
part of his solidarity with the oppressed (see McWilliams, 1980, pp. 39-43), while process theology, 
following A. N. Whitehead's oft quoted characterization of God as ‘the fellow sufferer who understands’, 
has readily incorporated God’s suffering into its reformulation of theism which makes much of God's 
receptivity to the world (see Williams in Meland, 1969, pp. 175-194). In Germany, Emil Brunner was 
prepared to abandon the philosophical dogma of the divine impassibility for the sake of a more biblical 
concept of God (Brunner, 1953, pp. 268, 294), while Jürgen Moltmann expounded a theology of divine 
suffering in The Crucified God (1974) and The Trinity and the Kingdom (1981). For Moltmann, the 
divine suffering was closely related not only to the theodicy problem and the Cross, but also to the 
trinitarian nature of God. For a brief but helpful survey, see Williams, 1952, pp. 113-117 and Bauckham, 
1984, pp. 6-12.  
8
 The term death of God theologians, however, does not represent a unified movement with a consensus 
on what their restrictive theologies meant. This is the case with the following major proponents and their 
work: Gabriel Vahanian and his The Death of God (1961); Paul Matthews van Buren with The Secular 
Meaning of the Gospel (1963); William Hamilton with The New Essence of Christianity (1966); Thomas 
Altizer with The Gospel of Christian Atheism (1966) and later as editor of the reader Towards a New 
Christianity (1967); Altizer and Hamilton’s joint effort Radical Theology and the Death of God (1966); 
Dorothee Sölle with Stellvertretung (1965) and Atheistisch an Gott glauben (1968); and, of course 
Moltmann’s Theology of Hope (1967). For further resources on the discussion, see Bishop (1968), 
Murchland (1967), and Christian and Wittig (1967).  
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of Nietzsche’s thoughts9 on the death of God, seeking a path for belief beyond it. While 
they differed considerably in their approach, they agreed on a perception of reality 
within which God no longer held a creating and ordering function.  
It was this perception that brought their attention to Bonhoeffer’s tantalizingly 
brief but suggestive remarks in The Letters (DBWE 8), wherein he reflects on the 
conception of a ‘religionless Christianity’. The series of letters exchanged with his 
family and friends during his imprisonment in Berlin-Tegel yields insight into his 
familial care and the bleakness of the prison, as well as further reflection upon various 
theological issues, calling attention to his earlier works, showing or demonstrating their 
implications. The concept of religionless Christianity is discussed in a very small 
portion of the letters, written to his friend and theological confidant Eberhard Bethge 
between April and August 1944, and reveal a singular existential reflection on faith. 
Bonhoeffer invokes the concept in imagining the form of faith that would take in the 
ruins of the post-war Christian West. The unfinished manuscript that explored it has 
been lost; what remains are the letters and an ‘Outline for a Book’. However, it was this 
relatively brief series of letters which gave the work its notoriety and attracted the 
attention of the Death of God theologians, who have appropriated the thought expressed 
therein.10 Indeed, Hamilton even considered Bonhoeffer as the ‘father of the God-is-
                                                 
9
 Some also did so in light of and with reference to Hegel. See Sölle, 1965, p. 54; Moltmann 1967, pp. 
165-172. 
10
 Robinson’s interpretation of the concept ‘religionless Christianity’ as a secular man’s call for a secular 
theology (1963, pp. 29-44); van Buren wrote of the concept ‘world come-of-age’ as portraying a world 
without the first cause (1968); Altizer saw Bonhoeffer as advocating a kenotic Christology (Altizer and 
Hamilton, 1966, p. 135; Altizer, 1966, pp. 62-69.); Vahanian referenced Bonhoeffer when writing about 
the need to participate in the reality of the world, instead of fleeing from it (Vahanian, 1966). Sölle, who 
saw Bonhoeffer as a kindred spirit, analyses and further develops Bonhoeffer’s concept of Stellvertretung 
[vicarious representative action] in her Christ the Representative (1967).  
It should be noted though, that just as the approaches of various thinkers under the label Death of God are 
varied, so is their reading of Bonhoeffer. See Eleanor McLaughlin’s ‘Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Death 
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dead theology’ (Hamilton, 1λ62, p. 440).  Yet, is the consideration of Bonhoeffer as a 
Death of God theologian justified?  
 In the letter from 30 April 1944, Bonhoeffer mentioned for the first time 
‘theological thoughts’ that might ‘surprise, or perhaps even worry’ Bethge – thoughts 
on religionless Christianity (DBWE 8: p. 362).11 The concept plays a fundamental role 
in his attempt to conceive of a contemporary Christianity as distinct from its perception 
as a religion. For Bonhoeffer the concept of religion is ‘only a historically conditioned 
and transient form of human self-expression’ (ibid.), which is marked by an inwardness 
and consideration of God as omnipotent coming to aid of human weakness (DBWE 8: 
p. 479). However, he contends, this religious understanding belongs to an epoch that has 
come to an end through the historical, scientific and socio-political development 
(DBWE 8: pp. 425-426) that has led to the ‘autonomy’ and ‘coming-of-age’ of the 
world itself (DBWE 8: p. 362).12 Bonhoeffer thus attempts to consider the form 
Christianity ought to take in such a radically religionless world.  
A specific concern comes to the fore in Bonhoeffer’s conception of Christianity 
as religionless – how to ‘talk about God without religion?’ (DBWE κ: p. 364). In other 
words, how is Christianity to speak of God, if his understanding as a stopgap or working 
                                                 
of God Theologians’ (2016, pp. 45-64); Craig L. Nessan’s ‘The American Reception: Introduction to 
Bonhoeffer’s Christ the Center’ (Bonhoeffer and Nessan, 2002, pp. 20-30); Stephen R. Haynes’ Ch. 2: 
‘The Radical Bonhoeffer’ (Haynes, 2004, pp. 13-36). 
11
 For reflections on Bonhoeffer’s concept of religionless Christianity, see first and foremost 
Wüstenberg’s Theology of Life (1998). Other works that should be taken into consideration are 
Benktson’s Christus und die Religion (1λ67); Kraus’ Theologische Religionskritik (Benktson’s Christus 
und die Religion (1967); Schönherr’s ‘Die Religionskritik Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s’ (1λ7κ-1988, pp. 239-
260). Finally, there are also the relevant sections in Dumas, 1971, pp. 163-196; Feil, 1991, pp. 72-76; 
Green, 1963, pp. 11: 21.  
12
 Bonhoeffer’s consideration of historical development toward autonomy is in no small part due to his 
reading of Wilhelm Dilthey, as demonstrated by Ralph Wüstenberg’s Theology of Life (1998, pp. 136-
145). 
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hypothesis is ‘increasingly pushed out’ (DBWE κ: p. 450), ‘ever on retreat’ (DBWE κ: 
p. 406) or ‘losing ground’ (DBWE κ: p. 426)? Rather than a theological sanctioning of 
historical development, Bonhoeffer understands his analysis as the precondition for a 
theology that meets the world in its current condition. His solution is to demonstrate that 
the very absence of the religious concept of God demonstrates the presence of the 
Christian God.  Drawing attention to the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ and his 
ultimate act of love by his death on the Cross, Bonhoeffer demonstrates that the 
Christian God establishes his presence precisely by abandoning us, consenting ‘to be 
pushed out of the world and onto the cross’ (DBWE κ: p. 47λ). This leads Bonhoeffer to 
reformulate the transcendence of God, which is no longer considered as ‘infinite, 
unattainable tasks, but the neighbour within reach in any given situation. God in human 
form!’ (DBWE κ: p. 4λ0). ‘Participation in the being of Jesus’ (DBWE κ: p. 501) thus 
replaces participation in a religiously conceived omnipotent God as solving the 
problems of this world. In a world without God as the stopgap, God’s transcendence is 
experienced in the incarnation of Jesus. Bonhoeffer wishes to assert that God is still 
very much present in a world that has come to function and cope without Him. 
Therefore, consideration of Bonhoeffer as a Death of God theologian does 
injustice to his insistence on God’s presence. The oft quoted part of Bonhoeffer’s letter 
on 16 July 1λ44, stating that ‘Before God, and with God, we live without God’ (DBWE 
8: pp. 478-479), is actually Bonhoeffer’s affirmation of God’s presence in this world. 
Even though Bonhoeffer’s notion of incarnational transcendence could be explored with 
reference to the Death of God theology (e.g. Carson, 1975), his consideration far from 
affirms a Hegelian kenoticism (explored with reference to Žižek later in this thesis). In 
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other words, for Bonhoeffer, God does not die and empty himself completely in Jesus 
the man but rather, in Jesus, opens a way to participate in transcendence. This is in stark 
contrast to Altizer’s consideration of Jesus as the ‘epiphany of a universal divine 
Humanity’ (Altizer, 1λ6λ, p. 73), or even that our only image of him should be ‘as an 
individual human being’ (Altizer, 1λ70, p. 141). 
Bonhoeffer is not a Death of God theologian; his God remains a living reality. 
What the foremost Bonhoeffer scholars, such as Bethge,13 Gremmels,14 Green15 and 
Wüstenberg,16 have pointed out in response to any consideration of Bonhoeffer as a 
Death of God theologian is that he is not in pursuit of a world without God, but rather in 
pursuit of re-presenting God in a world that has come to cope without Him (DBWE 8: 
p. 290). As Thomas Torrance noted:  
[T]he tragedy of the situation is that […] instead of really listening to 
Bonhoeffer many […] have come to use Bonheoffer for their own ends, 
as a means of objectifying their own image of themselves […]. In this 
way Bonhoeffer’s thought has been severely twisted and 
misunderstanding of him has become rife, especially when certain catch-
phrases like ‘religionless Christianity’ […] are worked up into systems of 
thought so sharply opposed to Bonhoeffer’s basic Christian theology, not 
least his Christology (Torrance, 1971, p. 74).17  
                                                 
13
 Bethge pointed out that consideration of Bonheffer’s religionless Christianity can and ought not be 
carried out apart from his Christology (1967, pp. 61-77). 
14
 Christian Gremmels noted that ‘Bonhoeffer’s theme is not the ‘coming of age’, ‘this-worldliness’, and 
‘religionlessness’ of the modern world. As plausible and impressive as these expressions are, 
theologically they function only as auxiliary concepts. They serve the task of witnessing to the presence 
of Jesus Christ in the present’ (Gremmels in DBWE κ p. 5κκ). 
15
 Green rejects the notion that Bonhoeffer had an idea of human progress (Green, 1999, p. 252).  
16
 Wüstenberg, similar to the others, argues that Christology is the key to understanding Bonhoeffer’s 
religionless Christianity (1998, pp. 159-160) and observes that any failures to do so reflect the 
perspectives of the interpreters rather than Bonhoeffer’s own assumptions (200λ, pp. 137-138). He also 
points out Bonhoeffer’s inconsistency in evaluation of the religion (1λλκ, pp. 31-99). 
17
 This brief account of Bonhoeffer’s religionless Christianity and its appropriation has also highlighted 
that even though this selection of Bonhoeffer’s letters from prison was highly influential in the perception 
of his theological legacy, it is precarious to construct his theology exclusively upon them. It also has to be 
remembered that the theological content of the letters is fragmentary, a sort of beginning of something to 
be developed. That is clearly visible in Bonhoeffer’s letter to Bethge, in which he wrote that ‘it would be 
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Rather than dealing with the absence of God per se, Bonhoeffer attempts to locate God 
in the areligious contemporary reality. The theme is rather ‘the claim of Jesus Christ on 
the world that has come of age’ (DBWE κ: p. 451). This is emphasised in his words: 
‘what keeps gnawing at me is the question, what is Christianity, or who is Christ 
actually for us today?’ (DBWE κ: p. 362).  
As this brief account has shown that the picture of Bonhoeffer as a Death of God 
theologian is incorrect, this thesis will not be conducted within the paradigm of the 
Death of God theology. As such, it will not consider Bonhoeffer’s religionless 
Christianity as a possible response to Žižek’s overcoming of God as the big Other, for 
any attempt to do so would be an abstraction and would distort Bonhoeffer’s marked 
insistence on God’s presence. Instead, as will be shown below, this thesis falls within 
the remit of critical theology. Even though it includes a theological challenging of 
meaning, that is not conducted in light of the event of the death of God on the Cross and 
any ensuing meaninglessness. Instead, critical theology’s challenging of meaning comes 
from its propaedeutic criticality. The inter-reading of Žižek and Bonhoeffer in this 
thesis is not established upon their ideas of the death of God or religionless Christianity; 
rather, the contact point between them is their mutual conviction about the sociological 
character of theology and its critical potential, observed in Žižek’s conception of the 
Holy Spirit community and Bonhoeffer’s community of saints.    
                                                 
very nice if you didn’t throw away my theological letters […] I might perhaps like to read them again 
later for my work’ (κ July, 1λ44 in DBWE κ: p. 513). 
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The Analyst: The Theological Materialism of Slavoj Žižek 
Slavoj Žižek (1λ4λ - ) is an internationally recognised Slovenian philosopher, 
psychoanalyst and critical theorist, and has been deemed ‘one of the world’s best known 
public intellectuals’ (Gray, 2012). His over eighty works and multitude of articles have 
been translated into numerous languages, and he regularly speaks on various topics 
around the globe. Aided by examples from popular culture, Žižek uses Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, Hegelian philosophy and Marxist economic criticism to interpret social 
phenomena, including religion, and in particular Christianity. It is with regards to the 
latter that he considers himself a Christian atheist or Christian materialist (Žižek, 
2012a, pp. 115-116).  
Žižek agrees with the ‘universalist’ legacy of Christianity, which is best 
expressed in Galatians 3:28, where the Apostle Paul asserts that ‘there is no longer Jew 
or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of 
you are one in Christ Jesus’.18 He identifies with the implication of this thought (at least 
as he perceives it) a complete egalitarianism of all people, and calls on Christianity to 
abandon its outer shell of religious form, manifested in institutional organisation and 
religious experience. Theology as post-metaphysical political thought, girded by 
universality for revolutionary thought and action, is the true legacy of Christianity. That 
is the reason why Žižek believes theology is indispensable and essential for any kind of 
socio-political engagement in the world.  
                                                 
18
 All Scripture quotations in the thesis are taken from the New Revised Standard Version.  
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Considerations of Žižek’s exploration of theology from a non-religious 
perspective have tended to find little value or distinctive contribution in the act. Thus 
the literary theorist Geoff Boucher asks whether or not the religious content of Žižek’s 
work risks a form of ‘irrational fundamentalism’ (Boucher, 2005, p. 44) while the 
political theorist Yannis Stavrakakis is critical of Žižek’s language of faith, claiming it 
risks ‘political absolutisation’ (Stavrakakis, 2005, p.44). Boucher’s colleague at Deakin 
University, Matthew Sharpe, gives a more measured response. Nevertheless, he likewise 
says that Žižek’s theological turn can ‘easily collapse into a perverse identification [. . .] 
with the mechanisms of prohibition themselves, rather than a passage beyond law’ 
(Sharpe, 2004, p. 250). Such, he argues, is attested in the history of the Christian 
churches. While these thinkers are correct, insofar as religious absolutism can lead to 
political absolutism, they are wrong in their representation of theology only through 
these negative associations with fundamentalism or totalitarianism. Instead of a 
consideration of theology as a creative resource, they argue for what could be described 
as implicit positivism: any sociopolitical theory should be built only upon solid and 
empirical facts ascertained from the ground up.19 Perhaps this criticism functions as a 
stopgap, something Žižek himself notes in Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? , where 
he warns that ‘instead of enabling us to think, forcing us to acquire a new insight into 
the historical reality it describes, [it] relieve[s] us of the duty to think, or even actively 
prevent[s] us from thinking’ (Žižek, 2001d, p. 3). It implies theology need not be taken 
seriously and the failure of Žižek’s critics to engage theology appears to confirm this 
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 Žižek’s reluctance to respond to casual inquiries about his use of theology can be understood in light of 
this criticism.  
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very point. This thesis will aim to show both the value and distinctive contribution that 
is brought to Žižek’s materialist thought through his engagement with theology. 
From the theological perspective, it is Žižek’s oxymoronic understanding of 
Christianity, which differentiates between its symbolic form and the materialistic core, 
rather than his proposition of Christianity’s socio-political potential, that has in recent 
years attracted attention from various theological perspectives.20 Not unlike Freud’s 
own reconstruction in Moses and Monotheism of the story of Moses and his death in an 
attempt to uncover this violent and guilt-ridden core in Judaism, Žižek proposes an 
unacknowledged and phantasmal core which emerges through the gaps and cracks of 
the actually-existing Christianity. Exploring this theological engagement with his 
appropriation of theology in the service of critical theory has given rise to this thesis, for 
responses have hitherto not moved beyond the necessary critique of his theological 
method and/or a differentiation of their own views.21 Whenever they do, it is with the 
aim of demonstrating the sociological potential of theology or as a theoretical resource 
giving contemporary expression to theological themes. A brief consideration of 
theological engagement with Žižek is thus in order.  
Theological Engagement with Žižek (Literature Survey) 
Among the very first theologians who have responded to Žižek’s work were members 
of the radical orthodoxy movement. This school of theology originated in the United 
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 Few examples of varied responses from different perspectives: Maldonado-Torres (2005) and Mejido 
(2005) from Liberation Theology, Biesecker-Mast (2003) from the Anabaptist and Griffiths (2004) from 
the Catholic perspective. More are mentioned below and throughout the rest of the thesis. 
21
 Among these are Frederik Depoortere (2008); Marcus Pound (2008); Roland Boer (2009, pp. 275-390) 
and indeed, as it will be observed later, John Milbank’s work on/with Žižek. In turn, Adam Kotsko (2008) 
provides a valuable account of Žižek’s theological endeavour only. 
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Kingdom and is named after its first edited volume, Radical Orthodoxy (Milbank et al., 
1999), which brought together its leading lights.  Perhaps foremost among the 
movement is John Milbank, who combines a strong commitment to Augustine and 
Aquinas with a harsh criticism of modern and secular thought from a postmodern 
perspective. Their utmost concern is the issue of ontology, or the underlying 
metaphysical framework of reality. They find an alternative to the modern ontology, 
which they regard as nihilistic, in analogia entis – the analogy of being, a synthesis of 
Neo-Platonism and Christianity which was achieved by Augustine and further 
developed by Thomas Aquinas.  Only this analogy of being can allow for a genuinely 
meaningful worldview, in which God is the fullness of being and all created beings 
participate in it analogically. The radical orthodox thus maintain that unless every 
discipline is framed by a theological perspective, it defines a zone apart from God and 
thus without grounding. Radical theology’s response to Žižek is thus not primarily due 
to his turn to theology, but due to his ontological philosophy, which they consider as 
unjustified.22 That said, however, their engagement seeks to address and respond to a 
philosophy of a materialism which, even if not grounded in the divine transcendence, is 
theological.  
 To represent the radical orthodox response, I will look at the case of John 
Milbank's engagement with Žižek. As their foremost figure, Milbank is a good 
representative of their general stance and, out of all the radical orthodox, has engaged 
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 Žižek’s groundless ontology will be further explored and contrasted with Bonhoeffer’s ontology in 
Chapter 4.  
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Žižek most often and most directly.23 I will do this by focusing on two works: first, 
Theology and the Political (Davis et al., 2005), which includes Milbank’s contribution 
under the title ‘Materialism and Transcendence’ (Milbank, 2005) and second, The 
Monstrosity of Christ (Žižek and Milbank, 200λ), a work that can be considered as the 
outcome of a developing dialogue between them.  
 In Theology and the Political, Milbank begins by demonstrating that due to 
Marx’s reductive materialism, post-war Marxist thinkers sought a non-reductive form of 
materialism, and in doing so borrowed from Platonic, Aristotelian, Idealist and even 
theological thought (Milbank, 2005, pp. 393-398). This initial demonstration enables an 
understanding of the context, form and essence of, among others, Žižek’s appropriation 
of theology and his thought in general as Hegelian. Accordingly, Milbank is correct in 
recognising that Žižek is practicing a Hegelian death of God theology resulting in 
universality (ibid., p. 422). In his astute navigation through the contours of Žižek’s 
thought, Milbank also upholds Christianity’s universality through the particular (ibid., 
p. 404), but argues that Žižek’s atheistic universality of struggle or tension functions 
only as an ontology of revolution, rather than sociality: ‘if universalism springs from an 
event, then to lose mythos and history is to lose the event, and so to lose the universal’ 
(ibid., p. 411). This nihilism, Milbank argues, is due to his inability to consider analogy, 
which mediates between the universal and particular, grounding engagement with others 
in a shared analogy of being, as pointing beyond themselves to God. Thus, while 
Milbank agrees with Žižek that Christianity is aligned with materialism and that the true 
                                                 
23
 It was Graham Ward, however, who first engaged with Žižek in Cities of God (2000a) and then later 
added a section on him to the conclusion of the second edition (2000b) of Theology and the 
Contemporary Critical Theory (1996). 
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form of universalism or sociality is Christian, he rejects his theological materialism as 
nihilist and ontologically incorrect. Milbank’s engagement with Žižek in Theology and 
the Political presents the parameters for their further engagement: while they both 
pursue a radical content of Christian theology and its sociological potential, they do so 
on a different grounding – one upon an orthodox ontology of analogia entis and the 
other upon an atheist ontology of verlassenheit [abandonment].  
 The Monstrosity of Christ (2009) is based on a premise that Žižek and Milbank 
both agree on – that Enlightenment reason has run its course. The question then, which 
they both answer differently, is what becomes of theology after secular Enlightenment 
reason has run its course? Žižek argues that secular reason is sublated by the dialectic of 
theological materialism, whereas, building on his criticism in Theology and the 
Political, Milbank argues that it is replaced by paradox or analogy.  
One of Milbank’s main criticisms in the book is that, in following Hegel, Žižek 
is adopting a Protestant meta-narrative and neglecting the Catholic tradition (Žižek and 
Milbank, 200λ, p. 112). Milbank argues that Žižek’s treatment of Catholics such as 
Chesterton, Kierkegaard24 or Eckhart is done through a Protestant lens and is therefore 
inaccurate.25 Indeed, Žižek’s claim that atheist Christianity is the true Christianity is 
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 Milbank here insists on his consideration of the Lutheran theologian Søren Kierkegaard as a Catholic. 
He argues that Kierkegaard’s linking of faith with reason restored a basically Catholic perspective and 
further mentions Kierkegaard’s Catholic critique of Luther for exalting faith at the expense of works.    
25
 An example of this is Žižek’s re-appropriation of the words of Chesterton’s detective Father Brown: 
‘he was made man’ (Chesterton, 2006, pp. 394-395). Chesterton used these words to portray how Western 
culture’s retreat into spiritualism and its willingness to believe in anything must be read as an inability to 
sustain the traumatic reality of the incarnated God. For Žižek, however, these words mean, along the lines 
of Hegel, that the external or transcendent God is now a contingent fact of human freedom itself. See 
Delpech-Ramey (2010), pp. 122-123. However, this criticism of Žižek, as right as it may be, can also be 
made of Milbank, who compares Kierkegaard to Eckhart and Chesteron. See Harris (2011), pp. 35-41 at 
p. 38.  
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only possible because he accepts a dialectical (that is, a truly Protestant) version of 
Christian doctrine as the most coherent (ibid., p. 117).  As an alternative to Žižek’s 
nihilistic interpretation, Milbank’s proposed analogy is variously found in the same 
sources that Žižek uses but has interpreted differently, such as Eckhart, Kierkegaard, 
Chesterton and Henri De Lubac. Such Catholic perspective affirms a kind of 
materialism that is quite positive in that it affirms a mediating link between matter and 
spirit – the Holy Spirit (ibid., p. 125). Milbank points out Žižek’s problematic 
theological method and the ensuing ‘strange’ interpretation of Christianity.26 Žižek, on 
the other hand, refuses to engage with Milbank’s paradox as it is not truly materialist, 
since it still maintains an ideological structure of the big Other. The meta-narrative that 
Žižek uses – Protestant (Hegelian) dialectic – is the only one that he will use, for it 
alone has, according to him, a truly materialistic essence and potential. This results in an 
impasse, which is perhaps best summed up by Žižek’s final contribution to the work 
(ibid., pp. 235-306), in which he observes that the exchange with Milbank has been 
reduced to each man reiterating his respective notions and has therefore exhausted its 
potentials (ibid., p. 235).  
Further Engagement? 
Having arrived at the point of exhaustion, the question thus presents itself whether it is 
meaningful to keep engaging Žižek? Milbank certainly seems to think it is not, as 
demonstrated in an interview for The Immanent Frame (Schneider and Milbank, 2010) 
shortly after the co-authored volume. To a question about the prospects for a 
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 That is, ‘strange’ in the sense that Žižek’s resulting interpretation of Christianity is something 
completely alien to the traditional conception.  
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philosophical encounter with theology that does not assent to a transcendent deity, 
Milbank responds: ‘I think that, in the end, the prospects are non-existent’ (ibid.). Žižek 
purely insists upon his reading of theology without considering the points of his 
dialogical partners. These partners, who are theologians and enter this discussion about 
theology’s sociological potential, are right to expect a theological discussion. Yet, Žižek 
is not a theologian and any expectation of him to reflect on his materialist theology 
strictly ab intra theologiae falls upon deaf ears.27 
 Indeed, Žižek’s materialistic interpretation of theology appears odd to the 
classical theological reader, insofar as it lacks a serious consideration of the traditional 
or current biblical scholarship, or engagement with the Church Fathers or Karl Barth’s 
Church Dogmatics (1936-1969), or even Latin American Liberation Theology. For 
example, in Žižek’s presentation of the weakness of the legalistic reading of the 
atonement (2003, pp. 102-103), he simply ignores the response to that in the form of 
Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo (1898) in the eleventh century.28 He also rarely refers to any 
contemporary New Testament scholars or contemporary theologians in general. There 
are few exceptions, such as when in his description of God as perverted he refers to the 
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 This is also observable in Žižek: A Very Critical Introduction (2008), where Marcus Pound, similar to 
Millbank, argues for a return to the Thomistic theology and challenges Žižek’s system as a whole. He 
proposes that the only way to do so is from the standpoint of theology and proceeds to read his thought as 
theology, rather than merely pitting theology against critical theory. Thus Žižek is critiqued for remaining 
locked in the very system he is critical of – sacrifice – and that his entire theoretical apparatus is 
predicated upon such a sacrificial system, leaving the violence of sacrifice as the horizon of the political. 
Pound furthermore questions whether abandonment on the Cross was really the final word, and claims 
Žižek’s resulting nihilism is incapable of sustaining an ideological critique and promulgates an ontology 
of revolution but not the progressive path toward Socialism. Pound claims to have recognised the 
importance of not adopting a defensive stand against Žižek but instead fully endorsing his claim – that 
Christianity really is worth saving. Unfortunately, Pound’s reading of Žižek as a theologian turns out as a 
critique of the latter’s materialistic theology and argumentation for adoption of a Thomistic outlook. 
28
 It may be that his treatment of atonement models, which appears only in the early Did Somebody Say 
Totalitarianism? (2001d), is an example of Žižek’s development process of theological materialism 
(similar to his abandonment of Freud’s account of religion). In that case he later realises that a discussion 
of the atonement models is unnecessary.  
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English edition of Rudolf Bultmann’s New Testament Theology (Žižek, 2003, p. 11κ), 
or when using John Howard Yoder’s rejection of the ‘Constantinian shift’ as an 
illustration of a non-reconciled political standpoint (Žižek, 2010c, pp. 12λ-130).29 In 
fact, his ignorance of the contemporary theological thought is revealed in his 
classification of the Norwegian metaphysician Peter Wessel Zapffe as a theologian 
(Žižek, 2014, p. 271).30 Instead, Žižek crafts his understanding of the New Testament by 
reading it in the context of Hegel, Lacan, Marx and contemporary radical philosophy. 
Certainly, Žižek at times engages theological thinkers, such as Chesterton or 
Kierkegaard, but at other times he chooses simply not to. The deciding criterion is their 
materialistic potential. This is also observed in Žižek’s liberal consideration of the 
biblical text itself, such as his selectivity in the Book of Job, or paraphrasing the original 
text in the Gospels.  
However, Žižek’s reason for this serious lack of consideration of the traditional 
theological scholarship lies in the conviction that such an activity would be not only 
unproductive but also obsolete, since that scholarship represents the restrictive and 
perpetual lost-ness in the Symbolic, failing to see its materialistic ground. His response 
would perhaps be along the lines of his conclusion to The Parallax View (Žižek, 2006b, 
pp. 382-282), in which he argues that sometimes the best way to fight against ideology 
is to do nothing. He illustrates his politics of refusal by using the enigmatic title 
character of Herman Melville’s story Bartleby the Scrivener (2009), who answers every 
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 In ‘Trial Balance’ of The Politics of Jesus, Yoder condemned Constantine's integration of the imperial 
government with the Church and argued that it leads to a double bind, where one either ‘accepts, without 
serious qualification, the responsibility of politics […], or one chooses a withdrawn position of either 
personal-monastic-vocational or sectarian character, which is apolitical’ (Yoder, 1972, pp. 105-106).  
30
 Perhaps Žižek might respond that he is merely extrapolating the theological import of Zapffe’s 
antinatalist philosophical position. 
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request with the phrase: ‘I would prefer not to.’ Žižek explains that in order to radically 
refuse the ideological system, he must sometimes also radically refuse the devices by 
which he distances himself from it, and in this way convince himself that he is not part 
of the problem. This, he argues, like God’s self-abandonment on the Cross, is another 
example of a dialectical negation of negation, a change in perspective that transforms an 
apparent defeat into victory. Perhaps, then, Žižek would respond to the request to 
engage with theological scholarship similarly, by responding: ‘I would prefer not to!’  
To enlighten this politics of refusal from another perspective, one could consider 
Walter Benjamin's essay ލZur Kritik der Gewaltތ (Benjamin, 1λ20-1921, pp. 179-204). 
In it Benjamin argues that challenges to, or violations of, the law always threaten to turn 
full circle and become a law-making violence of their own. This is a cycle bound to 
endless repetition, like that of the mythical punishment of Prometheus (ibid., pp. 196-
197). In the light of this problem Benjamin proposes that the only revolutionary forms 
of violence that does not re-instate the violence of the law are proletarian strikes. Rather 
than extorting concessions from the bosses, the general strike makes no demands other 
than the complete transformation of social relations and of work itself. This type of 
strike is a pure means and therefore not violent because its ends are radically senseless, 
unreasonable and extravagant according to capitalist logic. The strike’s only intention is 
non-participation in the logic of ends and means and a refusal of mythical imperatives 
in which transgression of the law meets with punishment. 
Thus, Žižek’s selectivity and liberal interpretation of the theological sources are 
along the lines of the ‘political criticism’ of the French Marxist literary critic Pierre 
Macherey, who, in A Theory of Literary Production, observes that: 
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The speech of a book comes from a certain silence, a matter which it 
endows with form, a ground on which it traces a figure. Thus, the book is 
not self-sufficient; it is necessarily accompanied by a certain absence, 
without which it would not exist. A knowledge of the book must include 
a consideration of this absence (Macherey, 1978, p. 85). 
 
This, he argues, establishes the usefulness and legitimacy of asking of every production 
what it tacitly implies, but does not say. The challenge of critical reading is therefore to 
get beneath the surface of a text’s ideological assumptions by asking of it what it does 
not say, to expose its silences and evasions. According to Macherey, literary texts have 
a particular ability to reveal ideological contradictions, which turns literary study into a 
politically subversive act. No doubt Žižek would argue the same: it is absolutely 
legitimate to ask of theological texts, including the Scripture, what they tacitly imply, 
what they do not say. When read in this way, they reveal the ideological narratives 
inscribing or creating meaning and thereby the veiled presence of the Real – the 
materialistic core of theology. As it will become clear time and again in this thesis, 
Žižek as a critical theorist carries in his heart the conviction that what is truly important, 
philosophically and politically, is that humanity resists the tendency to ascribe meaning 
or, indeed, any valuation and identity to life. Accordingly, the true Judeo-Christian 
legacy is not the fullness of meaning, but rather an acceptance of the meaninglessness of 
the universe. This temptation to meaning is for Žižek our struggle, to paraphrase 
Ephesians 6:12, the authority and cosmic power of the present darkness, to be resisted at 
all cost. In this struggle Žižek urges: ‘Do not be conformed to this world, but be 
transformed by the renewing of your minds’ (Romans 12:2).  
 What, then, is the potential of theological engagement with Žižek? Should any 
further activity take the form of merely accentuating the unreconcilable differences 
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between traditional theological perspectives and Žižek’s atheist materialist meta-
narrative? In other words, is the limit of this engagement to assess and differentiate?  
Potential for Further Engagement  
I suggest that the potential of engagement with Žižek lies in the challenge that his 
materialistic interpretation poses to theology’s self-understanding, by highlighting the 
importance of recognizing, reflecting upon, engaging and speaking into its cultural 
context. In his seminal Theology and Contemporary Critical Theory (Ward, 2000b), the 
radical orthodox Graham Ward examines critical theory’s employment of theological 
resources in the critique of modernity but also considers the implication of that for 
theology as a discipline. Theology, he argues, has been presented with an opportunity to 
engage in ‘Cross-cultural conversation; not where we are the key players, but where we 
have a contribution to make’ (ibid., viii), and calls for a two-fold response. Alongside a 
theological assessment of the critical theoretical thought, which characterises the radical 
orthodox engagement with Žižek, he advocates a discerning of its resources in the 
service of theology. The potential of engaging Žižek, I propose, is located in the second 
part of Ward’s consideration – discerning critical theory’s resources in the service of 
theology. It takes two forms: in extrapolation of theology’s sociological import and in 
service of its critical self-understanding.   
Demonstrating the Sociological Import of Theology 
First, engagement with critical theorists like Žižek is a recognition of the opportunity his 
intervention into the theory of theology’s sociological potential presents to speak with 
them about the socio-political issues of the twenty-first century adroitly, effectively, 
responsibly and in a self-reflexive manner in pursuit of a distinct sociological 
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conviction. After all, this is what Žižek calls for in The Monstrosity of Christ – for 
theological partners in this endeavour.31 This is what Ward (2005, p. 266) describes as 
theology’s ‘confrontational, not simply analytical’ method and is observed whenever 
the theological sources venture beyond the differentiation of their own views in order to 
demonstrate the socio-political potential of theology.   
One instance where this can be observed is in the engagement of the Croatian 
Lutheran theologian Boris Gunjević. In God in Pain (Žižek and Gunjević, 2012), 
Gunjević welcomes Žižek’s challenge and goes about demonstrating that there are many 
hidden treasures in the history of Christianity (including its revolutionary potential), 
which lie buried and undiscovered for perhaps hundreds or even thousands of years (pp. 
1-26). Indeed, it is theology’s responsibility to uncover these treasures that at times might 
have been considered rejects or obsoletes. He goes on to claim that: 
Inasmuch as theology is a deliberation on ecclesial practice in the light of 
God's word, then this practice must be shaped by the theological virtues of 
faith, hope, and charity, ever ready to communicate liberty, equality, and 
fraternity (ibid., p. 26). 
 
This quote clearly shows that Gunjević has not simply taken Žižek’s side, for he still 
considers theology to be the only fitting thought which can offer incarnational resources 
and incarnational tools for changing the world. Gunjević, however, recognises that to 
challenge Žižek over his meta-narrative and his theological method is unproductive. 
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 However, Milbank does not proceed any further from critiquing Žižek’s nihilism and the Hegelian 
meta-narrative. This has already been observed about the debate in Theology and the Political (Kotsko, 
2009, p. 117).   
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Instead, throughout the chapters of the book Gunjević discusses the incarnational tools 
and ecclesial practices that Christianity offers. 
In the second chapter (ibid., pp. 73-102) Gunjević gives the example of 
Augustine's City of God (1950-1954),32 which can serve both as a contrast to or rebuke 
of the current global capitalist politics, and as constructive instruction for the alternative 
way ahead.33 He mentions Augustine's observation that the Empire did not become vast 
and powerful because of its political allies or its military might but because, after 
subjugating other nations, the Romans brought them into the common Roman state (Žižek 
and Gunjević, 2012, pp. κκ-90). In other words, they were all granted equal rights and 
privileges in the community of Rome. It was exactly the guidance of the one true God 
with its ideal of the heavenly city which helped the Romans in this. Furthermore, the 
Romans attained their glory and supremacy because of the orderly guidance for desire, as 
it is only that which builds proper community (ibid., pp. 95-96). Augustine critiqued the 
virtues of the Empire which always sought to increase capital and legitimize various 
forms of terror. He suggested that the only way to strip away the supports for this is to 
engage in ecclesiastical practices, and in this way counter these Empire virtues by not 
participating in them. This no doubt resonates with Žižek’s politics of refusal (‘I would 
prefer not to!’). This instruction that Gunjević observes in Augustine functions as a 
subversive counter-parable to the imperial meta-narrative (ibid., p. 100). What Gunjević, 
in the tradition of Augustine, calls ‘nomadism’ or ascetic exercise, and Žižek calls 
                                                 
32
 Augustine’s work was a response to the accusation that the fall of Rome was Christianity’s fault.  
33
 Interestingly, this is also what Gustavo Gutierrez says in his Theology of Liberation (which, it can be 
said, is a manifesto of Liberation Theology in some ways), in which he praises Augustine’s City of God 
as the classic correct method of theological approach, because the Word of God is being brought to bear 
on the present historical situation (Gutierrez, 1974, p. 5).   
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‘politics of refusal’, becomes ‘the fundamental coordinates that help ground the political 
subject’ (ibid., p. 102). In this they both agree. Gunjević does not attempt to convince 
Žižek of the need either to abstain from Empire virtues or to engage in ecclesial practices, 
for indeed that would be to bring the engagement to its end yet again.  
Gunjević engages Žižek as a critical theorist analysing the daily socio-political 
realities and their ruptures, rather than as a theologian. As such he acts exactly in the 
way Žižek does and no doubt expects the same of his potential theological sparring-
partners – in other words, by radically refusing the devices by which he might distance 
himself from such atheistic interpretations. In this Gunjević resists the temptation of 
convincing himself that he is not part of the problem that is Žižek’s heterodox 
interpretation of Christianity. Through this ‘negation of negation’, an apparent defeat 
(the failure to engage with Žižek’s atheistic elements) is transformed into victory. It is 
as if Gunjević himself is simply saying, ‘I would prefer not to!’  
Critical Theory in the Service of Theology 
The second potential of this engagement is that theology’s contextual partners, like 
critical theory, bring about a greater awareness of the historically embedded 
particularity of its own truth claims. The failure to engage these partners is both a 
misunderstanding of the position, function and method of Christian theology in its 
cultural context and its misplacement. Instead, when theologians reflect on 
philosophical interpretations of Christianity such as Žižek’s, they discover the 
potentiality of removing every-day theological texts from the automatism of perception 
and making them appear in a new light.  
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The appropriation of Žižek’s insight in the service of theology can be observed 
with the Swedish theologian Ola Sigurdson who, in Slavoj Žižek, The Death of God, and 
Zombies (2013), stages a mutually critical dialogue between Žižek’s psychoanalytically 
inspired notion of the undead and Augustine’s understanding of human subjectivity in 
Confessions (1961). Despite his atheistic declaration and dismissal of all pre-modern 
philosophy and theology, Sigurdson argues, Žižek’s theology is structurally similar to 
Augustine’s anthropology, thus suggesting that the relationship is more complex than 
Žižek allows. While Žižek would no doubt complain that talk of Augustine is a plain 
return to the traditional transcendent theology, Sigurdson would respond that the 
relationship between immanence and transcendence in Augustine is more complex than 
a mere positing of a transcendent object somehow influencing Augustine’s innermost 
self. It is rather that the innermost being of the self is not the self itself but something 
other than the self. This is aligned with Žižek’s Lacanian assertion that the core of the 
subject is outside himself (Sigurdson, 2013, p. 377).  
Sigurdson concludes that both Žižek and Augustine are united in rejecting any 
superficial and transparent understanding of self, and become, consequently, an 
example of the engagement of a theological and psychoanalytical narrative. For 
Sigurdson, what Žižek offers theology is an account of human subjectivity that does not 
shy away from its profound alienation. ‘It is only through passing through the 
acceptance of death drive within ourselves that we can lose all narcissistic pretentions of 
being in charge of our actions and their consequences or having a given place in the 
symbolic edifice, paradoxically gaining our true subjectivity and our ultimate freedom’ 
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(ibid., p. 37λ). Žižek’s psychoanalytic discussion of concepts makes theological sense, 
Sigurdson argues.  
Gunjević and Sigurdson have discerned the use of Žižek’s resources for 
theology, the first by deciding to further elaborate Žižek’s consideration of theology as 
the ultimate political act through a discussion of the incarnational tools and ecclesial 
practices that Christianity offers, and the second by reflecting on how concepts from 
Žižek’s thought can function as a theoretical resource through which theological themes 
can find a contemporary expression. While appreciative of Gunjević and Sigurdson’s 
appropriation of Žižek in the service of theology, this thesis will attempt to explore the 
potential of theological engagement with critical theory even further, through utilisation 
of Žižek’s insights in critical theological self-reflection. In contrast to their 
appropriation, aimed at the extrapolation and outward-looking demonstration of 
theology’s sociological potential, this thesis will appropriate Žižek as a critical theorist 
in reflection on the act, content and implications of the Christian faith. Its primary 
character and focus will thus be deliberately critical and inward oriented.  
Theoretical Framework: Critical Theory and Critical Theology  
Critical Theory 
This interdisciplinary thesis is undertaken from the perspective of theory, which has 
become one of the greatest growth areas in cultural analysis and academic life over the 
last few decades. It is now taken for granted that theoretical tools can be applied to the 
study of virtually anything, for example, texts, societies, gender relations as well as 
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religion and theology, in order to reveal greater insight of those cultural artefacts.34 As 
such, theoretical analysis is an innately pluralist exercise, for it presents a range of 
possible methods and perspectives by which to analyse them and their contexts – social, 
political, historical, gender, ethnic. It is in line with this theoretical ethos that Žižek’s 
materialist philosophy will be applied to the study of Bonhoeffer’s theology in order to 
reveal greater insight into the latter’s thought. At the same time, it will, by placing them 
alongside, yield new insights into understanding Žižek. Foremost, it will highlight the 
fundamental role of their engagement with each other’s discipline. Thus, it will provide 
an account of and reflection upon Žižek’s engagement with theology and highlight and 
clarify the consequent theological character and persuasion of his materialism, while 
also drawing attention to Bonhoeffer’s engagement with philosophy and its fundamental 
role in the development of his thought.  
More specifically, the thesis is undertaken from the perspective of critical 
theory. The field of critical theory is distinguished by going further than merely 
applying theoretical tools to the study of phenomena in order to increase our 
understanding of them. This Western post-Marxist theory, when applied to the society 
as a whole, critiques it and seeks to bring about change (Horkheimer, 2002, pp. 188-
243). In its application of Marx’s famous dictum that ‘the philosophers have only 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it’ (Marx, 1λ75, 
p. 64), critical theory digs beneath the surface of social life and attempts to uncover the 
assumptions that keep us from understanding how ‘the world’ works, or rather, that tell 
                                                 
34
 The phenomenon of ‘cultural studies’ in general, one of the major success stories of interdisciplinary 
enquiry, is based on just that assumption – that any area of our culture is amenable to the application of 
the latest theories. 
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us how the world ‘works’, why and how these assumptions have been constructed, why 
it is impossible to imagine an alternative and how that is to be done nonetheless. In 
pursuit of this goal it fosters debate between all the major social sciences, the arts and 
the humanities, hoping to arrive at alternative accounts, interpretations and readings of 
phenomena which will produce tension within existing narratives. Thus, it is within the 
remit of critical theory that Žižek’s concept of anti-identitarian ‘struggling universality’ 
will be applied in consideration of the ‘community of saints’ Bonhoeffer explored in his 
first thesis in order to reveal greater insight into the thought expressed therein. 
Bonhoeffer’s theological arguments for true community and its form will be examined 
from Žižek’s materialist perspective, evaluating whether his arguments are unassailable 
and his conclusions are valid, particularly with regards to matters of ontology and 
identity. At the same time, however, it will be demonstrated how Bonhoeffer’s thoughts 
from Sanctorum Communio can be employed in critical social theory, thus applying 
Wayne Whitson Floyd’s observation that ‘theology for Dietrich Bonhoeffer was above 
all a form of critical theory, a style of thinking in the service of action’ (Floyd, 1λλ1, p. 
175).35  
Critical Theology  
It is in this respect that the thesis is undertaken within the interdisciplinarity of critical 
theory and theology or, rather, of an emergent ‘critical theology’. I call it emergent 
because its conception is continually developing and changing in its cultural context, 
just as critical theory itself is an ever-evolving concept. Indeed, the current embodiment 
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 This quote is taken from Whitson Floyd’s article discussing the sustained critical reflection of 
Bonhoeffer’s thought. 
  30 
 
of critical theorists whose theoretical analysis and critique of society at large is driven 
by theological convictions, such as Žižek and Alain Badiou, is distinct from its origins 
in the Frankfurt School with Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkeimer 
(1969), while still continuing its trajectory of wedding theory and praxis. In a similar 
way, critical theology is not a uniform and stable concept but is constantly evolving. Its 
touchstone can perhaps be located in Rudolf Bultmann’s theology of subjective 
existence taking into account the post-war reality and its implications (Bultmann, 1933). 
Indeed, the post-war modern theology was in general occupied with reflection upon its 
contextual ‘existence’ and this is certainly also observed with Bonhoeffer. Thus it was 
in Gareth Jones’ seminal Bultmann: Towards Critical Theology (1990) and Critical 
Theology (1λλ5), which also discussed Bonhoeffer, that the term ‘critical theology’ 
made its appearance. Jones was in pursuit of a theology reflective of its late twentieth-
century context of modernity and addressing its concerns. This thesis seeks to further 
the critically reflective character of theology Jones discussed, although in a distinctly 
postmodern context. As such it finds itself in the company of numerous and invaluable 
theological endeavours to engage with postmodern philosophy, such as Mark C. Taylor, 
Graham Ward and Jean-Luc Marion.36  
Yet the focus of this thesis is even more specific – postmodern critical theory. In 
his formative Theology and Contemporary Critical Theory (Ward, 2000b), the radical 
orthodox Graham Ward examined critical theory’s employment of theological resources 
                                                 
36
 Taylor’s Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology (1984) was one of the earliest attempts to study theology 
from the poststructuralist perspective, Ward’s Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology (1995) 
offered Barth’s doctrine of analogy as a theological reading of Derrida's economy of difference, and Jean-
Luc Marion’s God Without Being (1991) engaged in a postmodern, Heideggerian discussion of the nature 
of God. 
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in the critique of modernity but also considered the implication of that for theology as a 
discipline. This thesis seeks to contribute particularly to theology’s understanding of its 
role, position and potential in this engagement. It considers critical theology, a theology 
within the matrix of critical theory itself. Such an understanding of theology is more 
perspectival, rather than positional, challenging the socio-political constructs perceived 
as absolute and objective, while concomitantly reflecting critically upon the framework 
of theological analysis and theory production. The thesis thus welcomes the recently 
published Carl Raschke’s ground-breaking Critical Theology: Introducing an Agenda 
for an Age of Global Crisis (2016), wherein he recognises the immense consequences of 
critical theory’s appropriation of theology for theology itself and calls for naming the 
emerging genre ‘critical theology’. Raschke’s is the first work that directly attempts to 
trace the contours of this form of theological thinking by differentiating it from political 
theology. Concomitantly, Jeffrey Robbins published his own thoughts in Radical 
Theology: A Vision for Change (2016), although avoiding the term critical theology and 
instead reinventing the content and focus of radical theology. Even though this thesis 
deeply appreciates the critical character and sociological potential of their elaborating 
theology, it does not easily identify with either of these works. That is certainly the case 
with Robbins’ identification of the character of this theological thinking as postsecular 
but also with their shared conviction of its primary aim as demonstrating theology’s 
social potential. This thesis rather aims to stretch the concept of critical theology further 
by highlighting its self-reflectivity through appropriation of critical theoretical 
resources. It thus finds itself most comparable to Floyd’s Theology and the Dialectics of 
Otherness: On Reading Bonhoeffer and Adorno (1988) which, by engaging Bonhoeffer 
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and Adorno, not only contributes to the engagement between theology and critical 
theory but also examines the future of dialectical theology as a form of non-identity 
thinking that is receptive to the epistemological, social and ethical priority of 
Otherness.37 A critical theoretical challenging of the understanding of critical theology.  
It is in this multifarious and constantly developing sense of critical theology as 
‘emerging’ that this thesis is developed, located specifically at its convergence with 
critical theory. In order to further clarify the interdisciplinary, critical theological 
conviction and nature of this thesis, I will refer to Bonhoeffer’s own positioning in the 
foreword to the chosen text:  
In this study social philosophy and sociology are employed in the 
service of theology. Only through such an approach, it appears, can 
we gain a systematic understanding of the community-structure of the 
Christian church. This work belongs not to the discipline of sociology 
of religion, but to theology. The issue of a Christian social philosophy 
and sociology is a genuinely theological one, because it can be 
answered only on the basis of an understanding of the church. The 
more this investigation has considered the significance of the social 
category for theology, the more clearly has emerged the social 
intention of all the basic Christian concepts. ‘Person’, ‘primal state’, 
‘sin’, and ‘revelation’ can be fully comprehended only in reference to 
sociality [Sozialität]. If genuinely theological concepts can only be 
recognised as established and fulfilled in a special social context, then 
it becomes evident that a sociological study of the church has a 
specifically theological character (DBWE 1: p. 21).  
 
                                                 
37
 Floyd’s work is thus also in contrast to other Bonhoeffer works whose aim is primarily to demonstrate 
the sociological relevance of Bonhoeffer, such as Jeffrey Pugh’s Religionless Christianity (2008), or 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Theology Today (de Gruchy et al, 2009). Pugh applies the concept of religionless 
Christianity, which he understands as Bonhoeffer’s struggle with the deconstruction of his age, to our 
contemporary struggles. The collection of essays in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Theology Today seeks to 
appropriate Bonhoeffer’s insights to the apparent contemporary dualism of fundamentalism and 
secularism. 
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In parallel to Bonhoeffer’s employment of social philosophy in the service of theology, 
here it is critical theory that is employed in the service of theology. Only through such 
an approach, it appears, can we examine Bonhoeffer’s conception of the church as a 
community structure and its sociological implications. This thesis then belongs not to a 
clear-cut discipline of theology or indeed sociology, but is perhaps to be understood 
rather as critical theological theory which brings together concepts from various 
theoretical legacies. The issue of the sociological potential of theology is a genuinely 
critical one, because its full dimensionality can only be grasped from this 
interdisciplinary and critical perspective. The more this investigation has considered the 
significance of the social category for Bonhoeffer’s theology on the one hand, and the 
significance of the theological category for Žižek’s critical theory on the other, the more 
the specific sociological character of theology and its critical potential have emerged.  
Within its critical theological theoretical framework, this thesis will thus 
demonstrate three things: First, that this kind of critical theoretical engagement of Žižek 
and Bonhoeffer is model insofar as it understands both the nature and critical power of 
their intervention into theology or philosophy, respectively, and enters into a 
deliberation of theology as the ultimate socio-political act; second, that theology as a 
theoretical reflection can function as a powerful instrument for both sociological 
analysis and critique, as it has always suggested that another world is, in fact, possible;38 
yet third and foremost, it will demonstrate that critical theory can function as a resource 
in the necessary critical reflection on the act, content and implications of the Christian 
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 In that sense, what is witnessed in Bonhoeffer is the embodiment of this conviction and its application 
to Hegelian and Schelerian sociological concepts; what is observed in Žižek is its return in the guise of 
psychoanalysis or Post-Marxism or Hegelianism. 
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faith. In that sense, Žižek’s insights can aid the task of critical theology in evaluating the 
position, function and method of theology. 
The purpose of this thesis is thus not simply theological but rather the 
development of a critical theological perspective. Accordingly, the theory of the given 
reality of theological concepts is understood or examined from the perspective of 
critical theory. In some sense then, the thesis continues the observed trajectory of recent 
writing on critical theory and theology, while also taking the engagement further. While 
it does include reflection on how theology can be used in the service of critical theory, 
its primary focus is on how critical theory can help bring out the necessary self-
criticality of theology. Only in this way is theology able to face up to its own 
‘problems’, such as that of identity, explored in this thesis with reference to Bonhoeffer. 
As a (nascent) theologian and critical theorist, I can only hope that this study will be 
seen as a modest contribution to critical theology.  
Outline  
The thesis explores five main points:  
1. It seeks to provide a clear presentation of Žižek’s necessarily theological 
political thought resulting in a ‘struggling universality’.  
2. It examines the nature of theological engagement with Žižek thus far and 
identifies the potential thereof. 
3. It applies that potential to Bonhoeffer’s social theology of Sanctorum 
Communio, examining his engagement with social philosophy, his attempt to 
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demonstrate the sociality of theological concepts and his upholding of the 
church as a model form of community.  
4. It thus demonstrates how Žižek’s critical theory can be utilised as a resource in 
the service of critical reflection upon Bonhoeffer’s theology, while also 
showing how Bonhoeffer’s social theology can be used in the service of Žižek’s 
critical theory. 
5. It thereby contributes not only to the theological engagement with critical 
theory but, most importantly, to the development of a distinct perspective of 
critical theology.   
The thesis has two parts, each consisting of two chapters. While Part One focuses on the 
formation, contextualisation and presentation of Žižek’s political theology, Part Two 
engages it in a critical reading of Bonhoeffer’s social theology.  
I will begin in Chapter 1 with Žižek’s intellectual background, presented in three 
parts. A very brief but meaningful intellectual biography will illuminate some of the 
matters discussed in the second part of this chapter on the conceptual framework of his 
thought. Georg Hegel, Karl Marx and Jacques Lacan will be identified as the main 
philosophical forces of his thought and an outline of their more pertinent ideas will be 
given – Hegelian dialectics, Marx’s critique of capitalism and his conception of 
ideology, Lacan’s emancipation of psychoanalytic theory and his Orders – together with 
an overview of how they are employed by Žižek in his work. The last part of this 
chapter will focus on Žižek’s context of post-Marxism by way of contrast with the 
debates on postsecularity in which his voice at time appears, thus rounding off an 
introduction to his intellectual background.    
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Chapter 2 will provide an account of Žižek’s engagement with Christian 
theology, its importance for his political thought and the outcome thereof – a radical 
universalism grounded in the theology of dialectical materialism. After an introduction 
to the account, I will examine Žižek’s critique of Badiou in The Ticklish Subject (1999a) 
and the significance thereof. I will then present how he develops his own understanding 
of Christianity and the political potential of its subversive element, but only after a brief 
description of his rejection of actually existing Christianity. Next, I will look at the 
product of the theologisation of his political thought in the form of dialectical 
materialism, its overcoming of the constitutive exception and the new communality.  
Before insights from Žižek’s theological materialism can be appropriated in a 
critical reading of Bonhoeffer’s social theology, Chapter 3 will offer a necessary 
presentation of the latter’s intellectual background. After a short intellectual 
bibliography which, like its counterpart with Žižek, does not seek to provide an account 
of Bonhoeffer’s life39 but merely to demonstrate how certain biographical elements can 
further enlighten his intellectual development and contribution,40 I will situate 
Bonhoeffer’s endeavour to exegete and apply the ethical and sociological potential of 
traditional theological concepts in the context of modern theology. Finally, I will 
discuss Bonhoeffer’s intellectual formation with a specific interest. Rather than 
functioning as a general presentation of the various thinkers who have shaped or driven 
his thought, the thesis will focus on a selection of particular thinkers who, during his 
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 There are good works which pursue that particular goal, exemplified best by Eberhard Bethge. See 
Bethge (1994); Bethge (1999); and Bethge, Bethge and Gemmels (eds.) (1986). Alongside these, there are 
numerous other biographies that constitute a valuable reading, including Feldmann (1998); Robertson 
(1989); and Wind (1990). 
40
 I also do not engage in examination of or argumentation for the unity of Bonhoeffer’s life and work, for 
this would be outside the scope of this thesis.  
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studies at the Friedrich Wilhelm University in Berlin, influenced Bonhoeffer’s sustained 
engagement with philosophy: Ernst Toeltsch, Reinhold Seeberg, and Adolf von 
Harnack. It will show both how these liberal theological thinkers introduced and in a 
way projected Bonhoeffer into a dialectical engagement with social philosophical 
thinkers such as Hegel and how this distinguished his perspective from that of the 
reformed modern theologian Karl Barth.  
In Chapter 4 Žižek’s thought will be utilised in a critical reading of Bonhoeffer’s 
Sanctorum Communio. Bonhoeffer’s engagement with social philosophy therein, 
specifically Hegel, will be read alongside and considered from Žižek’s perspective in 
order to examine: (1) Bonhoeffer’s understanding, criticism and development of Hegel, 
particularly his conception of universality based upon the subject-object relationship 
and the concept of objective spirit; (2) his attempt to demonstrate the sociality of 
theological concepts of God, sin and the church; and (3) his upholding of the latter as a 
model form of community. Finally, the Žižekian reading will also enable a brief 
application of Bonhoeffer’s social forms – society, the mass and community – in 
analysis of the contemporary struggle for social change located in the revolutionary 
body.   
Works Consulted, Referencing and Translation 
This completely literature-based research interprets primary texts by making use of a 
number of sources, including books that provide an introduction to Slavoj Žižek’s 
philosophy and Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s theology, works that elucidate the main 
influences on Žižek’s philosophy as well as Bonhoeffer’s engagement with philosophy, 
their respective works and also works that serve as an introduction to them. With 
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regards to Žižek’s own works the focus will be on those within which his theological 
materialism is developed, works by academics in response to Žižek and works co-edited 
with Žižek that represent a dialogue with him. With regards to Bonhoeffer’s own works, 
the focus will be on his first doctoral dissertation Sanctorum Communio, while calling 
upon other works in the presentation of his thought. All Bonhoeffer references in this 
thesis are to the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works collection (DBWE) and will first list the 
volume number of the critical edition, followed by the page number and the eventual 
footnote in square brackets – e.g. DBWE 1: p. 111 [11].  
 Although the literature I have consulted includes works in Slovene (which is my 
mother-tongue), they are far fewer in number than I had expected. I discovered during 
the literature review that since the beginning of Žižek’s international career most of his 
work has been published in English first and only subsequently translated into Slovene. 
The Slovene articles by Žižek mentioned in the bibliography thus only repeat thoughts 
he originally developed in the English language. Furthermore, because of the sheer 
number of his publications, only a portion of his work is translated into Slovene. That is 
certainly the case with his recent works of engagement with theology, such as The 
Monstrosity of Christ and God in Pain, of which there are no translations. 
Consequently, Žižek’s engagement with theologians such as Milbank or Gunjević is 
unexplored, and limited to a few descriptive articles such as Kocijančič’s ‘Žižek in 
debata o resnici Krščanske Filozofije’ (Kocijančič, 2010). The thesis will also address 
the lack of consideration of Žižek’s academic output prior to his international career. 
This explains the absence of Slovene sources in this thesis. 
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 As part of this research I have also consulted German theological and 
philosophical works in their original language. My initial plan was to reference and 
quote the German editions, providing a translation in footnotes. However, since this is 
not primarily a philological thesis and because space is limited, I have resorted to using 
the English edition of the works in quotations. This decision was supported by the 
careful cross-referencing in the English editions of key texts, such as the Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer Works (DBWE) and the various editions of Hegel’s translations. This allows 
for an immediate location of the corresponding passage in the German edition. In the 
absence of cross-referencing, I have provided references to the latter also. Where an 
English translation is not available, I have provided a translation and have, occasionally, 
given preference to the German edition of those works, in order to emphasise a 
particular feature of the original text. 
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Chapter 1: Žižek’s Intellectual Background 
 
1.1 Žižek’s Intellectual Biography  
In this section I seek to provide a intellectual biography of Žižek. As much as I wished 
to avoid delving into biographical matters, this very brief and concise summary can 
serve to shed light on some of the matters discussed in the section on the intellectual 
background of his thought, and is therefore in my opinion meaningful. It is divided in 
two parts: the beginning and the international acclaim. 
1.1.1 The beginning 
Slavoj Žižek was born in 1λ4λ as the only child to Jože and Vesna, who were both 
bureaucrats in Ljubljana, Slovenia, which was then part of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. Even though Yugoslavia was a socialist country ruled by 
Marshal Tito (1892-1980), it was not aligned with the Eastern Bloc. Thus the political 
position of Yugoslavia that Žižek was born into was particular, with self-managing 
socialism and a non-aligned status; it had an element of ‘relative’ cultural freedom 
(compared to the communist countries in the Eastern Bloc).  
What was of particular influence on Žižek was access to the films, popular 
culture and theory of the non-communist West, which he consumed avidly in preference 
to the domestic television, books and films approved by the Community Party. Much of 
his encyclopaedic knowledge of Hollywood cinema was acquired during his teenage 
years, when he spent long hours at a theatre that specialized in showing foreign films. 
This was also the time when he devoted himself to reading foreign literature and 
  41 
 
developed an early taste for philosophy. He enrolled to read philosophy and sociology at 
the University of Ljubljana, where he read widely, no doubt aided by his linguistic 
abilities – he spoke six languages. He was principally influenced by the Marxist 
Slovenian philosopher Božidar Debenjak (1λ35- ).41 Because of Yugoslavia’s break 
with the Soviet Union in 1948, its Marxism was decidedly Western, rather than the 
philosophy of the Soviet Union. Indeed, Debenjak was one of the first to introduce the 
thought of the Frankfurt School in the curricula of Yugoslavian universities and was as 
such integral in Žižek’s turn to critical theory and also German idealism. In Debenjak's 
course Žižek read Marx's Das Kapital through the lens of Hegel's Phänomenologie des 
Geistes, a perspective which has heavily influenced his contemporary works. He 
graduated in 1971 and continued with postgraduate study reading philosophy, which he 
completed in 1975. His four-hundred-page thesis was entitled, The Theoretical and 
Practical Relevance of French Structuralism, a work which analysed the growing 
influence of the French thinkers Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva, Claude 
Lévi-Strauss and Gilles Deleuze. The superior quality of his thesis stirred up interest 
among the university's philosophy faculty, but also highlighted his stretching of Marxist 
theory.   
In 1979 he was given a post as researcher at the Institute of Sociology and 
Philosophy, University of Ljubljana, and earned his first Doctorate in Philosophy on 
German idealism. Concurrently, Žižek became part of a significant group of Slovenian 
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 His Vstop v Marksistično Filozofijo [Introduction to Marxist Philosophy] (1977) was published in four 
editions, and was one of the most influential syntheses of Marxist thought in Slovenia. He also translated 
several works, mostly from German, including several works by Karl Marx (especially young 
Marx), Friedrich Engels, Rosa Luxemburg, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Karl 
Korsch, Lenin, Jürgen Habermas and Martin Luther. He also translated Hegel's Phenomenology of the 
Mind and co-authored one of the most comprehensive Slovene-German dictionaries. 
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scholars working on the theories of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901-
1981) and with whom he went on to found the Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis in 
Ljubljana. This group, among whose best-known members are Mladen Dolar and 
Žižek's second wife Renata Salecl (b. 1λ62), established editorial control over a journal 
called Problemi and began to publish a book series called Analecta . In 1981 he also 
travelled to Paris, together with Dolar, at the invitation of Jacques-Alain Miller, Lacan’s 
son-in-law, who held an exclusive, thirty-student seminar at the École de la Cause 
Freudienne in which he examined the works of Lacan on a page-by-page basis. It was at 
this seminar, where Žižek and Dolar were the only representatives from Eastern Europe, 
that Žižek developed his understanding of the later works of Lacan. Miller procured a 
teaching fellowship for him at the Université Paris-VIII and it was here that Žižek 
finished his second Doctorate on a Lacanian reading of Hegel, Marx and Kripke.  
In the same decade, after Tito’s death in 1λκ0, there was a growing political 
opposition and a push for greater independence by the federation’s constituent republics 
of Yugoslavia – among them Slovenia. Žižek returned to Slovenia and became a regular 
columnist for a paper called Mladina , which served as a platform for the growing 
democratic opposition to the gradually diminishing communist regime, in particular its 
policies of increasing militarization towards Slovenian society. He withdrew his 
membership of the Communist Party together with thirty-two other public intellectuals 
in 1988, during the JBTZ protest – a protest against the political trial in a military court 
of those involved in Mladina’s publishing of articles critical of the Yugoslavian army, 
and became involved with a civil rights initiative, called the Committee for the Defence 
of Human Rights. Indeed, the political opposition in Slovenia was theoretically driven 
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by the previously mentioned group of scholars influenced by Althusser, Foucault and 
Lacan, of which Žižek was a key member.42 The group’s orientation was philosophical 
and political, discussing theories of ideology and power, aided by German idealist 
thinkers and popular culture. Out of the civil rights initiative, they cofounded and 
actively supported the Slovenian Liberal Democratic Party (LDS) and developed 
particular interests in feminist and environmental issues, as well as preventing the right-
wing nationalists from seizing power. Žižek himself stood as a presidential candidate 
for LDS in Slovenia’s first multi-party elections in 1990, but narrowly missed out. 
However, this result was insignificant for Žižek’s academic career, since he was already 
attracting international attention and his productivity only increased.  
Unfortunately, the period of Žižek’s intellectual formation during his studies at 
the University of Lubljana (1967-1981) and his academic activity prior to his emergence 
on the international stage with the publication of The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989) 
has to date not been given appropriate consideration. Thus there is no investigation of 
what I believe to be the principal influence of the Marxist Slovenian philosopher 
Božidar Debenjak (1λ35- ), the existential phenomenologist Tine Hribar (1941- ), who 
was Žižek’s collaborator in the late 1970s, or the nihilist phenomenologist Ivan 
Urbančič (1λ30- ), who in 1λ7λ employed Žižek at the University’s Institute for 
Sociology and Philosophy. Thus his post-doctoral period, marked by a continuing 
pursuit of a Hegelian reading of Marx and engagement thereof with the thought of 
Lacan remains unexplored. There is no consideration of his major works that 
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 See Mackendrick in Winquist and Taylor (2001, pp. 371-372). Ernesto Laclau also describes the 
‘Slovenian Lacanian School’ in his preface to Žižek’s The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989). However, 
the definitive work discussing the emergence of the Slovenian Lacan is Irwin and Moloh’s Žižek and his 
Contemporaries (2014).  
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demonstrate and arguably define the development of his philosophy, such as Bolečina 
Razlike [The Pain of Différance] (1971), Znak, označitelj, pismo [Sign, Signifier, 
Writing] (1976), Hegel in označevalec [Hegel and the Signifier] (1980), Zgodovina in 
nezavedno [History and the Unconscious] (1982), Birokratija i Uživanje [Bureaucracy 
and Enjoyment] and Filozofija skozi psihoanalizo I [Philosophy through 
Psychoanalysis] (1984), Problemi teorije fetišizma [Problems of Fetishism Theory] 
(1985), Hegel in objekt  [Hegel and the Object] (1986), Jezik, ideologija, Slovenci 
[Language, Ideology, Slovenes] (1987) and Druga smrt Josipa Broza Tita  [The Second 
Death of Josip Broz Tito] (1989).43 Little or no consideration is given either to Žižek’s 
numerous articles in journals from the ‘Slovene’ period, particularly his editorial 
contributions to Problemi44 and Slovene newspapers such as Delo, Dnevnik, and 
Mladina , through which he communicated his political critique. Research with this 
focus would enable exploration not only of the political implications but also of 
applications of his philosophy, as these articles provide a theoretical framework of his 
political engagement, particularly in the eighties and nineties, such as his involvement 
with the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights or his presidential candidacy.  
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 In order to fill the lacuna, these key texts would first need to be translated. A good place to start would 
be with his first work on Heidegger and language, Bolečina razlike (1971), which he later cast aside. The 
next milestone is probably his doctoral thesis, Hegel in označevalec (1980), which brought together all 
the topics still present in his work, and Zgodovina in nezavedno (1982), where he engaged in an analysis 
of the historical shifts of the last two centuries. The works would then need to be examined against the 
background of or with reference to thinkers such as Debenjak, who influenced or even ‘determined’ 
(positively or negatively) the development of his thought and especially his focus on Marx, Hegel and 
Lacan. 
44
 The Journal of the Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis, established in Ljubljana in 1982, is devoted 
to the conceptual development of psychoanalytic theory in its philosophical applications. 
  45 
 
1.1.2 International acclaim  
Žižek’s first published book in English was The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989), 
which, as the culmination of his research, sought to provide a reading of the German 
idealist philosopher Hegel through the prism of Lacan's psychoanalytic thought, 
revolving around the idea of the Other. Since then, Žižek has published over two dozen 
books, edited several collections, published numerous philosophical and political 
articles and contributed to various collections. He has also written in German, French 
and Slovene, and has had his work translated into some twenty languages. At all times 
his works revolve around Hegelian philosophy and Lacan’s theoretical psychoanalysis, 
with increasing post-Marxist political intent and delivered through an analysis of 
popular culture. In 1997 the influential British literary critic Terry Eagleton published a 
review of several of Žižek’s works in the London Review of Books and described his 
books as having ‘an enviable knack of making Kant or Kierkegaard sound riotously 
exciting; his writing bristles with difficulties but never serves up a turgid sentence’ 
(Eagleton, 1997, p. 49). He concluded that Žižek’s The Ticklish Subject ‘is a magisterial 
work from one of the major philosophers of our age — though most English 
philosophers have probably never heard of him’ (ibid., p. 51). Working at a remarkable 
speed of two, three and sometimes more books per year in addition to his articles and 
other contributions, his international reputation grew speedily and he was invited around 
the world to deliver public lectures and seminars. At the same time offers of teaching 
positions were also frequent, especially in the United States, where Žižek gained a 
strong following in cultural studies departments.  However, he turned them all down 
and instead chose appointments as a visiting scholar and often spent much of the year 
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traveling from one academic centre to another.45 Žižek's lectures began to attract large 
crowds of young intellectuals; police had to be called to one of his appearances at a 
Lower Manhattan art gallery after the shutout portion of an overflow crowd that had 
been shut out began banging on the building's windows, demanding admission. He 
produced two documentaries with Sophie Fiennes, The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema 
(2006) and its sequel, The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology (2013), as well as being the 
subject of Astra Taylor’s Žižek! (2005).   
In the last 20 years Žižek has participated in over 350 international 
philosophical, psychoanalytical and cultural-criticism symposia in the USA, France, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Iceland, Austria, 
Australia, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Spain, Brazil, Mexico, 
Israel, Romania, Hungary and Japan. Today he is perhaps one of the most well-known 
contemporary philosophers and cultural critics and speaks to socio-political issues 
around the globe, often in the company of other prominent contemporary philosophers. 
Be it at the “Occupy” movement protesting in Wall Street against the moral bankruptcy 
of Western Capitalism (Žižek, 2011), or speaking to the Greek “new left” party Siriza to 
seek a way out of the ever-deepening Greek economic crisis (Žižek, 2012c), or 
expressing support for the 2010 UK student protests against spending cuts to further 
education and an increase of the cap on tuition fees, or encouraging the critical thinking 
of students in South America disillusioned by the corrupt leadership of their countries, 
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 He has been a visiting professor at the Centre for the Study of Psychoanalysis and Art, SUNY Buffalo 
(1991-2), the Department of Comparative Literature, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis (1992), t 
Tulane University, New Orleans (1993), Cardozo Law School, New York (1994), Columbia University, 
New York (1995), Princeton University (1996), the New School for Social Research, New York (1997), 
the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (1998) and Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (1999).  
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or discussing problems arising from the “Arab Spring” revolution, Žižek’s speeches on 
radical change are highly sought after, noted and analysed for import. 
In the middle of the new millennium’s first decade Žižek joined the European 
Graduate School as a lecturer for the intensive summer school seminars and accepted 
the position of International Director of Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, 
University of London.  
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1.2 Žižek’s Conceptual Framework  
As already noted in his intellectual biography, Žižek’s work draws on three main areas 
of influence: philosophy, politics and psychoanalysis.46 Each of these areas is largely 
represented by the writings of a single individual: Georg Hegel for philosophy, Karl 
Marx for politics and Jacques Lacan for psychoanalysis. The ideas, methodologies and 
general effect of each thinker overlap in Žižek’s work and together they furnish the 
conceptual framework with which he tackles the objects of his analysis, including 
theology. The aim of this section, therefore, is to provide an outline of some of the more 
pertinent ideas proposed by Hegel, Marx and Lacan, as they are employed by Žižek in 
his work.  
1.2.1 Hegel according to Žižek and vice versa 
Traditionally, the work of Georg Hegel47 (1770-1831) represented the culmination of 
Western idealism, a system of philosophy which sought to examine the world in terms 
of ideas about it. Its philosophers argued that the material world does not exist 
independently of the ideas the mind has about it, thus making consciousness the 
foundation for reality.  
Žižek’s understands Hegel as occupying a central position in the Western 
tradition of metaphysics because his work falls precisely between the speculative 
idealism of Johann G. Fichte (1762-1814), in which all matter issues from the idea, and 
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 The synthesis of these three sources represents the scaffolding of the Frankfurt School and thus critical 
theory in general. While Herbert Marcuse (1955) introduced a combination of Hegel and Marx, Erich 
Fromm (1941) added his expertise on psychoanalysis.  
47
 For a general introduction to Hegel, see Houlgate’s Freedom, Truth and History (1991). Hegel’s own 
most detailed exposition of the dialectic is found in Vol. 6: Wissenschaft der Logik II of Hegel’s Werke in 
zwanzig Bänden (1983). The best work to read for Žižek’s position on Hegel is perhaps Less Than 
Nothing (Žižek, 2012a). 
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the speculative materialism of Friedrich W. J. Schelling (1775-1854), in which the 
absolute contingency of existence is accepted and yet the radically contingent nature of 
that existence itself gives rise to further speculation about its own nature. This complex 
relationship between the subject and the object of existence, between that which exists 
and the understanding that we have of that which exists, is at the centre of Hegel's 
investigations, who, for Žižek, is a thinker whose focus is not on fixed, static meanings 
or structures, but on the process of conceptual transformation itself.  
1.2.1.1 The influence of Kojève 
It should be noted at this point that, although Žižek’s early work was in German 
philosophy,48 his reading of German idealists was radically reorganised by his encounter 
with the intellectual debates of twentieth-century French philosophy. There Hegel was a 
pivotal figure, not as the founding point of German idealism and phenomenology, but as 
a philosopher of history and subjectivity. This transformation occurred in the 1930s in 
philosophical seminars by the Russian-born French philosopher and statesman 
Alexandre Kojève, whose integration of Hegelian concepts into continental philosophy 
had an immense influence on 20th-century French philosophy.49  
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 Žižek’s first book was on Heidegger and Language; see Žižek (1λλλa), p.13. Although Žižek does not 
state it himself, he is referring to Bolečina razlike (1972). This work on philosophy of Différance was a 
Heidegger-Derridean exercise, which he later cast aside. 
49
 For Kojève’s understanding of Hegel, see Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (1969). The seminars 
were regularly attended by many of the French intellectuals who shaped debates around structuralism and 
phenomenology after WWII, such as Raymond Queneau, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Georges Bataille, 
André Breton, Raymond Aron and Jacques Lacan. For example, the latter’s mirror stage theory was 
highly influenced by Kojève’s interpretation of Hegelian master-slave dialectic. For Lacan, following 
Kojève, human subjectivity is defined first and foremost by desire. It is the experience of lack, the twin of 
the experience of desire, that provides the ontological condition of subject formation.  
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Kojève interpreted Hegel by reading his theory of consciousness through the 
lens of both Marx’s materialism and Heidegger’s temporalized50 ontology of human 
being. For Hegel, human history is the history of thought as it attempts to understand 
itself and its relation to the world (Hegel, 1970a, pp. 28ff [1998, pp. 44ff]). He 
postulates that history began with unity, into which man emerges, as a questioning 
subject, introducing dualisms and splits. Man attempts to heal these sequences of 
‘alienations’ dialectically, and drives history forwards, but in so doing causes new 
divisions which must then be overcome. Kojève takes this idea of universal historical 
process and reads it affirmatively, as an intersubjective dialectic heading towards 
reconciliation and towards unity, and synthesizes it with theories of Karl Marx and 
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). From Marx he takes a secularised, de-theologised, and 
productivist philosophical anthropology, one that places the transformative activity of a 
desiring being centre stage in the historical process. From Heidegger, he takes the 
existentialist interpretation of human being as free, negative, and radically temporal. 
Pulling the three together, Kojève presents a vision of human history in which man 
grasps his freedom to produce himself and his world in pursuit of his desires, and in 
doing so drives history toward its end (understood both as culmination or exhaustion 
and its goal or completion). 
1.2.1.2 Žižek’s understanding of Hegelian dialectics 
Influenced by this Kojèvian reinterpretation of Hegel, Žižek then pushes it even further 
and avoids simple reconciliation by emphasising the perpetual tension or negativity. Far 
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 In discussing Being as a question, Heidegger uses the expression Dasein to denote man’s 
embeddedness and immersion in the concrete of the world. A human being then cannot be taken into 
account except as being existent in the middle of a world amongst other things. In that sense Da-sein is 
‘to be there’ – in the world.  
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from the usual received image (see Pinkard, 2000, ix) of Hegel as a celebrant of the 
World Spirit unfolding and revealing itself as fully-formed in the Prussian State, he is 
primarily a revolutionary spirit who opens up theoretical systems and for whom the 
moments of fracture that make critical thought possible are enduring dialectical points 
of impossibility.51 Thus for Žižek he is the most profound theorist of dialectical 
difference.  
Hegel’s method of dialectical thinking, as the process of unfolding universal 
history, was adapted from the early Greek philosophers Zeno (490 – 430 BC) and 
Socrates (470 – 399 BC). For them the dialectics was a method of seeking knowledge 
by a system of question and answer.52 For Hegel, however, the dialectics became much 
more – the secret propulsion of history. It is at times understood in terms of an over-
simplified three-step process, as expounded by Singer in his Hegel (1983, pp. 75- 83), 
but also asserted earlier by Hegel scholars, such as John McTaggart (1896) and Walter 
Terence Stace (1924). This process begins with a thesis, or an idea, which is then 
countered with an antithesis, or a qualification of that idea. Both are then combined into 
a synthesis, which is a larger and more encompassing idea. This dialectic process brings 
the two theses together into a higher unity that incorporates the element of truth from 
each position, while overcoming the contradictions internal to each.  
However, Hegel’s dialectical method has little to do with this way of presenting 
in the three dialectical stages of Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis. Gustav Mueller, the 
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 In this sense Žižek’s reading of Hegel is not dissimilar to that of Gillian Rose, who argues that Hegel’s 
Phenomenology is not a dominating absolute knowledge, but a gamble. See Rose’s Hegel Contra 
Sociology, (1λκ1, p. 15λ). Žižek himself acknowledges Rose’s interpretation of Hegel in For They Know 
Not What They Do (1991a, p.103).    
52
 In this model each question was refined by the previous answer. 
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author of a number of works on Hegel, who, in his essay ‘The Hegel Legend of “Thesis-
Antithesis-Synthesis”’ (Mueller, 1λλ6, pp. 301-305), traced the origin of this 
understanding back to Marx, who inherited it from the German philosopher Heinrich M. 
Chalybäus (1796-1862), who, in his Historische Entwicklung der Speculativen 
Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel (1843), characterised Hegel’s dialectic as positing the 
triad. Hegel himself never used that specific formulation, but ascribed that terminology 
to Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), whose work on the synthesis model was greatly 
elaborated and popularised by Johann G. Fichte (1762 – 1814) in his Grundlage der 
gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (1956). Instead, Hegel himself used a three-valued 
logical model of Abstract, Negative and Concrete, which denote the stages of the 
organic method whereby presuppositionless thought freely and necessarily determines 
itself. In his own words, ‘the concrete totality which makes the beginning possesses as 
such, within it, the beginning of the advance and development’ (Hegel, 1λκ3, p. 557/ 
2010, p. 40). It is by means of the dialectical principle, Hegel argues, that apparently 
stable thoughts reveal their inherent instability by turning into their opposites and then 
into new, more complex thoughts. The thesis-antithesis-synthesis formula does not 
explain why the thesis requires an antithesis, whereas Hegel’s own formula clearly 
shows that contradiction or negations do not come from the outside, but are inherent and 
internal to things themselves. This is the central aspect of Hegelian dialectics.  
The Hegel that we encounter in Žižek’s thought is certainly the philosopher of 
contradiction. His system is not only full of apparent contradictions but is itself based 
on the recognition that contradiction is the fundamental starting point of all philosophy, 
and indeed of all thought (Žižek, 1λκλ, p. 6). Correspondingly, the idea about something 
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is always disrupted by a discrepancy and the result is not absolute knowledge conceived 
as full and transparent, but a realisation that ‘absolute knowledge itself is nothing but a 
name for the acknowledgment of a certain radical loss’ (Žižek, 1λκλ, p. 7). In other 
words, the tension is never fully resolved. In this way the Concrete does not overcome 
the negativity of the Negative, but rather radicalises it to such a degree that it no longer 
appears as a negation. Žižek calls Hegel’s negation of negation a ‘repetition at its 
purest: in the first move a certain gesture is accomplished and fails; then, in the second 
move, this same gesture is simply repeated’ (1λλλa, p. 74).  
According to Hegel, the dialectical aspects or stages do not form distinct parts of 
logic, nor are they sharply contrasted with each other. They are related to each other in 
the sense that the second aspect is the negation of the first, and the third the negation of 
the second – the negation of the negation (Hegel, 1969a, p. 51 [2010, p. 121]; 1970b, 
pp. 65-66 [1977, p. 22]; 1970c, pp. 190f, 263f [2010, pp. 96f, 132f]). While the second 
element is the opposite of the first and the third element is in some sense the unity of 
these two opposites, it is not a simple, formal unity, but rather the unity of distinct 
determinations (Hegel, 1970c, p. 263f [2010, 132f]). Therefore, each element can be 
defined only in terms of the other – the contrast between them (Hegel, 1983, pp. 54ff 
[2010, pp. 361ff]). Accordingly, each element must always pass through the phase of 
the negative, and Hegel designates this movement with the word Aufhebung, translated 
into English as ‘sublation’, which carries connotations of both negation and elevation. 
For Hegel, the truth regarded as absolute must continually be discarded; but, in being 
discarded, it must at the same time be taken up afresh and raised up into a higher unity. 
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In other words, it is the affirmation of a truth that turns into a denial and then again into 
a transcending of both affirmation and denial. 
1.2.1.3 Dialectics as the methodological key to Žižek’s thought 
An example to illustrate Žižek’s dialectical thinking can be found in The Puppet and the 
Dwarf, in which Žižek attempts to explain his understanding of the doctrine of 
atonement, or the transformation of the condition through Christ. He lays out what he 
claims are two widely held positions:  
The first approach is legalistic: there is guilt to be paid for, and, by 
paying our debt for us, Christ redeemed us (and, of course, thereby 
forever indebted us); from the [second] participationist perspective, on 
the contrary, people are freed from sin not by Christ’s death as such, but 
by sharing in Christ’s death, by dying to sin, to the way of the flesh 
(2003, p. 102). 
 
These two perspectives, according to Žižek, are perhaps more familiar as the traditional 
(or conservative) view and the liberal view of the meaning of the Cross. The latter 
‘tends to deny the direct divine nature of Christ’ (ibid., p. 103), presenting him as more 
of a model to follow.  In an attempt to decide between the two, he states:  
In the abstract, of course, the participationist reading is the correct one, 
while the sacrificial reading ‘misses the point’ of Christ’s gesture; the 
only way to the participationist reading, however, is through the 
sacrificial one, through its inherent overcoming. The sacrificial reading is 
the way Christ’s gesture appears within the very horizon that Christ 
wanted to leave behind, within the horizon for which we die in 
identifying with Christ (ibid.).53 
 
                                                 
53
 Žižek’s presentation of the historic understanding of atonement as crude dualism, whatever one makes 
of it, is not completely arbitrary, since what he describes here is essentially a recognition of the Christian 
approach to salvation, which, while complex, lies in two different areas. In the first place, salvation is 
understood to be grounded in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ; in the second, the specific 
shape of salvation within the Christian tradition is itself formed by Christ – Jesus Christ provides a model 
or paradigm for the redeemed life.  
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Here Žižek is making one of his most characteristic dialectical moves, pointing out a 
‘mistake’ that is nonetheless a necessary step in arriving at the correct position. In this 
specific case, the legalistic approach is clearly incorrect, and in fact Žižek argues that if 
we stay within its frame, ‘Christ’s death cannot but appear as the ultimate assertion of 
the law […] which burdens us, its subjects, with guilt, and with a debt we will never be 
able to repay’ (ibid.). However, if we attempt to skip directly to the other position, that 
position loses its punch.54 The true meaning of Christ’s death is not immediately the call 
for participation, but rather the break with the legalistic view, which opens up the space 
for participation in a new kind of social collective outside the logic of debt and 
repayment. In other words, the death of Christ on the Cross is considered as important 
as the call for participation. Indeed, the call for participation is not possible without the 
death of Christ on the Cross. Therefore, the participation perspective, properly 
conceived, is a kind of embodiment of the break with the legalistic perspective enacted 
by Christ’s death on the Cross. It is this very negativity that provides the Cross its 
power. 
This example perfectly illustrates Žižek’s dialectical understanding, through 
which the concretization is found in the contradiction rather than the smoothing out of 
differences. This at-first-sight oxymoronic style of thinking is indicative of the whole 
approach to thinking that Žižek calls dialectical and which he employs when analysing 
everything, including Christian theology, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter. 
This approach then helps to account for the surprising title with which he describes 
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 Here too Žižek recognises that the atonement is a very rich concept, and that it is impossible to 
adequately describe what happened or what happens in the atonement with one clear figure of speech or 
analogy. 
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himself – a Christian atheist, or materialist Christian, and provides insight into such 
statements as the Christian tradition should be cherished by Marxism.55 What this 
means is that the identification of Žižek’s dialectical arguments is one of the most 
important ways to understand what he is saying, without which one is unable to follow 
his arguments. 
1.2.2 Marx, Marxism and Žižek  
In the preface to The Žižek Reader, Žižek professes himself as ‘unabashedly Marxist’ 
(Wight and Wright, 1999, x), someone who is convinced about the truth and value of 
Marx’s critique of capitalism and believes in the possibility of a better, alternative 
method of organising society. So, while Hegel’s dialectic functions as the method of 
thought that Žižek practices, Marx’s critique of capitalism presents the very grounds or 
motivation for why Žižek writes at all. In addition to Marx himself, Žižek also works 
with, or draws upon, two important groups of the broader Marxist tradition: the 
theoretical tradition of Western Marxism56 and the revolutionary tradition. For the latter 
Žižek’s focus is on its founder, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1κ70-1925), and his role as the 
strategist of the revolution or radical openness,57  while for the earlier it is formatively 
on Louis Pierre Althusser (1918-1990), on the topic of how the capitalist society 
propagates its existence.58 Essentially then, his work can be understood as a contribution 
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 Indeed, this is the main thought behind The Fragile Absolute (Žižek, 2000b). 
56
 Due to Yugoslavia’s break with the Soviet Union in 1λ4κ there was hardly any Soviet-style dialectical 
materialism taught philosophically. Instead, it was Western Marxism, focused on the Frankfurt School 
and critical theory, which has been dominant in Slovenia since the 1λ70s and which influences Žižek. 
57
 An example of Žižek’s attempt to retrieve something radical in the history of Marxist thought from the 
debris of Eastern European Stalinism is his ‘Repeating Lenin’ (http://www.lacan.com/replenin.htm), 
which brings together a selection of Lenin’s writings from 1λ17, and reappears in Welcome to the Desert 
of the Real (Žižek, 2002a, p. 89). 
58
 See 1.2.2.3. 
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to the Marxist59 body of criticism, which attempts to alter the way in which the world is 
understood in order that it might be changed for the better. 
1.2.2.1 Žižek and Marx 
Karl Marx (1818-1883), regarded as the father of modern communism, was trained as a 
philosopher and was a student of Hegel, but later became his critic and turned towards 
economics and politics. Indeed, Marx understood the whole of human history as 
depending on the material and economic conditions of human life.60 For him human is 
basically not a contemplative but an active being, this activity being primarily the 
material one of production. As such, manual labour becomes the fundamental form of 
human work, and human work is the ontological essence of man. This is the ground of 
Marx’s critique of the capitalist economic system as allowing the minority to 
accumulate vast wealth by oppressing the majority,61 which becomes alienated not only 
from its product, but from its fellow human beings and also its ontological self.62 What 
he understood as even more disturbing was the concealment, promotion and ratification 
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 This assertion is not at odds with my understanding of Žižek as a post-Marxist, as described in 1.3. I am 
merely understanding his motivation as essentially Marxist. 
60
 Marx’s first fully developed materialist conception of history appeared in his ‘Ökonomisch-
philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1κ44’ (Marx, 1967-1968, pp. 465-588). Later, together with 
Engels, he returned to the subject in ‘Die deutsche Ideologie’ (Marx and Engels, 1λ6λ, pp. 5-530). 
61
 For a clear exposition of Marx’s critique of political economy, see David Harvey’s The Limits to 
Capital (2006). 
62
 In ‘Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844’ (1967-1968), Marx famously 
depicts the workers under capitalism as suffering from four types of alienated labour. First, they are 
alienated from the product, which as soon as it is created is taken away from its producer –  they are the 
victim of the productive system and what they produce is not theirs. Second, they are alienated in 
productive activity, or work, which is experienced as torment. Third, workers are alienated from species-
being, for humans produce blindly and not in accordance with their truly human powers. Finally, they are 
alienated from other human beings, where the relation of exchange replaces the satisfaction of mutual 
need. Therefore, man alienates self in the objective product of labour. The specialised labour categories of 
capitalism further distort social relationships, so that man is only related to another through money, 
ownership and property, through which individuality is expressed. This, Marx argues, is the demonic 
nature of capitalism which imposes a structure on human relationship, resulting in labour, mankind’s 
distinct activity, no longer being meaningful and free, merely a means of survival. See also Kolakowski’s 
‘The Alienation of Labour. Dehumanised Man’ (1λκ1, pp. 13κ-141).  
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of these injustices by the cultural, political and legal framework of society – what he 
called the superstructure. This superstructure was mostly determined by the ruling 
minority who benefited from oppression and inequality. Marx therefore proposed an 
alternative system to capitalism, in which there would be no division or inequality, but a 
communal context through the abolition of private property, co-operative production 
meeting everyone’s needs, and where each individual would be allowed to realise his or 
her creative potential. He called this system communism.  
Žižek’s thought is certainly of Marxist motivation, although, out of his main 
sources, Marx is the one with whom Žižek has perhaps the most complicated 
relationship. On the one hand Marx is a decisive influence on his politics, but on the 
other, Marx is the least authoritative. While Hegel and Lacan are always ‘right’ (when 
properly interpreted), Marx is sharply criticised on a crucial point: not being radical 
enough (Žižek, 2012a, pp. 257-258). The fundamental capitalist truth of unleashed 
productivity, Žižek argues, was misrecognised as something independent of the concrete 
capitalist social formation, where capitalism and communism function as its two 
different historical realisations. ‘Instrumental reason as such is capitalist, grounded in 
capitalist relations, and “really existing socialism” failed because it was ultimately a 
subspecies of capitalism, an ideological attempt to “have one's cake and eat it”; to break 
out of capitalism while retaining its key ingredient’ (ibid., p. 257). In other words, Marx 
and the twentieth-century communist project failed because it allowed the possibility 
that communism could arise out of capitalism, rather than realising a complete break. In 
that sense Žižek considers Marx's notion of the communist society as the inherent 
capitalist fantasy attempting to resolve the observed capitalist antagonisms. He therefore 
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calls for a repetition of the Marxist critique of political economy without the utopic 
expectation that communism is its inherent outcome, or longing for a return to a pre-
modern notion of a balanced society.  
1.2.2.2 Žižek and Marxist critique of ideology 
As far as the post-Marxist Žižek is concerned, traditional Marxism possessed a solid 
grasp of the mechanics of society, but it had very little to offer in the way of 
understanding the workings of individuals. Marx described that which enables 
continuous exploitation of the majority proletariat by the ruling class as ideology – a 
system of ideas that an economic theory is based upon. This system, consisting of the 
religious, artistic, moral and philosophical beliefs contained within society, he argued, is 
always within the domain of the ruling class. Thus the alienated man relates to the real 
world in and through the prism of a construction. However, providing an explanation of 
how exactly ideology functions rather than merely a negative definition of ideology has 
proved challenging for the Marxist tradition.  
A very crude understanding of ideology proposes that it is simply an incorrect 
way of thinking about things, or that it has to do more with the way in which facts are 
interpreted, rather than simply mistaking them. In this way György Lukács (1885-1971), 
in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (1968, pp. 42-46), described ideology as a 
projection of the class consciousness of the ruling class, preventing the proletariat from 
attaining consciousness of its revolutionary position. It could therefore be understood as 
a kind of error in perception, which can be corrected by further thought. However, as 
Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) pointed out, Marxism had failed to consider how 
ideology works to make itself unrecognizable as such (Gramsci, 1971). It does so not 
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only through economic and political control, but actually persuades the whole of society 
that a prevailing ideology (protecting the dominant class) is really the only natural and 
normal way of thinking. According to this understanding, ideology is a means of 
describing the very horizon of thought itself, where despite contrary arguments, it is 
unfeasible to think of things in another way. By the same token, post-Marxists such as 
Žižek argue that capitalism has today become the horizon of our thought and that we are 
therefore unable to conceive of an alternative way of organising society.63 Ideology in 
this sense is not something that can be escaped by further thought, as it represents the 
very limit of thought. This development of the theory of ideology from Marx through 
Lukacs to Gramsci frames its perception in Marxist thought, but does little to explain its 
workings.  
1.2.2.3 Žižek and post-Marxist critique of ideology 
It was Louis Althusser (1918-1990) who, agreeing with Gramsci that ideology works 
most effectively at the level of ideas, sought to provide an explanation of how ideology 
functions. In his influential essay, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ 
(Althusser, 1971, pp. 121-173), he argued that ideology as a system of belief contains 
internal contradictions and requires a strategy of force to disguise them. It is therefore 
disseminated by the ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ (such as the Churches, the 
education system, the family unit, the legal system, the political system, the media and 
culture) and maintained by the ‘Repressive State Apparatus’ (such as the police force 
and prisons). Ideology interpellates or hails us, we respond in reflex-like fashion, acting 
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 For example, in the documentary Žižek! (2005), directed by Astra Taylor, Žižek claims that ‘it is much 
easier to imagine the end of all life on earth than a much more modest radical change in capitalism’. The 
trick of the hegemony is thus to persuade the whole of society that a prevailing ideology, the very one 
which in fact protects the dominant class, is really the only natural and normal way of thinking.  
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as required and remain captive. It is then a part of the relationship between the 
individual and society, where people respond consciously to ideology, but the latter is 
itself unconscious.64  
It is exactly at this point that Žižek makes his most telling contribution to the 
Marxist tradition.65 He agrees with Althusser that ideology is the way in which 
individuals understand their relationship to society, but provides a considerable 
supplement. The State Apparatuses, Žižek argues, are mechanisms that not only 
generate belief in a particular system, but do so before the subjects are even aware of it 
– they unconsciously pre-empt our belief and thereby habituate us to it. He explicates 
this with the help of Pascal’s Wager argument (Žižek, 1λκλ, pp. 36-40). If someone is 
struggling to believe, Pascal recommends simply acting like a Christian, i.e. engaging in 
Christian practices, for belief will follow soon enough. In the same way, the Ideological 
State Apparatuses work irrespective of whether individuals believe in them or not, 
simply by an individual’s obedience.  
In this way the Slovenian cultural critic challenges the assumption that ideology 
is a ‘conspiracy’ by counter-proposing that we are all as individuals complicit in its 
operation (ibid., p. 2λ). The radical nature of Žižek’s claim here should not be 
overlooked – we are all aware of the gaps and contradictions in ideology, but we turn a 
blind eye to them most of the time. Ideology then succeeds – not because it interpellates 
us and we react reflexively (as Althusser) – but because we want it to succeed. We want 
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 Insofar as it is how people relate to society, Gramsci argues, ideology will always exist, even in a 
classless society. This is contra Marx, who suggests that in such a society its appearance will be equal to 
its essence. 
65
 Žižek’s analysis of subjectivity as an ideological process is the main burden of The Sublime Object of 
Ideology (1989), which was published in the Laclau-Mouffe series of post-Marxist books reworking the 
Left project in terms of ‘radical and plural democracy’. 
  62 
 
to believe that we live under a consistent system of belief, and therefore interpolate 
ourselves to make it seem so. It is therefore us who fill in the gaps and disguise the 
contradictions, not some political elite on our behalf.  
Taking to the realm of ideas and culture, or the superstructure, Žižek seeks to re-
appropriate our perception of it as that which secures the perpetuation of the existing 
economic organisation. His treatise of subjects such as Hollywood, religious perversion, 
taboo topics and day-to-day activities, has brought about much interest in his assertion 
that our acceptance of them as routine demonstrates our assent to the capitalist 
ideology.66 Žižek found the theory of the instinctive and psychological processes that 
are the ground where ideology functions in none other than the French psychoanalyst 
Jacques Lacan.  
1.2.3 Žižek and Lacan  
The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901-1981)67 controversially redrafted the 
core concepts of the founder of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) in order to 
retrieve the truth about psychoanalysis as something reaching beyond the constraints of 
its discipline and in this way brought it into contact with the dominant philosophical 
schools of his time. Lacan is perhaps the most visible authority for Žižek – indeed, one 
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 This is aptly illustrated in the documentary The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology (2012), directed by Sophie 
Fiennes, in which Žižek appears in the scenes of various movies, pieces of music and day-to-day 
activities, exploring and exposing the ideological framework of our society.  
67
 For a clear introduction to Lacan that is broadly in line with Žižek, see The Lacanian Subject (Fink, 
1995). The bulk of Žižek’s references to Lacan are drawn from his seminars. Foremost among them are 
Seminar XX on feminine sexuality (Lacan, 2000); Seminar VII (Lacan, 1997) on ethics, which includes 
Lacan’s reading of Romans 7; and Seminar XI (Lacan, 1998), presenting the fundamental concepts of 
psychoanalysis.   
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of his main ambitions has been to provide a preliminary understanding of Lacan, to 
explain his theories.68 He describes this ambition in an interview as follows:  
My most secret dream is to write an old-fashioned, multi-volume theological 
tract on Lacanian theory in the style of Aquinas. I would examine each of 
Lacan’s theories in a completely dogmatic way, considering the arguments for 
and against each statement and then offering a commentary. I would be 
happiest if I could be a monk in my cell, with nothing to do but write my 
Summa Lacaniana (Boyton, 2001).  
 
The task of explaining Lacan is complicated due to the latter’s confusing style of 
writing, which is full of puns, Hegelian allusions and conceptual interplays, where 
theoretical divergences from psychoanalytic theory and philosophical theory occur.69 
Žižek has, in his tireless effort to clarify and elaborate Lacan’s thought, manifested in 
the numerous works from The Sublime Object of Ideology onwards, brought about a 
popularity of Lacanian psychoanalysis, which is much broader and more ambitious than 
the traditional conception of psychoanalysis. In that narrow conception, psychoanalysis 
is a field of knowledge that comprises a method for treating neurotic patients and a set 
of theories about mental processes. As conceived by Lacan and extrapolated by Žižek, 
psychoanalysis has a distinctive view of symptoms, diagnosis and clinical structure, and 
as such has cosmic ambitions, as it engages with cognate fields of politics, philosophy, 
literature, science and religion to form an overarching theory that analyses every human 
endeavour.70  
                                                 
68
 A prime example of this is certainly his explanation of Lacan’s ‘graph of desire’ (Žižek, 1λκλ, pp. 100-
124).  
69
 For example, Stavrakakis expresses concerns about the ‘intricacies of Lacan’s discourse, his baroque 
and complicated style’ (Stavrakakis, 1λλλ, p. 4). Lacan himself said ‘I am not surprised that my discourse 
can cause a certain margin of misunderstanding’, but this is done ‘with an express intention, absolutely 
deliberate, that I pursue this discourse in a way that offers you the occasion of not completely 
understanding it’ (Lacan cited in Samuels, 1λλ7, p. 16).  
70
 These cosmic ambitions were grounded in Freud’s ambition to give a psychoanalytic interpretation of 
human culture. It was in the 1950s that Lacan began to re-read Freud’s works in relation to contemporary 
philosophy, linguistics, ethnology, biology and topology. 
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In the introduction to the The Sublime Object, Žižek discloses his threefold aim: 
introduction of the fundamental concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis, re-actualisation 
of the Hegelian dialectical method in philosophy through a deployment of Lacan’s key 
concepts, and development of the theory of ideology by clarifying the correlation 
between Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis: 
It is my belief that these three aims are deeply connected: the only way to ‘save 
Hegel’ is through Lacan, and this Lacanian reading of Hegel and the Hegelian 
heritage opens up a new approach to ideology, allowing us to grasp 
contemporary ideological phenomena (cynicism, ‘totalitarianism’, the fragile 
status of democracy) without falling prey to any kind of ‘postmodernist’ traps 
(such as the illusion that we live in a ‘post-ideological’ condition) (Žižek, 1λκλ, 
p. 7). 
 
Undeniably, Žižek’s reading of Hegel, with its overwhelming emphasis on negativity 
and loss (see, for example, Žižek, 1λκλ, pp. 161-162), is Lacanian in the sense that it fits 
with the general ethos of Lacan’s writings about a world structured around lacks, gaps 
and voids.71 Likewise, well-known classic Marxist concepts, such as commodity 
fetishism (ibid., pp. 18-23), are read through the lens of Lacan’s concepts, such as 
sublime object (ibid., pp. 74-77) and surplus-enjoyment (ibid., pp. 50-55). However, it 
must be asserted that Žižek also elaborates Lacanian psychoanalytic theory in light of 
Hegel72 and Marx; thus the relationship is reciprocal, rather than one-sided. The purpose 
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 However, that does not in any way mean that Žižek’s reading of Hegel is Lacan’s reading. The latter 
read Hegel in a more traditional way. Žižek is aware of this challenge and attempts to show that his own 
‘Lacanian’ reading of Hegel is credible by demonstrating compatibility between Lacan’s concepts and the 
basic structure of Hegel’s thought. He argues that Lacan had a Hegelian style of thought even when he 
believed himself to be totally in opposition to Hegel (Žižek, 1λλ1a, p. λ4).   
72
 This strategy is particularly evident in For They Know Not What They Do (1991a), where Žižek 
provides an explanation of a concept from Lacan, such as the Real as the inconsistency of the symbolic 
register, then draws a parallel to Hegel’s writings, such as the dialectical negation of negation, and then 
links it to Marx’s understanding of ideological structure as void.  
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of Žižek’s inventive inter-reading is to develop a new and revolutionary way of 
interpreting political life and culture.  
1.2.3.1 Lacan and the Orders 
Lacanian psychoanalysis therefore serves as an illuminating and transformative spark 
for Žižek as he tackles theoretical examination and interpretation of a wide range of 
subjects. This is particularly true of ideology, which Žižek addresses with reference to 
Lacan’s three Orders as classifying all mental functioning: The Imaginary, The 
Symbolic and The Real. These permeate each mental act and bring to bear their own 
particular type of influence on an individual’s mental well-being. Lacan’s notion of the 
three interacting orders first appears in detail in what can be considered as the founding 
lengthy manifesto of Lacan’s original thought, the 1953 Écrit: The Function and Field 
of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis (2006), often referred to as the ‘Rome 
Discourse’. It is by utilising these three Orders that Žižek lays out the instinctive and 
psychological processes that enable the ideological to function.73     
1.2.3.1.1 The Imaginary  
The Imaginary, as explained by Lacan in Écrits (2006), designates the process by which 
the ego is conceived, the so-called mirror stage, which begins during infancy. Lacan 
holds that human beings are born prematurely, as can be seen in our inability to 
coordinate our movements until we are several years old. Infants overcome this inability 
by identifying with an image of themselves in the (actual or non-actual) mirror (ibid., p. 
76). This image of self as a fully synchronised and united body stands in contrast to the 
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 It is important to stress the complexity of Lacan’s thought and therefore what follows is not an attempt 
to summarize the meaning of his triad, but rather an attempt to provide an elementary outline of Žižek’s 
employment of Lacan’s Orders in his thought. For an illuminating article about the difficulties associated 
with summarising exactly the meaning of Lacan’s triad, see Bowie (1λ7λ).  
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sense of un-coordination and dislocation. As a result, it causes in the child an 
anticipation of future development, granting it a pleasing sense of coherency – an ego.  
 However, this process, which on the one hand is a stabilising fiction, on the 
other hand, due to the constant discrepancy between the child’s sensation of itself and 
the image of wholeness with which it identifies, is very unpredictable, in that it 
constantly undermines the very rectitude and unity it seeks to impart (ibid., p. 78).  This 
means that the ego formed by this identification is constitutionally divided between 
itself and its vision of itself, and is forever trying to reconcile the two. This also means 
that identity is displaced from itself, insofar that the fantasy with which we identify 
(ego) is outside ourselves.  
 Even in adulthood, the character of the ego is the same, seeking wholeness and 
unity and attempting to overcome the division which created it in the first place. To 
summarise, for Lacan (and consequently for Žižek), the Imaginary represents a restless 
seeking after self, constantly amalgamating instances of replication and resemblance in 
order to boost the fable of its unity.  
1.2.3.1.2 The Symbolic  
Žižek writes that, while the Imaginary is about identification with the image in which 
we appear likeable to ourselves, the Symbolic is ‘identification with the very place from 
where we are being observed’ (Žižek, 1λκλ, p. 116). The ambitious scope of the 
Symbolic, Lacan writes in Écrits, includes everything from language to the law, taking 
in all the social structures in between. This means that most of what is usually called 
reality is actually Symbolic, an impersonal framework of society within which human 
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beings take their place. All-pervading, it considers and in some sense imprisons people 
even before they are born – by the use of names, familial ties, gender, race and so forth.  
The Symbolic Order is held together by a list of words by which something can 
be referred to, what Lacan calls the signifying chain, or the law of the signifier  (Lacan, 
2006, p. 47λ). The notion is drawn from the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
(1857-1913) argument that language is made up of signs, and that each sign is 
composed of two parts, the signifier and the signified (de Saussure, 1959, pp. 65-78). He 
inferred that these two parts of the sign are connected by an arbitrary bond, which 
means that what is being signified by a signifier can change, and also that language is a 
relational system and therefore no sign can be defined in isolation from others. This 
differential aspect of language is crucial for Lacan, who extrapolates that if words only 
refer to other words rather than to a thing in itself, we are cut off from that world and 
stranded on the shores of language (Lacan, 2006, p. 66). Language is thus an 
independent system, which forms its own closed world, by constituting experience 
rather than reflecting it. An example of this would be the kind of difference it makes if 
we describe a person either as a terrorist or a freedom fighter. Even though that person 
stays the same, our attitude towards them is completely different depending on how we 
refer to them.  
 For Lacan and consequently for Žižek, it is this list of words or the total network 
of available signifiers which binds the Symbolic together. As a consequence, we cannot 
approach anything except by way of the unstable and arbitrary law of the signifier, and 
are doomed never to know things as they really are in themselves but instead remain in 
the prison of language (ibid., pp. 194-195). Furthermore, since the relationship between 
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the signifier and the signified is arbitrary and unstable, the character or type of the 
Symbolic Order in which we live is neither permanent nor necessary (Žižek, 1λκλ, pp. 
77-78). For example, due to the fundamental change of the role of women in the society, 
the signifier ‘woman’ refers to something different than it did in the past.  
 As we shall come to see in the next section, Žižek in his work often speaks of 
God as the ‘big Other’. That term at times designates the Symbolic Order as it is 
experienced by individual subjects, while at other times it designates the subject 
representing the Symbolic.74 In both cases, the use of ‘God’ is Symbolic, i.e. not God as 
He really is, but rather the unstable and arbitrary signifier. It could be said that God is 
the signifier and the signifier is God. This is skilfully illustrated in the first chapter of 
For They Know Not What They Do (Žižek, 1991a, pp. 7-60), in which Žižek explains 
that before the modern period in Europe, the ultimate big Other was none other than 
God. The Church guided society in the name of God, the king ruled by divine right and 
everyone had their proper places in the social order as ordained by God. In the modern 
period, however, God is no longer the privileged name for the big Other. Still, even 
though the public space of the Western world is for the most part secular, everyone still 
acts as though there is some Other out there, holding together the social order. Again, 
for Žižek, the belief in the big Other is found at the level of people’s practice, as 
opposed to their knowledge.  
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 Žižek (2012a), pp. λ5-λ7 cf. Žižek (2006a), pp. 8-12. Žižek inherits this complexity (rather than 
ambiguity) from Lacan, who refuses to comment explicitly on what he means by the big Other; see his 
translator’s note in Lacan (1λ7κ), p. 2κ2.  
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1.2.3.1.3 The Real  
From the description of the Imaginary and the Symbolic, it follows that the Real 
describes those areas of life which cannot be known, the things in themselves. In a way 
that means everything, for all knowledge of the world is mediated by language. If 
nothing is ever known directly, then the Real is the world before it is carved up by 
language (Lacan, 2006, pp. 23-86). This means that what is Real avoids description, 
because by default words are used to identify each separate element of the world. Lacan 
therefore concludes that the Real resists Symbolisation (Lacan, 1991, p. 164).  
Žižek, who is sometimes called ‘the philosopher of the Real’ (Myers, 2003, p. 
29), traces a trajectory through Lacan’s work revolving around the distinction between 
the Real and Symbolic in Looking Awry (1991b). While the realisation that we are 
condemned to living in the Symbolic might lead to the question of why any attention 
needs to be paid to the Real, Žižek, following Lacan, warns that the Symbolic and the 
Real are intimately bound up with each other (Lacan, 1λλκ, p. 37 cf. Žižek in Butler et 
al., 2000, p. 121). In The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema (2006), Žižek explains this with 
the help of a scene from the film The Matrix, in which Morpheus, after showing Neo the 
actual state of the world run by machines, offers him the choice of two pills: one to 
remain in this reality, and the other to return to the virtual reality constructed by the 
machines. Žižek argues that Neo should have asked for a third pill, one which would 
enable Neo to see the virtual reality (Symbolic) but to be able to discern the Real 
elements within it. Indeed, the Symbolic works upon the Real in that it cuts it up in 
myriad different ways. One of the ways in which the Real is recognised, Žižek argues, is 
by noting when something is indifferent to Symbolisation. Taking the example of 
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human beings (Žižek, 2001b, p. 104), one can see that some part of them is real by 
counting up the different ways in which we are symbolised, i.e. mammals, animals, the 
only extant members of the hominin clade, etc. Thus human beings enter the Symbolic 
Order when we are named or otherwise classified, but prior to that we are in the Real. 
The Real then comes after the Symbolic, in the sense that it is that which is left when 
the Symbolic is done slicing it up into articulate pieces (Žižek, 1λκλ, p. 4λ).75   
 Another disclosure of the presence of the Real is anything that is interpreted 
differently. This is illustrated by Žižek using the example of AIDS (Žižek, 1993, p. 44; 
2012b, p. 4), which, so he argues, is interpreted by some people as a punishment for 
homosexuals, or a divine retribution for carrying on a non-Christian way of life. Others 
see it as part of a plot by the CIA to stem population growth in Africa, while other 
people consider it the result of humankind’s interference in Nature. All these 
explanations revolve around the same brute fact of the disease which carries on 
regardless of the reasons attributed to it. In other words, AIDS is an interruption of the 
Real. It is meaningless in itself and all these interpretations of it are mere attempts to 
Symbolise it (Lacan, 1998, pp. 165-167). Indeed, Lacan asserts that meaning and 
change can only be found within the reality of the Symbolic Order, whereas the Real is 
meaningless, senseless and does not change (Lacan, 1991, pp. 219-220).  
Lacan’s late increased emphasis on the concept of the Real as a point of 
impossible contradiction in the Symbolic Order has had the greatest influence on 
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 Lacan also defines psychoanalytic praxis as a ‘concerted human effort […] which places man in a 
position to treat the Real by the Symbolic’ (Lacan, 1λλκ, p. 6).  
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Žižek.76 Indeed, he understands the Real as the arena of the dialectic, wherein opposing 
terms can coincide (Žižek, 1λκλ, pp. 1λ0-196; Žižek in Butler et al., 2000, pp. 120-122). 
It is only in the Imaginary that two terms can be reconciled in a harmonious synthesis, 
with the Symbolic functioning as the state where they are defined differentially.77 
Žižek’s preference for the Real as the only order in which contradictions are not 
smoothed away sheds further light on his aforementioned Hegelian dialectic thinking, 
which in turn further illuminates his preference for the Real.  
1.2.3.1.4 Addendum: Žižek and the Schellingian genealogy of his Subject  
There is one final point about the relationship between the Real and the Symbolic. It is 
exactly at their interface, or on their borders, that Žižek locates the subject.78 If the 
Symbolic was not an incomplete or insufficient account of the Real, which could be 
apprehended directly, then we, as subjects, would disappear. For Lacan and Žižek, the 
thing that makes us subjects is the signifying chain and the decisions we take in regard 
to it. If we all agreed on a single signifier we would no longer be subjects at all, but 
merely automatons or robots, blindly obeying the dictates of the Symbolic Order.  
 Because the Lacanian subject lacks any theory of its own ontogenesis, Žižek 
turns to German idealism to develop a dialectical materialism that would ground it, 
specifically to the German philosopher Friedrich W. J. Schelling (1775-1854). In The 
Indivisible Remainder (1λλ6), Schelling is understood by Žižek as a connection or 
transition between idealism and materialism that is later taken up by Marx, Nietzsche 
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 Following the triadic structure of the Lacanian registers, Žižek himself has stressed that there are in fact 
three basic orders of the Real: the real Real, the symbolic Real and the imaginary Real. See Žižek and 
Daly (2004); Žižek (2001b), pp. 7λ-κκ; and Žižek (2002b), xii.  
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 That is, where one is something because it is not something else.  
78
 In this he follows Lacan (1998, p. 141).  
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and Freud, and functions as a sort of philosophical vanishing mediator (ibid., p. 8).79 
While his philosophy maintains the form of idealism, its content is materialistic and 
therefore, Žižek argues,80 one should not discard the philosophy’s more mythological 
content (ibid., p. 7). His theory about the genealogy of the subject is grounded in 
Schelling’s Die Weltalter (1946), in which the latter considers the genesis of God as 
part of his larger goal to explain the emergence of an intelligible world at the same time 
as coming to terms with mind's inextricable relation to matter.  
 Žižek reads Schelling’s account of the origin of God as an allegory for the origin 
of the subject. He begins with the assertion that at first God was a pure Nothingness, 
part of the ‘chaotic, psychotic universe of blind drives’ (Žižek, 1λλ6, p. 13) which he 
calls the Grund of reality, enjoying the state of non-being – in other words, not yet an 
individual Being, but an impersonal Wollen that wills nothing (Žižek and Schelling, 
1997, p. 15). However, this non-assertive Will that wills nothing is actualised in the 
Will that actively wants this nothing, thereby annihilating every positive, determinate 
content (ibid., p. 23). The two sides of this same coin (wanting something as positive 
and wanting nothing as negative) result in a recursive deadlock. In other words, God is 
caught in a circle in which He fails to differentiate between himself and his Predicate. 
The only way to clear up the confusion, to achieve independence from the Ground and 
become an entity in His own right, a person, is ‘by acquiring a distance towards what in 
it is not God himself, but merely the Ground of His existence’ (Žižek, ibid., p. 36). Thus 
                                                 
79
 Following Kojève, it is Žižek’s understanding that psychoanalysis is the direct descendant of German 
idealism (1999a, pp. 65-66).  
80
 Although Schelling is traditionally categorised as a mere idealist, Žižek’s argument is not without 
foundation, for the aim of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is to provide a more objective conception of 
nature – i.e. as having a reality for itself. Moreover, Schelling’s philosophy, due to its apparently ever-
changing nature, has proven a significant challenge. Žižek is therefore not simply imagining Schelling’s 
materialism.  
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God becomes constituted as a subject by a loss, by expulsion of the very Ground or 
essence from which He is made. Žižek agrees with Schelling, that it is this very state of 
ejection which constitutes the vanishing mediator between Nothingness and God 
himself.   
Žižek’s reading of Schelling is not simply Lacanian, but is better described as 
Hegelian (ibid., pp. 5-56).81 He insists that Schelling’s main insight is that the identity 
of anything is split, alienated or always outside itself, and therefore any identity 
involves an indivisible remainder that undermines it. Indeed, Schelling and Hegel form 
a complex intertwining of Schellingian ontology and Hegelian logic of negativity, 
which is at the heart of Žižek’s own understanding of the radical nature of subjectivity 
in German idealism (Carew, 2011, p. 15). This is further evidenced by the fact that 
Žižek’s analysis of Schelling primarily focuses on the second draft of Die Weltalter , 
which alone displays a Hegelian structure of self-relating negativity in the exposition of 
freedom, whereas the third draft already marks a return to a form of dogmatic 
metaphysics (Žižek, 1λλ6, pp. 37-39).  
Based on Schelling’s genesis of God, Žižek argues that a subject is constituted 
by the removal of itself from itself, an externalisation (Žižek, 1λλλa, pp. 15κ-159). In 
other words, the core of the subject’s being is outside itself and the signifier 
representing the subject is just that, merely a representation. Before the beginning the 
subject is the psychotic antagonism between the will to contraction and the will to 
expansion. Although this subject is already a ‘one’, its proper beginning is the shift to 
willing or desire. By positioning myself in an external signifier which represents me, the 
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 For an apt description of the Hegel-Schelling relationship in Žižek, see Carew (2011). 
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move occurs from the Real to the Symbolic (Žižek, 1λλ6, p.43). As in the observation 
of the relationship between the two respective Orders above, the representation of 
myself is then not opposed to myself, but the two are implicated in each other. To 
summarize, Žižek locates the subject on the borders of the Real and the Symbolic, with 
the signifiers externalising it into the Symbolic.  
1.2.4 Concluding thought  
The three main influences on Žižek’s work are Hegel, Marx and Lacan. The first 
provides him with the type of thought or methodology that he uses – dialectic. In 
Žižek’s reading of Hegel the dialectic is never finally resolved. The second is the 
inspiration behind Žižek’s work, for what he is trying to do is to contribute to the post-
Marxist tradition of thought, specifically that of a critique of ideology. Finally, Lacan 
provides him with a framework and terminology for his analyses. Of particular 
importance are the concepts of the Symbolic and the Real. Žižek locates the subject 
with the help of Schelling at the interface of these two Orders. This fusion of Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory, Hegelian philosophy and Marxist political theory is the 
originality of Žižek’s contribution to Western intellectual history (Wieczorek in Žižek, 
2000a, viii).  
 What has hopefully also become clear in this section is that Žižek does not treat 
his sources as separate entities, but, in a critical theoretical way, instead brings them 
together creatively, expecting to reveal new insights and appropriations. Indeed, his 
intellectual trajectory can be seen as a series of attempts to bring them together in a 
coherent and compelling way and making them his own, by demonstrating a disavowed 
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but essential element of their thought. As we shall see in the next section, that is also the 
case with his approach to theology.  
  
  76 
 
1.3 The Context of Žižek’s Theological Engagement: post-Marxist 
critical theory 
In this section I aim to contextualize Žižek’s theological engagement. I argue that, even 
though his voice at times appears in discussion about the postsecular and he shares with 
it the conviction that religion is socio-politically relevant, his philosophical context is 
rather post-Marxist critical theory.  
 
1.3.1 Setting the scene 
Before we examine the content of Žižek’s engagement with theology, it is necessary to 
establish its context and motivation. Given his materialist persuasion and atheist 
identification, why does Žižek draw on theology in his analysis of the contemporary 
society? 
There has been much conversation in recent decades between sociologists of 
religion, theologians and political philosophers about the role of religion in our societies. 
A considerable proportion of the discussion has been focused on the idea of a 
secularization of society – the notion that religion would diminish as an inevitable aspect 
of modernisation, from conceptions of the secular as a category contrasting the religious 
and vice versa, to deliberations of the possible trajectories of the categories themselves, 
their relationship and their future. With time, however, as the secularization thesis became 
more and more problematic, there has been a call to rethink its claims. There has been a 
rise in numbers in terms of non-institutional affiliation and belief, and also in terms of the 
institutional strength of religious organisations. What is more, religion seems to be an 
increasingly important factor in the global political situation, for good or ill. In the 
reformulation of his original secularisation thesis, Peter L. Berger has claimed that it is 
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now more accurate to talk about a process of ‘de-secularisation’ and acknowledged that 
‘the world today […] is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so 
than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists 
loosely labelled ‘secularisation theory’ is essentially mistaken’ (Berger, 1λλλ, p. 2). Thus 
the world of academia has witnessed a renewed interest in or re-evaluation of religion in 
light of its ever-changing presence in the public sphere, and has explored the interface 
between the religious and the secular. A cluster of social and political theorists is now 
speaking of the “postsecular” public square, and acknowledging that religion has a role 
to play in socio-political reflection.  
The term postsecular  has been gaining influence as a description of the discussion 
and the society which we inhabit today, where religion is not merely something to be 
overcome. It is in the midst of this community of voices discussing the postsecular that 
Žižek’s thoughts have often appeared. Therefore, in seeking to contextualize the 
Slovenian philosopher, it is tempting to identify him as a postsecular thinker re-evaluating 
the role of religion in the contemporary world and concomitantly questioning the 
secularisation thesis. Yet, is that really the term which identifies or describes Žižek’s 
thought? Or is the debate about the postsecular merely one of the vehicles or platforms 
for his thoughts, which in fact are not really postsecular? In this section I argue that the 
latter is correct, while the former is a hasty and erroneous misinterpretation and 
misrepresentation of his thought and engagement with theology. Instead, I argue that 
Žižek’s context is that of post-Marxist critical theory. This theory refuses any notion of a 
postsecular, insofar as it denies secular and religious as dualist categories of a 
metanarrative, and is enabled by the theological for a critical investigation of the political.  
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To that end I will begin with a brief presentation of the postsecular and then 
contrast it to Žižek’s own post-Marxist context in order to show the difference in the 
socio-political function of theology. Furthermore, this contextualisation lays the ground 
for an understanding of the radical nature of Žižek’s engagement with theology and the 
criticality of the latter in his political philosophy, which will be explored in the next 
section. 
1.3.1.1 Secular and postsecular 
The very composition of the term “postsecular” places it in a relationship with the secular. 
A very short and simplified explanation of the secularisation thesis argues that as Western 
society becomes more modern, more complex, it inevitably becomes more “secular”. This 
shift is occasioned by the dynamics of modernity itself: modernisation, the rise of 
technology, rational and bureaucratic procedures, liberal democracy, urbanisation and 
industrial capitalism (Bruce, 2002, pp. 2-5). Brian Wilson characterises secularisation as 
a process by which ‘religious institutions, actions and consciousness, lose their social 
significance’ (Wilson, 1982, p. 49). As societies modernise, so they become less 
“religious” according to a number of criteria: in terms of personal affiliation and belief; 
in terms of the institutional strength of religious organisations; and in terms of the political 
and cultural prominence of religion in society.   
This conviction that the modern democratic state must effect a separation between 
religion and government, between “faith” and “reason”, originates from the religious wars 
of early modernity, the Enlightenment and revolutions of Europe and North America in 
the 18th century. This mode of thinking has been prominent since the 1960s and is 
associated with liberal thinkers such as the political philosopher John Rawls, whose A 
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Theory of Justice (1971) argued that equality of participation among citizens in the public 
domain was dependent on the ‘bracketing out’ of matters of personal or subjective 
conviction (such as religious faith), on the grounds that these represented forms of 
reasoning not universally accessible and therefore inadmissible as acceptable forms of 
political or moral reasoning. Hence, the strive for separation of religion and politics, and 
the assumption that the modern democratic state should be functionally secular or at least 
neutral towards the manifestations of religion in public.  
While the secularisation thesis presupposed a zero-sum game between the 
“religious” and the “secular”, as if they were incapable of co-existing, the postsecular re-
examines and finds the relevance of religion in the political and cultural sphere of the 
society, thus placing the categories of “secular” and “religious” into co-existence, a 
complex inter-relationship. Talk of this complex coexistence of the religious and the 
secular, a ‘postsecular society’,82 has been acknowledged in the work of some leading 
social theorists, most notably Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, Judith Butler and José 
Casanova. The latter speaks of public religions in a postsecular world (Casanova, 1994), 
while Butler explores the potential of religious perspectives for renewing cultural and 
political criticism in the context of her work concerning state violence in Israel-Palestine 
(Butler, 2011, pp. 70-91), and Taylor argues for a radical redefinition of secularism 
(Taylor, 2011, p. 34-5λ). Habermas’ recent work has spearheaded this new turn in social 
theory and political philosophy, with his talk of the ‘postsecular’ as an expression of the 
newly prominent role of religion in the public square, which re-examines the classic 
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assumptions of modern liberal thought towards the role of religion in the body of politics 
(Habermas, 2011, pp. 15-33).  
Increasingly, political theorists of many kinds are intimating that ostensibly 
secular democracies rely on worldviews not reducible to secular reason and as such 
religious or theological principles may continue to nurture and inform public debate. 
Various political theorists and social critics as well as philosophers agree with the 
suggestion that religion might be potentially emancipatory and progressive, rather than 
inherently antipathetic to human rights and the pluralist public discourse. It is within these 
growing discussions, focused on the critical and constructive reflection upon religion – 
theology – as a resource for political reflection, that Žižek’s contributions have been 
making a recurrent appearance.  
An example of this is Theology and the Political (Davis et al., 2005), a theoretical 
theological-political engagement with what its many contributors consider to be the crisis 
of liberalism and its manifestations of liberal democracy, philosophical liberalism and 
liberal theology. It includes some of the most influential contemporary philosophers 
(Terry Eagleton, Slavoj Žižek, Regina Mara Schwartz, Philip Goodchild, Simon 
Critchley, Antonio Negri, Kenneth Surin, Eleanor Kaufman and Hent de Vries) and 
theologians (Rowan Williams, Creston Davis, Conor Cunningham, William Desmond, 
Daniel M. Bell, Jr., Catherine Pickstock, Graham Ward, John Milbank and Phillip Blond 
– many of whom are closely associated with Radical Orthodoxy). These thinkers argue 
for Christianity and Marxism as offering ‘the only two real metaphysical alternatives to 
liberalism’ (ibid., p. 259-260).  
  81 
 
Another collection, edited by Hent de Vries and Lawrence Sullivan (2006), 
challenges the very premises of secularisation and explores the relationship of the 
political and religious domains, in light of the latter’s persistence. Distinguished scholars 
from philosophy, political theory, anthropology, classics and religious studies discuss the 
relationship from Ancient Greece, through Augustine's two cities and early modern 
religious debates, to classic statements about political theology by such thinkers as Walter 
Benjamin and Carl Schmitt, and conclude with a deliberation of new open ways of 
conceptualising society. The volume notably includes a historic discussion between 
Jürgen Habermas and Pope Benedict XVI, concerning the pre-political moral foundations 
of a republic.  
The volume Religion and Political Thought, edited from the theological 
perspectives of Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (2006), aims to provide a brief 
overview and exposition of the history of religious political thought. The book is divided 
into five chronological sections, each covering certain themes, but of particular relevance 
is Part V: ‘The Contemporary Debates’ (ibid., pp. 219-281), in which contemporary 
thinkers present their understanding of the relationship between religion and politics for 
today: the political philosopher Charles Taylor finds value in religion for social politics, 
the German Catholic Theologian Jürgen Manneman writes about religion as the motor for 
contemporary human and political processes of transformation, the theologian Marcella 
Althus-Reid presents the relationship from the perspective of Liberation and Queer 
Theology, John Milbank offers a Thomistic alternative to secular politics and Žižek seeks 
to raise awareness of the religious as a constitutive element of society and its cultural 
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foundations. The section is thus philosophically engaging, as each thinker seeks to present 
the primary religious sources in relation to a grand historical narrative.  
The above-mentioned are all examples of the current discussions involving Žižek 
about the role and potential of the religious, in particular theology, in the global socio-
political environment. Should Žižek then be considered as a postsecular? To answer this 
question, we must first take a closer look at the meaning that the term is supposed to carry. 
1.3.1.2 Problems with the postsecular 
If the very name of the term places it in a relationship with the secular, the question that 
immediately follows concerns the exact nature of the relationship between them. Already 
in the examples mentioned above we observe a variance in understanding of this 
relationship, from Habermas’ acknowledgment of religion’s prominent role to Taylor’s 
call for a radical redefinition of secularism. The term itself evokes relational resonances 
with other concepts, such as postmodern, post-colonial, post-structuralist or post-human. 
Aside from each of these terms having its own specialist discourse and complex 
genealogy, the underlying question appears to be the way in which the prefix ‘post’ is 
deployed in each. Does it denote a successor phase, temporarily or chronologically 
speaking, in which one epoch or paradigm follows another? Or is the term being deployed 
to question the very stability and coherence of its associated concept? For example, 
postmodern may indicate merely the era after a modernity or an architectural or aesthetic 
style after modernism. Alternatively, it may signal the very reappraisal of the assumptions 
underlying the modern. How exactly, then, does the prefix ‘post’ function with regards to 
secularity – is it questioning the very stability of secularity, or is it the latter’s 
development?   
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James Beckford (2012, pp. 1-19) offers a helpful, thorough and extensively 
referenced typology of the major interpretations of the concept, which broadly speaking 
can be summarised by the following: (1) the persistence of religious belief and practice 
belies the existence of secularization; (2) a more modest revisionist stance vis-a-vis 
secularisation which notes both the reality of secularism and its limitations as any kind of 
meta-narrative; (3) a re-enchantment of the secular, especially evident in the return of the 
sacred in popular culture; (4) the de-privatisation of religion and its resurgence as a public 
and political force; and (5) a reassertion of neo-orthodox worldviews.  
Thus the term post-secular can carry different interpretations in relation to the 
secular and is not exhaustively defined, but has an undetermined meaning. Beckford 
(2012, pp. 12-13) concludes that due to such a proliferation of usage of the term its very 
currency has become irredeemably devalued.83 That is why some thinkers avoid the term 
or concept and have sought to critique it. Martin (2011, p.14), for example, perceives the 
term as a fanciful invention without any proof, while Dalferth (2010) claims that it seeks 
to characterise societies which are neither religious nor secular but indifferent. The term 
post-secular and its conception have proven very problematic. 
Among the thinkers critiquing the notion of the postsecular is Žižek (1λλλb), who 
refers to the concept as ‘postsecular crap’. He caricatures the postsecular argument as 
follows: ‘Of course, we no longer have the ontological god, but it is an Otherness which 
is a mystery; a gap is opened, something is present in the mode of absence. It’s always to 
come, it is never here, it’s the mystery of otherness to be respected’ (ibid.). No doubt he 
is here referring to the postmodern interpretation of the religious observed in the thought 
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of Jacques Derrida (1995), with which he disagrees and which he criticizes in Did 
Somebody Say Totalitarianism? (2001d). In the section titled ‘Postsecularism? No 
thanks!’ (pp. 152-160), he disapproves of Derrida’s desire to keep what the latter deems 
as the authentic kernel of religion (religious experience) but to throw away the 
institutional and mystifying husk (theology), and argues that this takes away the 
transforming potential of religion and instead turns it to into a fetish. He also disagrees 
with Jürgen Habermas’ view of the public sphere and of the state. Whereas Habermas 
(2008b) advocates the traditional liberal separation of religion and politics, Žižek is 
convinced of the need to include religion as our modern democracies are more post-
political than political, and religion might thus be a radical critique of the de-politicisation 
of the public sphere and of the state (Žižek, 2001d, p. 152). What Žižek observes within 
both Derrida and Habermas is religion re-imagined as a politically compatible or servile 
philosophy which avoids challenging the current political or sociological makeup. Devoid 
of critical socio-political potential, its function is that of a fetish – to escape the 
uncomfortable dimensions of religion in favour of a mere thought experiment without 
any social consequences. In contrast to this, Žižek’s estimation and appropriation of 
Christian theology is purely concrete and incarnate, revealing rather than obscuring or 
mystifying the social reality.  
Žižek’s resistance to the term postsecular, as described above, is not merely 
because he does not agree with the meaning ascribed to it by Derrida or Habermas, but 
because he profoundly disagrees with the very dualistic categories of religious and secular 
in their obfuscating function. While he does share with them the conviction that religion, 
or to be precise theology, is socio-politically relevant, the very ground for this conviction 
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differs. Žižek’s endeavour transcends the division between secular and religious, but also 
any understanding of postsecular, in the sense that it represents the very dismantling of 
understanding the religious and secular on their own, as abstracts, and proposes that the 
two are rather intrinsically bound into a dialectical concrete. This is illustrated perfectly 
in the following well-known quote:  
My claim here is not merely that I am a materialist through and through, 
and that the subversive kernel of Christianity is accessible also to a 
materialist approach; my thesis is much stronger: this kernel is accessible 
only to a materialist approach – and vice versa: to become a true 
dialectical materialist, one should go through the Christian experience 
(Žižek, 2003, p. 6).84  
 
On this point Ward Blanton remarks that Žižek’s more recent writing on Christianity does 
not differ from his earlier work with regard to style, motifs and theoretical descriptions 
(2007, p. 178 footnote 19). I agree, and rather than saying that this either means that Žižek 
has always been writing about Christianity or that he is still just writing about materialism, 
I would argue that he has always written about both together. 
Žižek is not alone, as other thinkers have, like him, refused the very categories of 
secular and religious, and subsequently the postsecular. Such is Kong’s (2010, p. 764) 
rejection of the concept as superfluous since secularization never existed, or McLennan, 
Smith and Whistler’s (2010, p. 14) dismissal of it as an imperialist response to the 
imperialist understanding of secularity. This perception of the academic and social 
distinction between religion and the secular as a primary motor of the self-expansion of 
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the modern, rational West, resonates with Žižek’s caricature of the postsecular described 
above as a liberal tradition of creating a split that was not there. That is also why Ward 
Blanton, in his essay ‘Neither Religious Nor Secular’ (in Boer, 2010, pp. 141-161),85 
deconstructs the very categories of secular and sacred as inextricably caught up within 
Western hegemony, and calls upon biblical criticism to cease defining itself by using 
these terms and open itself up to new ways of thinking and being as a discipline.86  
Therefore it must be concluded that while Žižek’s voice is often perceived by 
theological circles in the rise of the postsecular (e.g. Sigurdson, 2010), it is incorrect to 
describe or contextualise him as a postsecular due to his rejection not only of the 
problematic interpretation of the concept, but more importantly, of the dualistic categories 
of religious and secular. Instead, as we shall see below, his critical attitude to the 
Enlightenment project, or its offspring the secularisation thesis, is to be considered as that 
of post-Marxist critical theory. 
1.3.2 Marxism and theology as sociopolitical sojourners  
In From Marxism to Post-Marxism? , Göran Therborn regards the Marxist turn to theology 
as ‘the most surprising development in left-wing social philosophy in the past decade’ 
(Therborn, 2008, p. 130). Certainly, the turn is surprising within the specific context of 
Marx’s criticism and suspicion of religion, which was understood as the opium of masses, 
the extreme of ideology and false consciousness.87 However, that very criticism reveals 
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the cultural power and function of religion, which has been appreciated by a number of 
Marxist thinkers from the very beginning.  
In 1940 the German Marxist social critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin (1968, 
p. 253), in his Theses on the Concept of History, tells the story of the Turk, a famous 
chess-playing device of the eighteenth century, as an analogy for historical materialism. 
Presented as an automaton that could defeat skilled chess players, the Turk puppet 
actually concealed a dwarf master chess-player who controlled the machine and could 
counter, thus assuring its victory in the match. Benjamin compares the puppet to historical 
materialism in philosophy, which is always victorious as long as it employs the services 
of theology, which in turn is small and ugly and ought to be kept out of sight, the inference 
being the distinctly teleological historical materialist understanding of history as 
culminating in a secularised embodiment of the Judeo-Christian apocalyptical idea. 
Dialectical materialism, Benjamin argues, is an incarnation of theology and as such the 
latter is unavoidable – political theology. Yet it is important to note that Benjamin’s 
consideration of the theological was not isolated, for an element of Marxist recognition 
or identification, if not appreciation, of a revolutionary dimension to Christianity has been 
present ever since Engels.88  
This is nicely illustrated in the consideration of Thomas Müntzer as a part of 
Marxist heritage. Frederick Engels (1820-1895) first elaborated his position in an 
influential study of Müntzer and the peasant revolution, The Peasant War in Germany 
(1978b), where he understands Müntzer’s fiery theological language as rhetoric for larger 
groups of peasants, a cover for a secular, revolutionary core that he communicated plainly 
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to his inner circle.89 This work by Engels initiated a series of further studies, such as that 
of the Marxist theoretician’s Karl Johann Kautsky (1κ54-1938). His Vorläufer des 
neueren Sozialismus (Kautsky, 1897) is an extensive study of revolutionary and 
communist movements before the modern era, which pays careful attention to the 
treatments of Thomas Müntzer, the Münster revolution and the Anabaptists. Compared 
to Engels, Kautsky gives far greater credit to Müntzer’s revolutionary, and indeed 
communist, credentials when he posits that the revolutionary currents breaking over 
Europe were due, in no small degree ‘to his extravagant communistic enthusiasm, 
combined with an iron determination, passionate impetuosity, and statesmanlike sagacity’ 
(ibid.). Yet this is inseparable from Müntzer’s theological engagements, with a view to 
overthrowing oppressors and freeing those burdened in the name of a thoroughly 
democratic and communist project. 
The insight that theology itself was crucial was shared also by Anatoly 
Lunacharsky (1875-1933), the Commissar of the Enlightenment after the Russian 
Revolution and author of Religiia i Sotsializm [Religion and Socialism] (1908).90 In that 
work he admires the revolutionary role of prophets such as Müntzer, but also the biblical 
figures of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Paul and Jesus. The Marxist philosopher Ernst 
Bloch (1885-1977) further influenced the raising of Müntzer to the status of pre-
revolutionary hero. His Thomas Müntzer als Theologe der Revolution (1960) represents 
a wholehearted embrace of Müntzer and the peasant revolt, arguing for the centrality of 
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theology in his radical politics, as also the pre-Marxist forms of communism that are 
found in the radical tradition of Christianity. He focuses on the apocalyptic dimension of 
Müntzer’s message in order to show how revolutionary such religiously-inspired 
apocalyptic movements can be. The Scripture thus effectively acts as the bad conscience 
of the believers, with its vivid apocalyptic texts fanning the flames of revolution. This 
understanding is repeated by Bloch in Atheismus in Christentum (1968), in which he 
argues that one of the main sources for revolutionary affect and commitment is found in 
the Bible. Indeed, the latter work is Bloch’s attempt to demonstrate Christianity’s 
potential for liberation through a sociological study of the Bible. He locates its appeal for 
the oppressed in its antagonism to authority and subversive potential against authoritarian 
metaphysical theism. Not unlike Žižek then, as we shall see in the next chapter, he finds 
a subversive element at the core of Christianity, which leads to a necessary atheism. 
1.3.3 Western Marxism, theology and political critique  
In Western Marxism, a particular strand of cultural criticism arose out of the Frankfurt 
School91 – critical theory. This method of analysis was an amalgam of philosophical and 
social-scientific techniques that had wide-ranging applications. Long before 
postmodernism became fashionable, Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) and Max Horkheimer 
(1895-1973), two of the leading figures of the Frankfurt School, wrote one of the most 
searching critiques of modernity to have emerged among progressive European 
intellectuals. In Dialektik der Aufklärung [Dialectic of Enlightenment] (Adorno and 
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Horkheimer, 1969/2005) they examined how the Enlightenment project, of which 
Marxism was a part, was able to end up in the horrors of the Second World War. The 
progress of reason, they argue, had become irrational and the reason for this irrationality 
was domination driven by an irrational fear of the unknown: ‘Humans believe themselves 
free of fear when there is no longer anything unknown. This has determined the path of 
demythologization […] Enlightenment is mythical fear radicalized’ (ibid., p. 11/22). 
Their historical analysis of the formation of the modern age of Enlightenment leads them 
to two theses: ‘Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology’ 
(ibid., p. 6/xviii). The first thesis allows them to suggest that, despite being declared 
mythical and outmoded by the forces of secularization, older rituals, religions and 
philosophies may have contributed to the process of enlightenment and may still have 
something worthwhile to contribute. The second thesis allows them to expose ideological 
and destructive tendencies within modern forces of secularization, but without denying 
either that these forces are progressive and enlightening or that the older conceptions they 
displace were themselves ideological and destructive. Thus we see that Adorno and 
Horkheimer challenged the dualism of myth and enlightenment, or religion and reason, 
by showing that myth is already enlightenment and the latter is a regression to the 
mythical, understanding the relationship between them as truly dialectical.  
More recently, critical theory has seen a proliferation of Marxist-inspired thinkers 
under the label post-Marxists, who explore theological resources, free of the 
preconceptions of orthodox Marxist thought, which refuses to countenance any tinkering 
with its basic philosophical categories. The list includes the work of Alain Badiou, 
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Giorgio Agamben, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Terry Eagleton and of course 
Slavoj Žižek.  
In Saint Paul (2003), the French philosopher Alain Badiou claims that Paul laid 
the foundation for a particular kind of universalism that Badiou also endorses.92 Badiou 
is not interested in Paul as a religious thinker, but as ‘an anti-philosophical theoretician 
of universality’ (ibid., p. 10κ), whose way of thinking ‘the event’ (ibid., p. 2) is hardly 
surpassed and therefore the form of this thinking, not the content, should be searched to 
enlighten the struggle against global capitalism. In that sense, Paul’s theology was a 
revolutionary event of thinking and ought to be repeated formally in our current socio-
political context, but without the content. 
While the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben disagrees with Badiou’s 
interpretation of Paul, and so has written his own commentary on the Epistle to the 
Romans (Agamben, 2005), he nevertheless agrees with him on the importance of reading 
Paul. He seeks to separate the Pauline texts from the history of the Church that canonized 
them, thus revealing them to be the fundamental messianic texts of the West. Far from 
Paul’s letters being concerned with the foundation of a new religion, they seek to abolish 
the Jewish law. Through a close reading and comparison of Walter Benjamin’s enduring 
and influential contribution to Western Marxism mentioned above and the Pauline 
Epistles, Agamben discerns a number of parallels between the two works, concluding that 
Benjamin’s philosophy of history constitutes a repetition and appropriation of Paul. 
In Multitude (2005), a follow-up to the well-known Empire (2000), the American 
literary theorist and political philosopher Michael Hardt and the Italian sociologist and 
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political philosopher Antonio Negri often make use of biblical and theological themes, 
such as a Christian view of the body and the battle over icons in Byzantium some 1200 
years ago. These discussions are readily connected to their own agenda, such as issues of 
embodiment and vision. For example, the chapter in Multitude entitled ‘Traces of the 
Multitude’ (Hardt and Negri, 2005, pp. 1κλ-227) consists of a discussion of the ‘social 
body’ that reminds them of the theological discussion on the same theme initiated by the 
French Jesuit Henri de Lubac in Corpus Mysticum (2007).93 Meanwhile, in Empire, they 
use as an illumination of ‘the future life of Communist militancy’ the milder religious 
example of Saint Francis of Assisi (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. 413).  
The British literary scholar and cultural theorist Terry Eagleton, has, in After 
Theory (2004), severely criticised recent cultural studies and postmodernism with the help 
of Saint Paul and by an appeal to an Aristotelian-Augustinian version of Catholic theology 
inspired by the late Dominican Herbert McCabe. In that work theology is used not only 
as an illustration but as an argument in its own right. Eagleton continues this exploration 
in Holy Terror (2005), which deals with the metaphysics of terrorism, and also in his 
criticism of the New Atheists in Reason, Faith, and Revolution: Reflections on the God 
Debate (2009). In the latter he divulges his reason for dealing extensively with theology: 
‘however implausible many of its truth claims’ seem to be, it still ‘is one of the most 
ambitious theoretical arenas left in an increasingly specialised world’ (ibid., p. 167). Even 
if, according to Eagleton, theology in many places of the world increasingly continues to 
be part of the problem, it nonetheless exhibits the capacity to foster ‘the kind of critical 
reflection which might contribute to some of the answers’ (ibid., p. 168).  
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 Interestingly, de Lubac has drawn on many of the same thinkers as do Hardt and Negri, especially the 
Russian philologist Mikhail Bakhtin. 
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It is within the context of post-Marxist critical theory that Žižek posits that the 
attempt to think politically, without religious categories, is faulty. He argues that today’s 
political thought has been turned into ethics and a legal philosophy, and is as such post-
political. It has been reduced to a promotion of moral values and ethical policies.   
In an attempt to demonstrate and critique the failures of the current political 
system of liberal democracy, the post-Marxist thinkers, among whom is also Žižek, refer 
to classical theological sources, such as the letters of Saint Paul.94 Thus theology is 
recognised for its critical potential and as an important element of the political, be it for 
organisation, maintenance or enhancement of social living. It acts as a conceptual pool 
facilitating and grounding critique. The Swedish theologian Ola Sigurdson argues that 
Marxism and theology have always shared an interest in what he calls hope – ‘a mutual 
expectation, beyond mere wishful thinking that something new is possible, a better 
society than the current alienated and social existence of humankind’ (Sigurdson, 2012, 
p. 5). In this philosophical sense, common to Sigurdson as a theologian and Žižek as a 
post-Marxist, theology and Marxism could be understood as revealing the socio-political 
reality with its faults and necessarily emerging as an alternative. Positioned in this 
context, Žižek’s interest in theology is hardly original or without precedent.95  
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 Blanton and de Vries ask the question specifically with regards to contemporary political philosophy’s 
attention to Paul. See Blanton’s ‘Paul and the Philosophers: Return to a New Archive’ (in Blanton and de 
Vries, 2013, pp. 1-38). For a critical response to this engagement see Chieza's ދPasolini, Badiou, Žižek 
und das Erbe der christlichen Liebeތ (in de Kessel and Hoens, 2006, pp. 107-26); Onfray's Atheist 
Manifesto (2007);  Rasch's Sovereignty and Its Discontents (2004); and Esposito's Bios: Biopolitics and 
Philosophy (2008).  
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 This remarkable theological genre among a section of the European intellectual left has also recently 
been bolstered by Roland Boer’s Criticism of Heaven (2009), which offers a wide-ranging treatment of 
‘biblical Marxists’ and Marxist grappling with religion. He picks up their often extended reflections and 
deliberations over theology and the Bible, of which there is an abundance but which has not been 
acknowledged and analysed appropriately, even though the authors never attempted to hide these 
deliberations, but were straightforwardly open about them. Boer provides a very detailed reading of 
certain oft-neglected works, such as Bloch’s Atheism in Christianity, Althusser’s early theological essays 
and the collection of lectures Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists, Lefebvre’s 
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1.3.4 Concluding thought 
I conclude that contextualising Žižek as a postsecular thinker is an incorrect framing of 
the content and motivation of his engagement with theology. He considers the 
demarcation between the categories of religion and the secular as an obfuscating myth 
and the postsecular momentum, insofar as it re-interprets religion as servile and impotent, 
as its continuation. His theological engagement, on the other hand, subverts clear 
categorical demarcations and is properly placed in a post-Marxist context, where the 
theological is explored for the process of radical change, of illuminating and dismantling 
the perpetual mystifications of the capitalist political order.  
What will be revealed in the next section on Žižek’s theological materialism is the 
form that his engagement with theology takes and how it impacts his materialist thought. 
The criticality of theology for his political philosophy will become evident, not only in 
enabling a critical investigation of the political, but also as its embodiment. It is in its 
contestation of the current socio-political setup that theology not only enables but is the 
revolutionary and ultimate political act – a materialist philosophy that is distinctly 
theological.   
  
                                                 
‘Notes Written One Sunday in the French Countryside’, Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks and Adorno’s 
habilitation thesis Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic.  
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Chapter 2: Žižek’s Political Theology  
 
In this section I seek to provide an account of Žižek’s engagement with Christian 
theology, the importance for his political thought and the outcome thereof – a radical 
universalism grounded in the theology of dialectical materialism. The previous chapter 
therefore served as a necessary background for this one, providing an introduction to the 
main influences on Žižek’s thought and their concepts, the understanding of which he 
re-appropriated and interrelated, as well as contextualising his engagement with 
theology as post-Marxist. I will begin this account with an introduction to the manner in 
which this engagement materialises. I will then, through an examination of Žižek’s 
critique of Badiou in The Ticklish Subject and its significance, present how he develops 
his own understanding of Christianity and the political potential of its subversive 
element, but only after a brief description of his rejection of actually existing 
Christianity. Next, I will look at the product of the theologisation of his political thought 
in the form of dialectical materialism, its overcoming of the constitutive exception, and 
the new communality. Finally, I will provide a very brief afterthought regarding Žižek’s 
theological method.  
2.1 Introduction 
When seeking to provide an account of Žižek’s engagement with theology, the 
temptation is to speak of a ‘theological turn’ – that at a certain point in his philosophy 
he decided to engage theology. This is the case that Sharpe and Boucher make in Žižek 
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and Politics, when they position it in the timeline of his engagement with Badiou from 
The Fragile Absolute (2000b) onwards (Sharpe and Boucher, 2010, pp. 194-195).96 
However, Žižek has always engaged Christian theology and materialism together. 
Sharpe and Boucher seem to miss that Žižek’s willingness to engage Badiou in 
theological terms and his later persistence with the theological is grounded upon his 
already observed reading of Walter Benjamin in The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989) 
and his defence of theological language in The Indivisible Remainder (1996) and The 
Abyss of Freedom/Ages of the World (Žižek and Schelling 1λλ7).  
Walter Benjamin is at the centre of the chapter ‘You Only Die Twice’ (Žižek, 
1989, pp. 145-167), in which Benjamin’s already mentioned Theses on the Concept of 
History (Benjamin, 1λ6κ, p. 253), via Lacan’s notion of the death drive, is read as a 
critique of the surviving big Other in Stalinist historical materialism, which does not 
take responsibility for the past as the subject abdicates responsibility to the big Other 
who drives the historical ‘progress’. Benjamin’s historical materialism, by contrast, 
takes that responsibility, when he asserts that meaning is determined only by the 
outcome of the present struggle. Žižek argues that this acceptance of responsibility for 
the past is the essence of Benjamin’s reference to ‘theology’ in his first thesis. Indeed, 
Žižek has upheld this criticism of Stalinist historical materialism together with its 
theological moves, as was observed in the previous section.  
With regards to Schelling, also already observed in 1.2.3.1.4, in The Indivisible 
Remainder Žižek extrapolates that Schelling’s Die Weltalter  is for him the founding text 
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 This is incorrect, since Žižek’s initial engagement with Badiou was in the earlier The Ticklish Subject, 
as is clear from my demonstration below. See Žižek’s ‘The Politics of Truth, or, Alain Badiou as a Reader 
of St Paul’ (1999a, pp. 127-170). 
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of dialectical materialism, not despite its theological content, but precisely because of it 
(Žižek, 1λλ6, p. 36). Indeed, his account of the intra-divine struggle becomes 
instrumental for Žižek’s understanding of subjectivity. It is therefore correct to resist 
speaking of a decisive theological turn in Žižek’s thought, for even if his interest in 
theology is more obvious in some of his works than others, its ‘more-than-a-simple 
presence’ is evident in almost all of his works since The Sublime Object of Ideology.  
It can be said, however, that it is only in his encounter with Badiou that Žižek 
begins to develop his own distinctive understanding of the origin of Christianity and its 
relationship to Judaism and paganism. Prepared in The Ticklish Subject, it is developed 
in three books, which he published in quick succession: The Fragile Absolute (2000b), 
On Belief (2001b) and The Puppet and the Dwarf (2003). These books should be read 
together in order to gain a sense of the constant revision and development that Žižek’s 
thinking undergoes in order to arrive at its present form, as observed in works like The 
Parallax View (2006b), Paul’s New Moment (Žižek, 2010b, pp. 92-99), The Monstrosity 
of Christ (Žižek and Milbank, 200λ), God in Pain (Žižek and Gunjević, 2012) and Less 
Than Nothing (2012a), and also in other recent works, such as Living in the End Times 
(Žižek, 2010c, pp. 80-134) and Absolute Recoil (Žižek, 2014, pp. 245-282), which 
include chapters or large sections on theology.  
Rather than accepting talk of a theological turn, it is more appropriate to speak, 
as Roland Boer does (2009, pp. 335-390),97 of theology as playing an important part in 
Žižek’s development as a distinct political thinker. In Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality (2000), Judith Butler criticises Žižek on the grounds that while his 
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 Even though he still speaks of a theological turn in Žižek’s thought or ‘conversion’, Roland Boer offers 
a valuable account of Žižek’s development as a political thinker and the role of theology in that process.  
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psychoanalysis provides an important contribution to how ideology works at an 
individual level, it does not provide a solution or a way out (Butler in Butler et al., 
2000, pp. 28-29). It rather insists on the notion of constitutive exception, which 
simultaneously enables and hobbles every effort at emancipation, thereby subverting it:  
We think we have found a point of opposition to domination, and then 
realize that that very point of opposition is the instrument through which 
domination works, and that we have unwittingly enforced the powers of 
domination through our participation in its opposition (ibid., p. 28).  
 
Since Žižek’s psychoanalytic thought cannot enact change and is therefore impotent, it 
cannot provide the basis for a viable politics, Butler argues.98 So, rather than speaking 
of a theological turn, it is exactly in a response to or development of his political 
thought that theology plays a crucial role. By engaging further with Christian theology, 
first Paul and then Jesus, Žižek escapes from the closed-circuit of Lacan’s 
psychoanalysis and emerges as a distinct political thinker.  
2.2 Badiou and Paul’s truth-event 
After the challenge of Butler, Žižek engages with Alain Badiou’s similar charge in The 
Ticklish Subject (1999a) that psychoanalysis cannot give us any political position.99 
This is or could be considered as Žižek’s first effort at a militantly political book (ibid., 
p. 4), in which he sets about engaging and critically examining Badiou’s notion of the 
truth-event in Saint Paul (2003). Thus the point of contact between Žižek and Badiou is 
not the latter’s use of Paul, but his concern with truth, an account of universality. This 
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 Likewise, Laclau argues that Žižek’s political thought is not advanced and ‘remains fixed in very 
traditional categories.’ In other words, it is underdeveloped and is merely juxtaposing Marx and Lacan 
(Laclau in Butler et al., 2000, pp. 206, 209). 
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 Žižek engages or refers to Badiou at various points in his earlier works, but proper engagement comes 
only in The Ticklish Subject. See Žižek (1991a), pp. 188, 270; Žižek (1997), pp. 26, 59, 92; and Žižek 
(1993), p. 4. 
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interest in truth shows Žižek in stark contrast to postmodern philosophy, which refuses 
to deal with the notion. While he agrees with the postmodern assertion that there is no 
going back to some pre-modern understanding of truth, Žižek nevertheless argues for 
the necessity of a new concept of truth (Žižek, 1λλ3, pp. 3-4). This is the point of 
contact with Badiou, who agrees and proposes that truth or its nature, rather than being 
a positive body, is something that happens, i.e. an event.100 In other words, it does not 
concern the state of things (being), but is rather an event of location of the political act 
and subject. The place where that event comes from is the marginalised. Each truth-
event corresponds to a given situation, in which all elements are present, but not all are 
represented. For example, a country contains people who live there without being 
officially recognised as citizens or legal residents. Žižek agrees with Badiou’s 
conceptualisation of universalism that it is those very excluded, with no place in the 
order or system, that embody the true universality and represent the whole or entirety in 
contrast to others, which only represent their particular interests (Žižek, 2003, p. 112). It 
is therefore exactly this excluded element which is the site from which a truth-event 
erupts. When it does so, only those who embrace the truth-event are subjects in the 
proper sense of the word, and their attempt to follow the consequence of it is called a 
truth-process. Žižek and Badiou agree that universalism is always the result of a great 
process of struggle of the excluded that opens with an event.   
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 I am here following Žižek’s presentation of Badiou’s theory in Chapter 3: ‘The Politics of Truth, or, 
Alain Badiou as a Reader of St. Paul’ of The Ticklish Subject (1999a), pp. 127-170. Badiou’s Pauline 
application of event is developed from his seminal Being and Event (2006), which is built in reliance 
upon Heidegger’s Being and Time (1962).  
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Badiou then uses Paul as an utmost example of a subject naming the truth-event 
(Badiou, 2003, p. 2).101 The resurrection of Christ as an unexpected event seizes Paul, 
causing him to dedicate his life to spreading the gospel. The Pauline category of death 
or living in the flesh marks the realm of being – not being aware of the event – while 
life or living in the Spirit marks the realm of living in light of the truth-event.102 
Therefore the resurrection is to Badiou the key to Paul’s truth-event and his death is 
merely another indication that God became a human being. Certainly, the resurrection is 
for Badiou a fable, but he understands that as the very condition for universality – it is 
not tied to any element of the life of Jesus and enables Paul to structure a subject, which 
is ‘devoid of identity and suspended to an event whose only “proof” lies precisely in its 
having been declared by a subject’ (ibid., p. 5.).103 The differences in this world have 
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 This reading of Paul without the presupposition of any specifically Christian belief or commitment is 
perhaps pioneered by Jacques Lacan, who, in his seminar on the Ethics of Psychoanalysis in 1959, as the 
lecture draws to a conclusion, uses Romans 7 and paraphrases it to discuss desire (Lacan, 1992, p. 83). 
Lacan explains his use of Paul and the religious text in the following manner: ‘We analysts […] do not 
have to believe in these religious truths in any way, given that such belief may extend as far as what is 
called faith, in order to be interested in what is articulated in its own terms in religious experience – in the 
terms of the conflict between freedom and grace, for example […]. There is a certain paradox involved in 
practically excluding from debate and from analysis things, terms and doctrines that have been articulated 
in the field of faith, on the pretext that they belong to a domain that is reserved for believers’ (Lacan, 
1992, pp. 170-171).  
Similarly, Badiou writes in his preface to St Paul: ‘I care nothing for the Good News he declares, 
or the cult dedicated to him. But he is a subjective figure of primary importance.’ Like Lacan, he 
emphasises that it is possible and indeed legitimate to read Paul: ‘we may draw upon [him] freely, 
without devotion or repulsion’ (Badiou, 2003, p. 1). For Badiou, Paul is taken to be exemplary of a kind 
of commitment that he believes to be necessary for contemporary politics.  
102
 Žižek on the other hand contrasts being and truth-event as between law and love. The order of being is 
the domain of law, whereas the truth-event and fidelity to it belongs to the way of love – what he calls 
‘the properly Christian way of Love [agape]’ (Žižek, 1λλλa, p. 47). This construction seems theologically 
odd, since in Pauline theology the contrast is between law and grace, and this is also emphasised by 
Badiou. See Badiou (2003), pp. 63, 66-67, 74-κ5. This is picked up by Boer, who argues that Žižek 
realised his mistake and moved onto grace in On Belief (Boer, 2009, pp. 337, 349-351). However, Žižek 
seems to be highlighting the importance of fidelity to the truth-event here. He does say later that the life 
in ‘love is accessible to all of us through grace’ (Žižek, 1λλλa, p. 147). 
103
 Interestingly, while Badiou does not require a historical Jesus, he does on the other hand desire a 
historical Paul. See ‘Who is Paul?’ in Badiou, 2003, pp. 16-30. 
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thus become indifferent in light of the new event and are materialised in the Pauline 
conception of church.104   
Žižek concurs with Badiou’s subject without identity and expresses it 
psychoanalytically as the ‘intrusion of the traumatic Real that shatters the predominant 
symbolic texture’ (Žižek, 1λλλa, p. 142), a reminder that the subject is not only its 
Symbolic representation. However, he disagrees with Badiou in two ways: first, the 
religious example is not only an example but is actually an implicit paradigm for the 
theory of the truth-event. Second, it is not the resurrection of Christ which seizes Paul, 
but actually his death on the Cross (ibid., pp. 145-147).105 He delivers his critique with 
the help of the Freudian notion of the death drive as that which persists beyond life and 
death. This negative gesture of detaching oneself from a given situation, Žižek argues, is 
absolutely necessary if something new is to emerge. In Badiou’s reading, the death of 
Christ, as he puts it, has no inherent meaning whatsoever, for it merely prepares the site 
for the event. However, Žižek argues, in order that his universal message might matter 
more than his person, Christ had to die (Žižek, 1λλλa, p. 157), for it is only through the 
murder of particularity that universality follows (Žižek, 2003, p. 17f). Only by this 
negativity can the subject be established. As such, Žižek’s criticism is that by ignoring 
Christ’s death on the Cross106 and merely talking about the resurrection, Badiou 
understands the truth-event as just a radically new beginning and as such a pseudo-
event. 
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 In Being and Event, Badiou describes the church precisely as the post-evental ‘operator of faithful 
connection to the Christ-event’ (Badiou, 2006, p. 392).  
105
 Reading the crucifixion as key is also evident in Taubes’ Die politische Theologie des Paulus, where 
he insists that it is precisely the message concerning the crucified Messiah which subverts Imperial 
authority. Indeed, he regards Romans as a declaration of war on the Roman Empire (Taubes, 1993, p. 16).  
106
 Badiou talks of the Cross as little else but a demonstration that Christ was really human.  
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 The same criticism continues on to Badiou’s reading of Romans 7 (Žižek, 
1999a, pp. 147-149 cf. Badiou, 2003, p. 75-85),107 in which Paul grapples with 
something akin to the notion of the inherent transgression. The very emergence of a 
certain ‘value’ serving as a point of ideological identification relies on its transgression, 
on some mode of taking a distance from it:  
What shall we say, then? Is the law sinful? Certainly not! Nevertheless, I 
would not have known what sin was had it not been for the law. For I 
would not have known what coveting really was, if the law had not said, 
‘You shall not covet.’ But sin, seizing the opportunity afforded by the 
commandment, produced in me every kind of coveting. For apart from 
the law, sin was dead. Once I was alive apart from the law; but when the 
commandment came, sin sprang to life and I died. I found that the very 
commandment that was intended to bring life actually brought death. For 
sin, seizing the opportunity afforded by the commandment, deceived me, 
and through the commandment put me to death (Romans 7:7-11). 
 
By both Žižek and Badiou, Paul is here understood as the prime example of someone 
who is starting to become conscious of the contradictory character of the Symbolic 
Order.108 They also both agree that the only way out is by identifying with some truth-
event. However, whereas Badiou argues for a direct identification with the resurrection 
in order to escape Law as the obscene superego supplement, Žižek argues that the only 
solution is that one must die to the law:  
What ‘death’ stands for is at its most radical, not merely the passing of 
earthly life but the ‘night of the world,’109 the self-withdrawal, the 
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 For a shorter but precise summary of Žižek’s engagement with Badiou’s reading of Romans 7, read 
Žižek’s ‘Paul and the Truth Event’ in Davis et al. (2010), pp. 92-99.  
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 Their reading of Romans 7 here essentially follows Lacan’s reading of the Law as Symbolic in ‘On the 
Moral Law’ (Lacan, 1997, p. 83).  
109
 Hegel’s phrase ‘night of the world’ is employed by Žižek frequently (1992, pp. 50-52; 1994, p. 145; 
1996, p. 78; 1997, pp. 8-10; 2006b, p. 44). It is used to express the radical negativity of the subject, the 
overwhelming excess at the moment of doubt, which is the origin of the Cartesian subject. In ‘PART 1: 
Spirit according to its Concept’ of the Jena lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel writes that ‘the 
human being is this night, this empty nothing, which contains everything in its simplicity – an unending 
wealth of many representations, images, of which none belongs to him – or which are not present. This 
night, the interior of nature, that exists here – pure self [...]. One catches sight of this night when one 
looks human beings in the eye – into a night that becomes awful’ (Hegel, 1λ70d / 1λκ3) available online 
at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/jl/ch01a.htm).  
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absolute contraction of subjectivity, the severing of links with ‘reality’ – 
this is the ‘wiping of the slate clean’ that opens up the domain of the 
symbolic New Beginning (1999a, pp. 154).110  
 
The only way to escape the contradictory Symbolic Order, in this case the Law, is by 
symbolically dying to it, rather than merely enacting a new beginning within it. 
According to Žižek, that is what marks a real, subjective truth-event. 
Therefore, in the process of engaging Badiou’s philosophical account of 
universality, the latter’s reading of Paul as the founder of Christianity leads Žižek 
directly to his own reading of Paul and Christianity.111 His critique is not developed in 
purely theoretical terms, but finds Žižek arguing that there is an inner necessity to this 
turn to theology as ‘only Christianity opens up the space for thinking the inexistence of 
the big Other, insofar as it is the religion of a God who dies’ (Žižek, 2013b, p. 176). The 
question of what exactly this means is the subject matter to which I turn my attention 
next. For now, however, the following observation is in order: Through this engagement 
with Badiou, Žižek begins to develop his own reading of Christian theology and its 
import for his own political thought. As we shall see, the latter is thought out through 
the former (and vice versa).   
2.3 Christianity’s Perverse Core 
The engagement with Badiou’s reading of Paul and the truth-event leads Žižek to 
conclude that ‘what we need today is the gesture that would undermine capitalist 
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 See also p. 159. 
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 However, while Žižek clearly connects Paul’s universalist legacy to Christianity, as previously 
observed (in section 1.3), Badiou places it in the trans-historical revolutionary/communist context. Thus, 
in Del’ideology, Badiou and his co-author François Balmès regard Paul as a ‘communist invariant’, 
together with Thomas Müntzer and the German peasant revolt (Badiou and Balmès, 1976, pp. 60-75). I 
have relied here on the English translation (rough draft) by Z.L. Fraser, available online at: 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/47747975/Of-Ideology (Accessed: 20 September 2016).  
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globalisation [with particularisation] from the standpoint of universal Truth, just as 
Pauline Christianity did to the Roman global Empire’ (Žižek, 1λλλa, p. 211). Just as the 
global Empire, which was held together by a non-substantial link to the Roman legal 
order, was undermined by Pauline Christianity from the standpoint of universal Truth, 
the same standpoint is needed in the struggle against capitalist globalisation. In a sense, 
all of Žižek’s books on Christianity represent an attempt to grapple with the full 
implications of this statement. In all of them, after calling for a Pauline-style 
intervention, he turns to an analysis of what it is about the contemporary situation that 
makes a Pauline gesture possible and necessary.  
 Žižek’s own understanding of contemporary society is that it is increasingly 
characterised by perversion. This comes from the fact, already observed in 1.2.3.1.2, 
that modernity has permanently undercut the big Other of society.112 Whereas before 
God was the privileged name for the big Other, ordering everything and everyone’s 
place in society, once that was no longer the case, the subjects were left in a double 
bind. Building on Lacan’s premise, Žižek argues that the role of the big Other was to 
prohibit and thereby shield the subjects from harmful pleasures, while at the same time 
providing a small amount of pleasure through the law’s inherent transgression. This 
means that in modernity, without the law, pleasure threatens to overwhelm the subject, 
while on the other hand, the breakdown of law also threatens to deprive the subject of 
the small amount of pleasure derived from transgressing the law.  
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 See also Chapter 1: ‘On the One’ of Žižek (1λλ1a), pp. 7-60. 
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 Perversion,113 Žižek argues, is a twofold strategy to counteract the nonexistence 
of the big Other and the resulting double bind. There is first ‘an (ultimately deeply 
conservative, nostalgic) attempt to install the law artificially, in the desperate hope that 
we will then take this self-posited limitation seriously’ (2003, p. 53). Secondly, there is 
‘in a complementary way, a no less desperate attempt to codify the very transgression of 
the Law’ (ibid.). As an example, Žižek goes on to mention the imposition of ‘traditional 
values’ by the Christian fundamentalists in the United States. While on the surface this 
imposition represents an attempt to suppress destructive pleasures, the Christian 
fundamentalist position is at the same time sustained by an ‘ambiguous attitude of 
horror/envy with regard to the unspeakable pleasures in which sinners engage’ (Žižek, 
2003, p. 68).114  
 What, then, is the way to avoid perversion, and what does Christianity have to 
do with that? This is developed and clarified in The Puppet and the Dwarf, in which, by 
again focusing on the problem of perversion in Romans 7 as presented by Lacan,115 
Žižek clarifies the connection between the contemporary situation and Pauline 
intervention. Given that Žižek presents Paul’s argument as geared toward escaping 
perversion, does he propose that the only option is a straightforward turn to the 
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 The term is here by Žižek perceived in a broader sense, applied beyond its usual sexual context 
primarily to political situations – thus for instance describing Stalinism and Nazism as utterly perverse 
political ideologies (e.g. 1993, p. 195; 2001b, p. 139; 2007, p. 227; 1997, p. 69). It marks a conservative 
‘solution’ to the problem of the decline of the big Other, which reveals a belief in its existence. In that 
sense, ‘perversion is not subversion’ (1999a, p. 247). 
114
 This, Žižek argues, is exemplified by the numerous sex scandals involving major figures on the 
religious Right, such as the American televangelist Jimmy Swaggart, whose zealous condemnations of 
sexual immorality were countered by his sexual scandals in the eighties and nineties, or his preaching 
against self-centredness, which is carried out as a ‘show’ event, bearing the appearance of an ego-trip. 
Another example is that of the former Republican senator Rick Santorum’s infamous remarks claiming 
that the acceptance of homosexuality will inevitably lead to ‘man on dog’ sex. Only an obsession with 
transgressive sexuality would make such a connection seem plausible, Žižek contends.    
115
 See footnote 108. 
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Christian position? Not at all. In Chapter 2 of The Puppet and the Dwarf, entitled ‘The 
Thrilling Romance of Orthodoxy’ (2003, pp. 34-57), Žižek uses G. K. Chesterton’s 
(1874-1936) Orthodoxy (1996) and injects his insights into contemporary debates that 
show a certain perverse logic,116 while arguing that perversion is actually the key 
strategy of existing Christianity (Žižek, 2003, p. 53). The Christian system of 
prohibition and self-denial ‘is the only frame within which we can enjoy pagan 
pleasures: the feeling of guilt is a fake enabling us to give ourselves over to pleasures’ 
(ibid., p. 57). He gives the following example:  
This is what the perverse version of Christianity entices us to do: betray 
your desire, compromise with regard to the essential, to what really 
matters and you are welcome to have all the trivial pleasures you are 
dreaming about deep in your heart! Or as they would put it today: 
renounce marriage, become a priest and you can have all the little boys 
you want. The fundamental structure here is not so much that of 
conditional joy117 (you can have it if you…), but rather, that of fake 
sacrifice, of pretending not to have ‘it’, to renounce it, in order to deceive 
the big Other, to conceal from it the fact that we do have it (ibid., pp. 49-
50). 
 
In fact, Žižek goes so far as to wonder if the Christian God is himself a pervert, in that 
he seems to need the Fall to occur in order to be able to redeem humanity.118 He needs 
Judas to commit the despicable act of betraying Jesus in order to carry out his plan of 
redemption. It is this very moment of perversion, where God himself seems to operate 
according to the principle ‘let us do evil that good may result’ (Romans 8: 3), that is the 
perverse core of Christianity to which the subtitle of The Puppet and the Dwarf refers. 
                                                 
116
 For example, upholding democratic values through torture (Žižek, 2003, p. 37). 
117
 While otherwise following Chesterton, Žižek here critiques him for his ‘doctrine of conditional joy’ – 
joy that depends on what is forbidden (Chesterton, 1996, p. 40). By insisting that there is a constitutive 
exception (you may have joy, if you…), Žižek argues, Chesterton remains within perversion.  
118
 This draws on Žižek’s previous discussions of the philosopher Malebranche as proposing that God 
incited Adam and Eve to sin in order to be able to redeem them (Žižek, 1λλλa, pp. 116-119 at p. 118). 
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Therefore, the Christianity of today cannot be the cure for perversion, since it is itself 
perverted. What is required is to dispose of this perverted core and recover the true, 
authentic Christian message with its revolutionary potential embodied in its founding 
gesture. To this we turn next. 
 
2.4 The Jewish Context of Christianity  
The first necessary step in removing Christianity’s perverse core, Žižek argues, is to 
fully grasp the distinctiveness of the Jewish context within which Pauline Christianity 
arose. Just what Žižek means when he talks about the Jewish context is again a project 
that he develops throughout his books pertaining to Christianity.  
 In the Fragile Absolute and On Belief, Žižek attempts to ground his 
understanding of Judaism in Freud’s Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion 
(1939). In this alternative account of the emergence of Jewish Monotheism, Freud 
presents Moses as an Egyptian who adhered to the worship of Aton, the first recorded 
monotheism. When the Pharaoh who had imposed Aton-worship was deposed, Moses 
turned to the Jewish slaves and led them out of Egypt in the hope of perpetuating the 
religion of Aton. Moses proved to be a harsh leader, which eventually led to a rebellion 
against him. The Jews killed him and did away with Aton worship. However, just as the 
murdered primeval father in Totem und Tabu (1913) was transformed into a 
domineering internalised authority by his guilty sons, the murdered Moses returned in a 
more fearsome and powerful form as Yahweh. Freud argues that Paul’s creation of 
Christianity based on the death of Christ was an attempt to move beyond this primal 
crime and the inherent guilt. Whereas the Jews and other religions are forever haunted 
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by guilt for their act because they do not admit to committing it, Žižek concludes, 
Christians achieve a kind of purification, or are at peace, because they openly admit to it 
(Žižek, 2000b, p. λ0).  
 It is in The Puppet and the Dwarf (‘Subtraction, Jewish and Christian’, 2003, pp. 
122-143) that Žižek for the first time develops his own account of Jewish origins, which 
becomes the basis for his most systematic stance on Christianity. Abandoning Freud’s 
account, he instead focuses on the (unusual) figure of Job as the founder of the Jewish 
religion.119 The choice of this Old Testament figure is due to his representation of doubt 
or questioning of the symbolic Order, which, Žižek argues, is the absolutely necessary 
first step toward revolutionary change:  
What makes the Book of Job so provocative is not simply the presence of 
multiple perspectives without a clear resolution (the fact that Job’s 
suffering involves a different perspective than that of religious reliance 
on God); Job’s perplexity stems from the fact that he experiences God as 
an impenetrable Thing; he is uncertain what He wants from him in 
inflicting the ordeals to which he is submitted, and, consequently, he – 
Job – is unable to ascertain how he fits in the overall divine order, unable 
to recognise his place in it (Žižek, 2003, p. 124). 
 
Žižek’s understanding of Job is adopted from G. K. Chesterton’s philosophical essay 
The Book of Job: An Introduction (1916), with particular interest in the commentary’s 
emphasis that the Book of Job does not provide a satisfactory answer to why Job suffers, 
why God tests Job or why God refuses to explain His design. It is with reference to the 
latter that Chesterton remarks, ‘The refusal of God to explain His design is itself a 
burning hint of His design. The riddles of God are more satisfying than the solutions of 
man’ (ibid.). In Žižek’s words, when God is confronted with the suffering of Job, ‘he 
                                                 
119
 See also Žižek’s ‘A Meditation on Michelangelo’s Christ on the Cross’ in Davis et al. (2010a), pp. 
176-179.  
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resolves the riddle by supplanting it with an even more radical riddle, by redoubling the 
riddle, by transposing the riddle from Job’s mind into the thing itself – he comes to 
share Job’s astonishment at the chaotic madness of the created universe’ (Žižek, 200λa, 
p. 48). What occurs is a Hegelian transposing of epistemological limitation into an 
ontological fault (cf, Žižek, 2003, p. 55): God himself is astonished. It is through this 
dialectical transition that God or the big Other as the constitutive exception, 
Chesterton’s or actually existing Christianity’s perversion of conditional joy, is 
overcome: 
God is here no longer the miraculous exception that guarantees the 
normality of the universe, the unexplainable X who enables us to explain 
everything else; he is, on the contrary, himself overwhelmed by the 
overflowing miracle of his Creation. Upon a closer look, there is nothing 
normal in our universe — everything, every small thing that is, is a 
miraculous exception; viewed from a proper perspective, every normal 
thing is a monstrosity (Žižek and Milbank, 200λ, p. 50).  
 
Cf. with Chesterton:  
To startle man, God becomes for an instant a blasphemer; one might 
almost say that God becomes for an instant an atheist. He unrolls before 
Job a long panorama of created things, the horse, the eagle, the raven, the 
wild ass, the peacock, the ostrich, the crocodile. He so describes each of 
them that it sounds like a monster walking in the sun. The whole is a sort 
of psalm or rhapsody of the sense of wonder. The maker of all things is 
astonished at the things he has Himself made (Chesteron, 1917, xxiii). 
 
When God appears at the end of the book, Žižek argues, he doesn’t provide an answer 
to Job’s questions, but ‘acts like someone caught in a moment of impotence – or at the 
very least, weakness – and tries to escape his predicament by empty boasting’ (Žižek, 
2003, p. 125). It was Job, the revolutionary ideal, who brought God to this point of 
confusion and seeming bewilderment by His own creation, with his relentless 
questioning. He is the archetypal figure of someone resisting meaning. Certainly, this is 
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very different to the traditional understanding of Job as a patient sufferer with a firm 
belief in God. Nonetheless, Žižek argues that the book is an exemplary case of the 
critique of ideology in human history. The book dismisses any attempt of legitimising 
suffering, represented by Job’s ‘comforting’ friends,120 against whom God himself takes 
Job’s side (Job 42:7-λ). Žižek goes on to point out that what is most interesting is Job’s 
silence after God speaks.121 He does not continue with an open declaration that God has 
failed him, but remains silent. According to Žižek, this is  
neither because he was crushed by God’s overwhelming presence, nor 
because he wanted thereby to indicate his continuous resistance, that is, 
the fact that God avoided answering Job’s question, but because in a 
gesture of silent solidarity, he perceived the divine impotence. God is 
neither just nor unjust, simply impotent. What Job suddenly understood 
was that it was not him, but God himself, who was actually on trial in 
Job’s calamities, and He failed the test miserably (2003, pp. 126-127).  
 
In a way, Žižek argues, Job’s silence also indicates that the Jewish community still 
persists with something analogous to the superego structure. Even though God’s 
omnipotence is discredited, Jews still continue to engage in ritual practices as if nothing 
                                                 
120
 Žižek compares the three friends and their insistence on inscription of meaning to the three doctors in 
Freud’s account of a dream in which he examines his patient Irma’s throat: ‘The structure here is exactly 
the same as that of Freud’s dream of Irma’s injection, which begins with a conversation between Freud 
and his patient Irma about the failure of her treatment due to an infected injection; in the course of the 
conversation, Freud gets closer to her, approaches her face and looks deep into her mouth, confronting the 
horrible sight of the livid red flesh. At this point of unbearable horror, the atmosphere of the dream 
changes, the horror all of a sudden lapses into comedy: three doctors, Freud’s friends, appear and, in 
ridiculous pseudo-professional jargon, enumerate multiple (and mutually exclusive) reasons why Irma’s 
poisoning by the infected injection was nobody’s fault (there was no injection, the injection was clean…). 
So there is first a traumatic encounter (the sight of the raw flesh of Irma’s throat), which is followed by 
the sudden change into comedy, into the exchange between three ridiculous doctors which enables the 
dreamer to avoid the encounter with the real trauma. The function of the three doctors is the same as that 
of the three theological friends in the story of Job: to obfuscate the impact of the trauma with a symbolic 
semblance’ (Žižek, 2009a, p. 53). 
121
 Žižek simply ignores Job’s response to God in 42:1-6, where Job admits that he was wrong and God 
was right. No doubt, he could argue that Job’s reply is in a sense part of Job’s subsequent decision to keep 
the status quo. Still, he is quick to notice verses 7-λ regarding Job’s friends. Chesterton certainly doesn't 
understand God as silent, but as rebuking not only Job’s comforters, but also Job – the accuser: ‘God 
rebukes alike the man who accused and the men who defended Him.’ See Chesterton, The Book of Job, 
http://www.chesterton.org/introduction-to-job/. The convenient omission of Job’s response is an example 
of Žižek’s liberal treatment of the biblical text.  
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happened, in order to conceal God’s impotence (ibid., p. 129). More importantly, along 
the line of Marx, it is not only ritual practices but the observation of the Jewish Law, 
with its dimension of divine justice, which legitimises any temporary injustices.  The 
Jewish Law stands as the prime example of the ideological fantasy. In fact, this is what 
leads Žižek to contend in The Parallax View that ‘the proclamation of the Decalogue is 
not the normal case of ideological interpolation: The Decalogue is precisely a law 
deprived of the obscene fantasmatic support’ (Žižek, 2006b, p. 427). It is therefore 
imperative that any attempt to escape from the perverse logic of the obscene superego 
supplement start here. 
2.5 Christianity’s Subversive Element  
Only with an understanding of its Jewish context, Žižek argues, can Paul’s 
revolutionary gesture be properly understood. Actually, in opposition to Nietzsche, who 
understands Paul as power-hungry and filled with hatred and desire for revenge against 
the Jewish Law (Nietzsche, 1942, pp. 39-42), Žižek understands Paul as a Jew, rather 
than a convert.122 From this perspective, Paul did not abandon the Jewish position, but 
did something with and within the Jewish position itself. What Paul did was to bring 
about a subversive new understanding of the Law, which was otherwise an obstacle to 
the Gentiles (Žižek, 2003, pp. λ2-121). In explaining how Paul manages to do this, 
Žižek echoes Freud’s basic scheme of the relationship between Judaism and 
Christianity, namely, his contention that Paul founds Christianity by revealing what 
                                                 
122
 Judaism is thus in a dialectical relationship to Christianity: Without Judaism first identifying and 
remaining faithful to the fantasmatic kernel, Christianity would not have been able to identify with it and 
show it to be empty. Without the Jewish community constituted as an ethnic remainder, Paul would not 
have been able to claim that the whole of humanity is a remainder. 
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Judaism kept hidden. Yet where Freud views Christ as a repetition of Moses, Žižek 
views him as a repetition of Job.   
However, Christ’s repetition of Job is not just a simple repetition, but a 
radicalisation. In other words, Christ brings the act of Job to its conclusion. Job, who 
out of solidarity chooses to remain silent upon discovering God’s impotence, in this 
way maintains the logic of the subject supposed to believe, keeping up appearances for 
the sake of the big Other. This big Other is no longer God, but the human public in 
general. Christ, however, breaks this cycle of the subject supposed to believe through 
his cry of dereliction on the Cross (Matthew 27:45-46), which, because he is the 
Incarnation of God, represents more than just a cry of anguish and pain, as Žižek 
explains: ‘Christ’s words on the Cross “Father,123 why have you forsaken me?” — in 
this moment of total abandonment, the subject experiences and fully assumes the 
inexistence of the big Other’ (2002b, p. 1κ0). Because Christ himself is God, this is 
rather a proclamation of judgement: where there is supposed to be God, there is 
nothing. There is no objective meaning in history and no big Other who guarantees the 
happy outcome of our lives and deeds.  What is more, ‘the impotent God who failed in 
creation’ is the split Absolute subject: ‘the traumatic experience of God is also the 
enigma for God himself – our failure to comprehend God is what Hegel called a 
“reflexive determination” of the divine self-limitation’ (Žižek, 2001b, pp. 132-133). By 
                                                 
123
 This is another example of Žižek’s liberal treatment of the biblical text. In his quotation of Christ’s cry 
of dereliction in Matthew 27:45-46, Žižek replaces ‘eloi – God’ with ‘Father,’ thus bringing it into a 
smoother compatibility with Lacan and Freud’s role of the father in psychoanalysis. Pound contends, in 
my opinion rightly, that in this way Žižek conflates two distinct events: Christ’s forsakenness by ‘God’ in 
Matthew and his committal to the ‘Father’ in Luke 23:46. The result is of course that abandonment has 
the last word. See Pound (2008), pp. 48-4λ. Thus Žižek’s ‘error’ is indeed intentional, like his selectivity. 
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borrowing Chesterton’s words, Žižek claims that on the Cross, ‘God seemed for an 
instant to be an atheist’ (Žižek, 2003, p. 14).   
Theologically speaking, Žižek’s understanding of the death of God himself on 
the Cross is along the lines of Philippians 2:7 – Christ empties himself in a kenotic way, 
and in this way enables or brings about a gap (Žižek, 2003, p. 26; 2010c, p. 118). In this 
sense the Christian God of kenosis is the actualised difference in that he himself is the 
very person who provokes the question of whether he is still God.124 This kenosis in its 
radicality as self-sacrifice of God is enabled by the fact that Christ is God. While the 
God of the Old Testament is still ‘the real thing of beyond’, the divine dimension of 
Christ is ‘just a tiny grimace, an imperceptible shade, which differentiates him from 
other (ordinary) humans.’ In that sense Christ is ‘“the Thing itself”, or, more accurately, 
“the Thing itself” is nothing but the rupture/gap that makes Christ not fully human’ 
(Žižek, 2001c, p. 101).  
According to Žižek, this theme of the death of God still constitutes a challenge 
today, and for reasons which are indeed consistent with the critique of the perverse core 
of the actually existing Christianity that he presents in The Puppet and the Dwarf 
(2003). As he sees it, the very concept of Trinity or the triune God leads not only to 
monotheism, but also ultimately to atheism. The importance of the belief that God 
himself dies on the Cross is displayed in the early church history, with Tertullian, who 
held that the true Christian belief is that God himself died and yet lives eternally, and 
also during the Aryan controversy and against Apollinarian circles, when Athanasius 
                                                 
124
 Žižek probably derives this understanding of kenosis from Chesterton. The concept appears also in 
Gianni Vattimo’s integration of the concept of the death of God in ‘the God who is Dead’ (Vattimo, 2002, 
pp. 11-24).  
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insisted that it was God himself who was crucified (Tertullian’s Adversus Marcionem 
cited in Jüngel, 1977, p. 85).125 However, any discussion of or reference to the crucified 
God loses the edge where Athanasius claims that Christ did not suffer in his divinity, 
but in his flesh for us (Athanasius’ Contra Arianos, cited in Jüngel, 1977, p. 86). 
Afterwards the theological discussion of the death of God subsides and only re-emerges 
in late nineteenth and twentieth century. As a result, ‘Today, two thousand years later, 
this death of God is still an enigma: how to read it outside the pagan-mythic topic of 
divine sacrifice or the legalistic topic of exchange (payment for sins)?’ (Žižek 200λa, p. 
3λ). Žižek’s understanding of the Cross here is fully Hegelian in that the infinite pain of 
the loss or death of God is sublimated in God himself, ‘as a moment of the supreme 
Idea’: 
God himself is dead […], purely as a moment of the supreme Idea, the 
pure concept must give philosophical existence to what used to be either 
the moral precept that we must sacrifice the empirical Being, or the 
concept of formal abstraction, to re-establish the idea of absolute freedom 
and along with it the absolute passion (as in suffering), the speculative 
Good Friday in place of the historic Good Friday, to speculatively re-
establish Good Friday in the whole truth and harshness of its godlessness 
(Hegel, 1983, p. 134).126  
 
This re-establishment of the Good Friday in its ‘whole truth and harshness of its 
godlessness’, Žižek argues, is the potential (if read properly) of Chesterton’s non-
perverse reading of the death of God. Indeed, Žižek’s claim is even that it was 
‘Chesterton, who thought through the notion of the “death of God” to its radical 
                                                 
125
 The examples of Tertullian and Athanasius are here mentioned only to illustrate the extent or 
importance which a theoretical understanding of the Cross in Christianity has occupied. 
126
 This is my altered translation of a quote from Hegel’s ‘Glauben und Wissen oder die 
Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität, in der Vollständigkeit ihrer formen, als Kantische, Jakobische 
und Fichtesche Philosophie’ (Hegel, 1λκ3, pp. 273-287). It differs somewhat from the Cerf and Harris 
translation (Hegel, 1977, pp. 190-1λ1) in order to preserve the clarity and main point of Hegel’s thought 
here.  
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conclusion: only in Christianity God himself has to go through atheism’ (Žižek, 200λa, 
p. 3λ). The fact that God in Chesterton’s reading is a suffering God means first of all 
that God is involved with his creation, indeed involved in the suffering:  
The insight into the speculative identity of Good and Evil, the notion of 
God’s two sides, peaceful harmony and destructive rage, the claim that, 
in fighting Evil, the good God is fighting himself (an internal struggle), is 
still the (highest) pagan insight. It is only the third feature, the suffering 
God, whose sudden emergence resolves this tension of God’s two faces, 
that brings us to Christianity: what paganism cannot imagine is such a 
suffering God (Žižek, 200λa, pp. 47-48).  
  
Since it is God himself who dies on the Cross, this reading of the event prevents any 
attempt at resurrection of God as the big Other, perversion. In contrast to the standard 
form of atheism, where ‘God dies for men who stop believing in him; in Christianity, 
God dies for himself’ (Žižek, 2003, p. 15). Since God did not die for us, but for himself, 
this precludes a sacrificial reading of his death.  
This non-perverse God who dies for himself is a God who refuses to guarantee 
the meaning of our reality, a God who is no longer above or beyond, but engaged in this 
reality, as in his answer to Job and in Christ’s cry on the Cross.  In a long comment on 
Job in one of his conversations with Glyn Daly, Žižek gives the following elaboration: 
‘[T]he moment you accept suffering as something that doesn’t have a deeper meaning, it 
means that we can change it; fight against it. This is the zero level of critique of 
ideology – when you don’t read meaning into it’ (Žižek and Daly, 2004, p. 161). Žižek 
is quick to reply to any objection under the umbrella of the inscrutability of God’s ways 
by recalling Job’s lesson:   
The legacy of Job precludes such a gesture of taking a refuge in the 
standard transcendent figure of God as a secret Master who knows the 
meaning of what appears to us to be a meaningless catastrophe, the God 
who sees the entire picture in which what we perceive as a stain 
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contributes to global harmony. […] Christ’s death on the Cross thus 
means that we should immediately ditch the notion of God as a 
transcendent caretaker who guarantees the happy outcome of our acts, 
the guarantee of historical teleology – Christ’s death on the Cross is the 
death of this God, it repeats Job’s stance, it refuses any ‘deeper meaning’ 
that obfuscates the brutal reality of historical catastrophes (Žižek and 
Milbank, 2009, pp. 54-55).  
 
If God is dead not just for us but for himself, then what does Žižek do with the biblical 
account of the resurrection? Does he ignore it or dismiss it in order to avoid resurrecting 
God as absolute? As explained in The Monstrosity of Christ he reads it in a Hegelian 
way, insisting that ‘Crucifixion and Resurrection […] should be perceived not as two 
consecutive events, but as a purely formal parallax shift on one and the same event: 
Crucifixion is Resurrection – to see this, one has only to include oneself in the picture’ 
(ibid., p. 291). He goes further by saying that this is not a Hegelian reading, but Pauline, 
since it was the Apostle who re-read the death of Christ as a triumph:  
Let us take the case of Saint Paul, whose rereading of the death of 
Christ gave Christianity its definitive contours. He did not add any new 
content to the already-existing dogmas – all he did was to remark as the 
greatest triumph, as the fulfilment of Christ's supreme mission 
(reconciliation of God with mankind), what was before experienced as 
traumatic loss (the defeat of Christ's mundane mission, his infamous 
death on the Cross). Here we encounter again the fundamental Hegelian 
motif: ‘reconciliation’ does not convey any kind of miraculous healing of 
the wound of scission, it consists solely in a reversal of perspective by 
means of which we perceive how the scission is in itself already 
reconciliation – how, for example, Christ's defeat and infamous death are 
already in themselves reconciliation. To accomplish ‘reconciliation’ we 
do not have to ‘overcome’ the scission, we just have to re-mark it (1991a, 
p. 78).127  
 
                                                 
127
 This explains the subtitle of Žižek’s essay in Paul Among the Philosophers, ‘From Job to Christ: A 
Paulinian reading of Chesterton’ (Žižek in Caputo et al., pp. 39-58).  
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2.6 Dialectical Materialism  
This proclamation of God’s impotence in Christ’s cry of dereliction, Žižek argues, 
marks the emergence of materialism and explains his insistence at the (previously 
mentioned) start of The Puppet and the Dwarf that in order to become a dialectical 
materialist one should go through the Christian experience (Žižek, 2003, p. 6). The 
Christ-event reveals not only the nonexistence of the big Other, but opens up the space 
for thinking about its implications (Žižek and Milbank, 200λ, p. 2κ7), that is the 
inconsistency and contingency of reality itself (2006b, p. 79). The event not only reveals 
that there is nothing but material reality, but also that this material reality is itself 
inconsistent and incomplete. Without this experience, for example, the religious core 
survives in humanism, even up to Stalinism with its belief in history as the big Other 
that decides on the objective meaning of our deeds. In a 2008 Lecture at Vanderbilt 
University entitled ‘Between Fear and Trembling: On Why Only Atheists Can Believe’ 
(Žižek, 200κa), Žižek gives the example of many communist cadre who committed 
suicide when Stalinism was renounced in Russia. The reason for that, Žižek argues, was 
not that they were unaware of the atrocities that were committed (quite the opposite), 
but the fact that there was now no historical big Other to justify it. Without the Christian 
experience the big Other remains. Žižek’s description of a true dialectical materialist as 
one who necessarily goes through the Christian experience, indicates clearly that the 
Christian experience itself is not dispensable. In other words, only Christianity has the 
ability to become genuinely materialistic.  
This was again confirmed at The Actuality of the Theologico-Political 
Conference at the Birkbeck Institute, hosted by Žižek himself, who, to Eric Santner’s 
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question of why the persistent turning to Christianity, replied that without the 
theological, critique of ideology fails. ‘The old syntagm, the ‘theologico-political,’ 
acquires new relevance here: it is not only that every politics is grounded in a 
‘theological’ view of reality, it is also that every theology is inherently political, an 
ideology of a new collective space’ (Žižek, 2010c, p. 119).  
Žižek claims that genuine materialism and Christian theology mutually 
presuppose each other; therefore the role of theology in his work cannot be reduced to 
the status of an illustration or a passing fad, and neither can it be dismissed as a purely 
negative concern. The latter seems to be the understanding of Žižek’s engagement with 
theology by John D. Caputo. In his review of The Monstrosity of Christ, he expresses 
doubts about Žižek’s sincerity and guesses that his true intent is to undermine Christian 
belief in God:  
We all know that Žižek can very well make his main case with no 
mention of Christ at all, that he can use the seminars of Lacan, the films 
of Alfred Hitchcock or the novels of Stephen King just as well. His 
whole point, as he says elsewhere, is subversive: to build a Trojan-horse 
theology, to slip the nose of a more radical materialism under the Pauline 
tent of theology in order to announce the death of God […]. He discusses 
Christian doctrines like the Trinity, the Incarnation and the Crucifixion, 
the way an analyst talks with a patient who thinks there is a snake under 
his bed, trying patiently to heal the patient by going along with the 
patient’s illusions until the patient is led to see the illusion (Caputo, 
2009).  
 
However, Caputo’s understanding of Žižek acting like an analyst showing that God is 
dead is incorrect by not being radical enough, since for Žižek God himself is the analyst 
showing that he is dead. Far from Žižek insincerely subverting belief, he rather 
sincerely engages the essence of Christian belief: a God who suffers and dies.  
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Schelling’s Die Weltalter (1946), discussed previously in 1.2.3.1.4, is for Žižek the 
founding text of dialectical materialism, not despite its theological content, but precisely 
because of it: 
The point is not to reject what is not true in Schelling, the false 
(‘obscurantist,’ ‘theosophico-mythological’) shell of his system, in order 
to attain its kernel of truth; its truth, rather, is inextricably linked to what, 
from our contemporary perspective, cannot but appear as blatantly ‘not 
true,’ so that every attempt to discard the part or aspect considered ‘not 
true’ inevitably entails the loss of the truth itself […] (Žižek, 1λλ6, p. 7)   
 
Indeed, Christianity is the prerequisite of the critique of ideology. This critique is 
inherently Christian in and of its experience and is itself articulated in theological terms 
and continues to address core theological issues. This is seen in The Parallax View, in 
which Žižek not only carries forward the major conclusions concerning Christianity 
reached in his earlier works, but expresses new developments of ideological critique in 
theological terms (2006b, pp. 68-123). It is through explicit discussions of theological 
terms that notions such as the reality of human freedom are introduced. Such notions, 
which possess a symbolic authority, are then grounded in the material, the physical. He 
does this by engaging with the sciences, such as cognitive science, quantum mechanics 
and evolutionary theory.128 In this way, Žižek does not end up affirming the 
metaphysical concept of God, but replaces an outdated and instinctive metaphysical 
system with a materialistic model, which can make sense of the latest science and 
simultaneously does justice to the experience of human freedom. Dialectical 
materialism is thus a non-reductive type of materialism, which does not claim that 
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 See also Žižek (1996), p. 230, where Žižek uses quantum physics to provide a scientific grounding for 
the idea that the realm of deterministic physical law is ‘non-all’. Thus human subjectivity emerges out of 
the order of determinism in a dialectic manner.  
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‘everything is matter’, but instead confers upon ‘immaterial phenomena a specific 
positive nonbeing’ (2006b, p. 16κ).  
At the same time, this type of materialism is not simply non-reductive, i.e. it 
does not merely posit non-material beings. Instead it is truly dialectically aufgehoben 
[sublated]129 in that the autonomous symbolic level of reality is necessarily grounded in 
the contradictory material level (Žižek, 1λλ6, p. 74). In his treatment of the 
understanding of the death of Christ described above, Žižek therefore proposes that the 
proper understanding is only that which grounds the symbolic in the material – the 
understanding that exposes the human subject as self-legislating, without a divine 
master. God thus functions as the ultimate ethical agency putting the burden on 
humanity to organise itself. In Paul’s New Moment, Žižek thus concludes: ‘This is why 
I – precisely as a radical leftist – think that Christianity is far too precious a thing to 
leave to conservative fundamentalists. We should fight for it. Our message should not 
be, “You can have it,” but “No, it’s ours. You are kidnapping it”’ (Žižek, 2010a, p. 
1κ1). Therefore, Žižek’s dialectical materialism is properly theological materialism.  
2.7 A theological overcoming of the constitutive exception 
In On Belief (2001b), Žižek fully spells out the import of Christianity’s overcoming of 
the constitutive exception for his political thought, which takes on the form of 
Leninism, and by this providing a full reply to Butler’s accusation of the political 
impotency of his psychoanalytic thought. On the last pages of the book, Žižek is clear: 
Here enters the ‘good news’ of Christianity: the miracle of faith is that it 
IS possible to traverse the fantasy, to undo this founding decision, to start 
one’s life all over again, from the zero point – in short, to change Eternity 
itself (what we ‘always–already are’). Ultimately, the ‘rebirth’ of which 
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 One is only defined in relation to the other and incorporates the other into itself. 
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Christianity speaks (when one joins the community of believers, one is 
born again) is the name for such a new Beginning (ibid., p. 148). 
 
It is important to observe the change of language that occurs away from Lacanian 
terminology in this passage. Instead, it leans heavily on theological terminology, which 
enables a political act.130 At the end of the book Lacan subsides and we instead find 
references to Søren Kierkegaard, Karl Marx, Evelyn Waugh, Berthold Brecht, Friedrich 
Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling and Vladimir Lenin. It is Lenin, with his absolute 
commitment to the revolutionary cause and the suspension of ethics in its name, who is 
a repetition of the paradigmatic Christ-event, and who changed the coordinates of the 
liberal-capitalist world order (ibid., p. 114).131 Lenin’s advocation of actual freedom, 
representing the ability to step outside or transcend the particular context in question, as 
opposed to formal freedom, where the freedom is only apparent and its boundaries are 
in fact set by a certain situation, is thus the choice to change the very coordinates of that 
situation. Lenin’s actual vs. formal freedom is thus of the same order as Christianity’s 
possibility of a thoroughly new beginning, and Roland Boer is certainly right when he 
extrapolates that Žižek’s deliberation of Lenin’s actual vs. formal freedom is a Leninist 
formulation not only of Badiou’s Being and the event, but first and foremost of law and 
grace in Paul’s theology (Boer, 200λ, p. 112). While there are frequent references to 
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 A little earlier Žižek actually invokes the term ‘miracle’, quoting Lenin’s contention that ‘in some 
respects, a revolution is a miracle’ (Žižek, 2001b, p. 84). 
131
 Žižek actually compares Lenin as a revolutionary figure to Paul and Christ to Marx, although he is not 
the first to do so – Badiou does so as well. See Badiou (2003), p. 2 cf. Žižek (2000b), p. 2. Of course, 
Žižek's Lenin is the Lenin of the revolutionary moment from April to October 1λ17 (not the earlier or 
later one). He is presented as the purest historical example of an evental subject who has had the courage 
to act without the sanction of the big Other. Boucher and Sharpe critique Žižek that this image of Lenin is 
not actual, complete or true. See ‘Repeating Lenin, an Infantile Disorder?’ in Sharpe and Boucher (2010), 
pp. 225-228. Like his reply to accusations of supersessionism, which I elaborate in 2.7.2.1, Žižek is well 
aware that there are more controversial aspects to Lenin, but he refuses to reduce the potentiality of Lenin 
to that contentious figure. 
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Lacan in On Belief, the main points of Christian theology are no longer interpreted by 
means of his categories, but by Lenin, in the company of whom theology articulates key 
political points.  
 
2.7.1 Militant politics of external and contingent Grace 
One such example is Žižek’s theological articulation that Lenin’s actual freedom, or 
Badiou’s event, or Christianity’s act of a thoroughly new beginning, is only a 
possibility of something new; it is not ensured. This point is very important and 
deserving a quote from Žižek:  
By taking upon himself all the Sins and then, through his death, paying 
for them, Christ opens up the way for the redemption of humanity – 
however, by his death, people are not directly redeemed, but given the 
POSSIBILITY of redemption, of getting rid of the excess. This 
distinction is crucial: Christ does NOT do our work for us, he does not 
pay our debt, he ‘merely’ GIVES US A CHANCE – with his death, he 
asserts OUR freedom and responsibility, i.e. he ‘merely’ opens up the 
possibility, for us, to redeem ourselves through the ‘leap into faith,’ i.e. 
by way of choosing to ‘live in Christ’ – in imitatio Christi, we REPEAT 
Christ’s gesture of freely assuming the excess of Life, instead of 
projecting/displacing it onto some figure of the Other (2001b, p. 105). 
 
As already noted, On Belief is saturated with theological language, but in relation to this 
quote one term is deserving of special mention: ‘grace’ (ibid., pp. 1-5). Žižek 
understands grace as the unexpected, unpredictable revolutionary moment, which 
arrives from the outside. Theologically speaking, grace concerns salvation, which 
cannot be earned or deserved, but is rather given by God as a pure externality and 
contingency, to use Žižek’s terminology.  
While God is an entirely different matter for Žižek, he does stress the analogous 
impossibility of predicting revolution, thus maintaining the externality of grace. Even if 
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one assesses the social and political situation, it is impossible to predict how, when, or 
even why the revolution will occur.132 In this context of Žižek, God stands for the 
radically unexpected. Thus we see Žižek developing a materialist theology of grace as 
external, unexpected and beyond human agency, which appears as fore-ordained only 
after it was received, all in order to explain that a suspension of political coordinates 
appears as leading up to it and inevitable only after it occurs. When Paul announces the 
Messiah and thereby brings about a revolution against the existing symbolic order of 
Judaism and Hellenism, this is not an externalisation of an internal event, but an event 
whose Truth only becomes evident or revealed afterwards. Žižek’s theory of a political 
act seeks to promote or give courage to the promotion of political alternatives. These, 
however, are unimaginable or we can say no more about them, but as soon we enter the 
domain of this political act, it becomes cognitively accessible and allows us to 
experience a truly new communality.  
For Žižek, it seems, theology forms one of the most complex ways of speaking 
about radical political change. Moreover, as Boer points out, his militant politic ‘is an 
inescapably radical and revolutionary theological doctrine’ (Boer, 200λ, p. 376). 
Theology is political and the political is theological; therefore, political theology is not 
only possible, but necessary (Žižek, 2010c, pp. 118-119). The attempt to think 
politically, without religious categories, was a failure, Žižek argues, and contends that 
today’s political thought has been turned into an ethics and a legal philosophy. The 
business of politics is supposed to promote moral values and ethical policies which are 
reached either through a discursive will formation (humanitarianism, freedom etc.) or 
                                                 
132
 Thus for example the Arab Spring, a surge of collective action throughout North Africa and the Middle 
East, was unpredictable and indeed unpredicted.  
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through the language of rights (original positions, striking a balance between individual 
rights and community goods, rights as trumps etc.). Theology can help to revive the 
political, to re-politicize politics, by constructing new political subjects who break out 
of the ethico-legal entanglement and ground a new collective space. Žižek concludes: 
‘Paraphrasing Kierkegaard, one can say that what we need today is a theologico-
political suspension of the ethico-legal’ (ibid., p. 11λ). It is to Žižek’s appropriation of 
Kierkegaard that we now turn. 
 
2.7.2 Žižek’s Atonement: An act of madness that suspends the law 
Žižek’s doctrine of atonement is in stark contrast to the four dominant traditional 
atonement models. He points out the problems of all four in Did Somebody Say 
Totalitarianism? (2001d, pp. 45-59) as follows. The ransom theory is riddled with the 
problem of who the price was paid to – if it was Satan, then God and Satan are in a way 
partners in exchange, whereas, if it was God, then why exactly did God exact this 
sacrifice? Žižek dismisses the psychological reading, through which Christ’s sacrifice 
relieves our guilt and shows God’s care for us, as an explanation through a 
psychological mechanism, rather than in theological terms. The legalistic reading is 
flawed because of its inference that God is somehow compelled to comply with a 
legalistic framework. After all, God is the Creator of the world, not part of it. Why 
doesn’t he directly forgive humanity? Lastly, the edifying-religious moral reading, 
which asserts that not only forgiveness but also Christ’s death elicits our compassion 
and desire to transform ourselves, is marred by a perverse logic: in the Garden of Eden 
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God places humanity in trouble, in order to be able to prove his devotion to them by 
later saving them. Instead, Žižek argues:  
Christ’s sacrifice, with its paradoxical structure (it is the very person 
against whom we humans have sinned, whose trust we have betrayed, 
who atones and pays the prices for our sins), suspends the logic of sin 
and punishment, of legal or ethical retribution, of ‘settling accounts,’ by 
bringing it to the point of self-relating (ibid., pp. 49-50). 
 
Christ is the self-willed victim who, despite Peter’s protestations, freely gives himself 
over to the chief priests. His death thus performs a psychoanalytic cut, by introducing a 
moment of madness and suspending the Law or social convention. Far from mediation 
between God and the world in the traditional sense, Christ is the vanishing mediator , 
whose death is the death of God as the big Other or the constitutive exception (Žižek, 
2010a). The atonement is thus best understood as a break, a cut or trauma, in the sense 
that Christ traumatises the Jewish Law and the systems of retributive justice by 
committing a senseless act not circumscribed by social convention.133 It is in The 
Fragile Absolute that Žižek begins to spell out Christianity’s breaking out of the logic 
of constitutive exception, of the vicious cycle of law and sin (2000b, pp. 133, 135, 143), 
culminating in the following passage:  
What if the split between the symbolic Law and the obscene shadowy 
supplement of excessive violence that sustains it is not the ultimate 
horizon of our experience? What if this entanglement of Law and its 
spectral double is precisely what, in the famous passage from Romans 7: 
7, Saint Paul denounces as that which the intervention of the Christian 
agape (love as charity) enables us to leave behind? What if the Pauline 
agape, the move beyond the mutual implication of Law and sin, is not the 
step towards the full symbolic integration of the particularity of Sin into 
the universal domain of the Law, but its exact opposite, the unheard-of 
gesture of leaving behind the domain of the Law itself, of ދdying to the 
Law’, as Saint Paul put it (Romans 7:5)? In other words, what if the 
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 Žižek therefore sees Christ as an example of the death drive – bringing into focus the desire for death 
in his relentless pursuit of Calvary. It is this desire for death that upsets the socio-symbolic (Žižek, 2001b, 
pp. 107-110).  
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Christian wager is not Redemption in the sense of the possibility for the 
domain of the universal Law retroactively to ‘sublate’, integrate, pacify, 
erase – its traumatic origins, but something radically different, the cut 
into the Gordian knot of the vicious cycle of Law and its founding 
Transgression? (ibid., pp. 99-100)  
 
This is the ‘Christian experience’ to which Žižek refers as necessary in order to become 
a true dialectical materialist, the recognition or realisation that Christ stands for a break 
with all totalities and cosmic schemes. Instead of the indiscriminate, postmodern talk 
about differences, Christ divides between good and bad in accordance with the Gospel, 
saying: ‘Do you suppose that I came to bring peace on earth? I tell you, no, but rather 
division’ (Luke 12:51).  
 God’s self-abandonment on the Cross is already upheld in For They Know Not 
as the ultimate example of a dialectical negation of negation, a change in perspective 
that transforms an apparent defeat into victory (1991a, p. 29). Using theological 
language, Žižek calls this triumph the resurrection, but interprets it in a non-traditional 
way.134 His interpretation is in line with Hegel, for whom the death of God in Christ 
represents the giving over of God’s self to the world, whereas his resurrection was and 
is in the community.135 It is identical with the advent of the Holy Spirit, as the bond of 
the new community founded on Christ’s revelation on the Cross. Thereby, in a 
dialectical reasoning, the Holy Spirit is the immediate consequence of the crucifixion, or 
the public revelation that the big Other does not exist.136 Žižek states that ‘from the 
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 For how this non-literal resurrection functions, see ‘Paul and the Truth Event’ (Žižek in Davis et al., 
2010b, pp. 87-92).   
135
 The move from religion to politics by the Young Hegelians that was to follow, and that was in a way 
more obviously critical of religion, was thus traced out already by Hegel. Such is the case of Das Leben 
Jesu (1864), in which David Strauss examined the representation of Jesus’s life in terms of an elaborate 
understanding of myth, in which the incarnation of the Logos was not solely limited to Jesus, but was 
through him distributed among the multiplicity of individuals.  
136
 In a recent interview, ލŽižek and Dupuy: Religion, Secularism, and Political Belongingތ, given 
together with Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Žižek, after delivering an account of his understating of the resurrection, 
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Christian standpoint, praising Christ is the act of accusing God-the-Father’ (Žižek, 
2010c, p. 115). In other words, it is an embodiment of the negativity of the Cross. Žižek 
describes this with reference to Matthew 18:20, ‘For where two or three gather in my 
name, there am I with them’, but departs from the original by interpreting it as ‘When 
there will be love between two of you, I will be there’ (Žižek, 2013b, p. 177). The 
Christian community is thus, like the Jewish community, bound together by solidarity 
with the impotence of God as the big Other. What distinguishes the Christian 
community is its dispensing with the Jewish secret:  
The secret to which the Jews remain faithful is the horror of the divine 
impotence – and it is this secret that is revealed in Christianity. This is 
why Christianity could only occur after Judaism: it reveals the horror first 
confronted by the Jews (2003, p. 129).  
 
2.7.2.1 Interim Thought: Žižek’s account of religion and Eurocentrism 
In his analysis and understanding of religion, Žižek has to some extent re-appropriated 
Hegel’s problematic137 model of religion. The latter aimed to develop a general theory 
of religion by employing an evolutionary model, present in the 18th and 19th century. 
This model denotes a movement from simple to complex, primitive to modern, and 
from African, Aboriginal Australian or Native American to European religion. It thus 
displays its problematic character of the then actual Eurocentrism and Imperialism, 
where the pagan forms of religion are superseded by the monotheism of Judaism, which 
in turn is superseded by Christianity – the ultimate stage of the model. Hegel lists the 
religions in the following order of ascending rank: magic (fetishism, animism, 
                                                 
explains or rather defends it by saying: ދMaybe my reading of the resurrection is too simplistic, but it is 
my reading!’ (Žižek and Dupuy, 2014, 1t 44:20).  
137
 For examples of criticism of Hegel’s colonialist political philosophy displayed in his model of religion, 
see Serequeberhan (1989), pp. 301-308, and Larrain (1991).  
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primitivism), Buddhism, Lamaism, the State Religion of the Chinese Empire, Taoism, 
Hinduism, Persian Religion, Egyptian Religion, Greek Religion, Jewish Religion, 
Roman Religion and Christianity.138  
Žižek’s model of religion is also evolutionary as is clear from his Judeo-
Christian account above, where Jews are still faced with a God who is omnipotent and 
wrathful; thus Judaism is a ‘religion of Anxiety’, whilst Christianity is the ‘religion of 
love’ (Žižek, 2001b, p. 132).139 In The Fragile Absolute (2000b, pp. 96-98) the 
movement is from Ancient pagan or pre-Judaic religions to Judaism and finally to 
Christianity, which is the ultimate form, and Žižek describes religions other than 
Christianity as pre-Christian (ibid., p. 95).140 The model is not supposed to be all 
inclusive (this explains the absence of Islam, among others), for Žižek does not aim to 
develop or present a general theory of religion, but instead wishes to present the 
dialectical movement of historical thought towards ‘uncoupling’. Thus, as Žižek 
elaborates in On Belief (2001b, p. 106), the first in the series of uncoupling was the 
Greek philosophical wondering, which was unplugged from the immersion of the 
subject into the mythical universe. Second, Judaism unplugged from polytheism, and 
finally, Christianity unplugged from one’s substantial community. Žižek does not 
understand this movement as a simple linear succession, but rather as the sublation or 
supersession of what went before. ‘Christianity […] renounces this God of beyond, this 
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 This is also the plan of his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. See the contents pages of 
Volume 16 (1969b) and 17 (1971).  
139
 Žižek borrows the phrase from Augustine.  
140
 A similar evolutionary movement can be observed in his understanding of the development of 
Christianity: from Eastern Orthodoxy, to Roman Catholicism, and finally to Protestantism. Of course, the 
latter example is not temporal, but rather the dialectical shift from the universal to the particular, to the 
singular. See Žižek and Milbank (2009), p. 28. 
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real behind the curtain of the phenomena so that there is nothing there except an 
imperceptible X that changes Christ, this ordinary man into God’ (ibid., p. 89).  
This evolutionary account by Žižek has attracted criticism and challenges to 
distance himself from Hegel’s account. William D. Hart (2002, pp. 553-557), the 
critical theorist of religion, for example, contends that even if Žižek does not fully 
commit to Hegel’s model of religion, his own evolutionary account is still Eurocentric, 
as it claims the superiority of Christianity. Hart argues that since the account is 
constitutive of Žižek’s politics, the latter as well is Eurocentric (ibid., p. 556). To this 
challenge Žižek responds that he is far from uncritically endorsing Christianity (Žižek, 
2002c, p. 582). Furthermore, he openly admits to Eurocentrism, if the latter means 
privileging the Judeo-Christian tradition or according it a special position:  
Where are the concrete counterarguments? I make a series of claims 
about the specificity of Judaism and Christianity – where am I wrong? ... 
Do we find features that I attribute to Christianity in Buddhism or 
Hinduism? Am I wrong in attributing these feature to Christianity? Or am 
I wrong in asserting the emancipatory potentials of these features? (ibid., 
p. 579) 
  
Žižek is more than aware of Hegelian narrative as ideological legitimization of Western 
colonialism, but it is wrong to stop there and overlook Hegel’s philosophy as providing 
the ‘ultimate subversive intellectual tools that allow us to discern and question the very 
Eurocentric colonialist bias’ (ibid., p. 580). By doing so, Hart reduces Hegel to a mere 
racist ideologue of capitalist colonialism. Žižek thus flips the coin and turns the 
postcolonial critique into a Eurocentric endeavour par excellence.  
2.8 The True Community  
This community of the Holy Spirit is a new form of sociality, which is formed and held 
together through the revelation of the big Other’s impotence, but also replaces him in 
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his abdication (Žižek, 2010c, pp. 371-375; 2014, p. 274). This new community is thus 
established and organized upon the remainder, that which is left and could not be killed 
on the Cross (Žižek, 2013a, p. 173).141 The experienced state of destitution thus 
becomes a catalyst for change:  
Paradoxically, the fall of this big Other […] is not the same as the 
disappearance of belief – in a way, it opens up the space of an authentic 
belief which sustains an act, a belief which is no longer transposed onto, 
sustained, or covered by some figure of the big Other. In taking the risk 
of an act, I fully assume the belief in myself, accepting that there is no 
Other to believe for me, in my place. This is the properly Christian belief, 
the message of God’s death: the Christian community of believers is 
alone with its belief, freely assuming full responsibility for it, no longer 
relying on a transcendental authority that would guarantee it (Žižek, 
2010c, p. 134).  
 
While destitution is here understood by Žižek as having a dimension of the terrifying, in 
that it represents a realisation that man is utterly alone without the ideological support 
of the big Other, it is at the same time a realisation of freedom. Forsakenness thus 
enables a new form of community which is significantly characterised by two things: It 
is a sociality that is truly universal, in that everyone can participate in it, and the 
participation is direct, irrespective of their social status and position (ibid., p. 120). In 
the words of Paul: ‘There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there 
is no male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (Galatians 3:2κ). It is also the 
first form of sociality without any hidden agendas, Žižek claims, for it is truly revealing 
of the nothingness behind it (2000b, p. 139).  
Because of that, it is a community which truly embraces differences. The death 
of Christ, or God’s self-undermining, opens up the possibility of a collective of subjects 
who are directly confronted with each other apart from the symbolic fiction imposed by 
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 Žižek is here using Eagleton’s exposition of the sacrament of the Eucharist (Eagleton, 2008, p. 272).  
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the big Other. This kind of love, founded on the Real of the subject (2009b, p. 105), is 
the opposite of sentimental love which idealises the other subject, in that it directly 
identifies with its finitude and weakness. In other words, it is not simply a form of 
liberal tolerance, which abstracts from differences, such as race, religion or gender, and 
accords everyone a generic set of human rights. Christian love,142 Žižek argues, goes 
beyond that by loving people not in spite of their differences, or despite their 
weaknesses, but loving them exactly for those traits. In this way it is an event or 
moment of caring for people as they truly are. The maxim ‘God is love’ (1 John 4: κ) 
should thus be read alongside ‘No one has ever seen God; but if we love one another, 
God lives in us and his love is made complete in us’ (1 John 4:12):  
And here love enters: the most radical moment of love is not the belief of 
others which sustains the subject in its existence, but the subject’s own 
counter-gesture, the terrifyingly daring act of fully accepting that its very 
existence depends on others, that – to put it in somewhat inappropriate 
poetic terms – I am nothing but a figure in the dreamspace of an 
inconsistent other (Žižek, 2014, pp. 274-275).  
 
In order to elaborate the radical character of this Christian love, Žižek turns to the 
words of Jesus from Luke 14:26: ‘If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father 
and his mother, his wife and his children, his brothers and sisters – yes, even his own 
life – he cannot be my disciple’. For Žižek this verse embodies the ethical suspension 
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 Žižek is diverging from trend here by focusing on Christ, for it is usually Paul’s emphasis on love, 
which becomes especially important for materialist readings. Beginning perhaps with Jacob Taubes’ 
(1993, pp. 52-53) warning that Paul’s love is not to be understood as in any way sentimental, but as 
ingredient to a rather clear-eyed political project. With reference to Romans 13:8-10, Taubes supposes 
that it is Paul rather than Jesus who is the decisive inventor of a love ethic and notes that where Jesus is 
said to have reduced the commandments to two – love of God and of neighbour – Paul dispenses with the 
first and emphasises only the latter. Of course, Žižek does uphold Paul to Christ as a Lenin to Marx, but it 
is important to note the engagement of Žižek with Christ and his teachings as a theological figure (just as 
Paul), rather than a militant figure.  
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achieved by the Cross (1999a, p. 115),143 whereby the substance of social life is 
renounced, in order for it to exist as such. Thus the verse is not read as a constitutive 
exception of the social order, but the very means of breaking from it. Here ‘love itself 
enjoins us to “unplug” from the organic community into which we were born’ (Žižek, 
2014, p. 121). It is in the light of this love that Žižek reads Galatians 3:2κ as a call for a 
general universalism indifferent to social divisions.  
2.8.1 Žižek’s Kierkegaardian suspension of the ethical 
The work of this love is that which suspends the ethical. In Chapter Two of The 
Parallax View (2006b, pp. 68-123), Žižek develops this suspension of the ethical 
through a critical reading of Søren Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the story of 
Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac in Fear and Trembling (2005). In the very moment when 
the ethical becomes a temptation, Kierkegaard reflects, Abraham overcomes his own 
ethical convictions and only by faith alone, outside worldly coordination, by telling no 
one about this. In that very moment he assumes an almost higher position than God 
himself – Abraham stands in an absolute relation to the Absolute, where ‘the ethical is 
reduced to the relative’ (Kierkegaard, 2005, pp. 82-83). His behaviour appears absurd – 
he is willing to murder his own son, whom he treasures more than anything else. 
Certainly, Kierkegaard is not concerned with putting the ethical in general under 
question, but the scene presents an antagonism which cannot be overcome. Suddenly 
the man of God and a murderer of a child appear in the same person. It is this very 
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 Of course, Žižek puts a political spin on this verse by explaining that it is about respect and obedience 
towards superiors, while the original context is not so much about superiors but about familial ties. 
Nevertheless, the basic logic of argumentation can stand. This is another example of Žižek's symptomatic 
attitude, where the text and theology do not necessarily match, as we have seen in his exegesis of Job and 
of Christ’s last words. 
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antagonism, as presented by Kierkegaard, which for Žižek demonstrates the tension of 
the Christ-event and the subsequent truth-events.  
Thus the radical and individualistic position observed by Kierkegaard in 
Abraham’s inhumane and yet God-fearing belief becomes for Žižek an argumentative 
vehicle which enables the thinking of a politically militant subject. Žižek reads the 
compelling of a higher necessity to betray the very ethical substance of one’s being as 
the revolutionary compelling the subject (2001d, p. 14), introducing a gap into the very 
order of being (2003, p. 37). This subject is faithful to a truth-event, which is not 
legitimised by the symbolic order. Abraham’s acceptance of the incomprehensible will 
of God sets about to destroy the symbolically imposed picture of the loving and caring 
father, the patriarch. For Žižek it is exactly his ability to sacrifice that which gives 
meaning to his life or world, which delivers the subject in a certain sense to freedom 
and thereby true subjectivity. This is also exactly the aspect that he sees in the death of 
Christ on the Cross – the self-emptying.  
Therefore, the real paradox of Kierkegaard’s faith lies for Žižek in the seeking 
after the meaning of life in reference to God, wherein the gap between God and man 
cannot be overcome. The believer risks everything for nothing (Žižek, 2006b, p. λ7). It 
is only after Kierkegaard’s ‘infinite resignation’, the realisation that there is no 
guarantee that the absolute dedication will be compensated, that Kierkegaard’s 
radicality of the leap of faith is reached. In Kierkegaard’s own words:  
But the understanding comes to a standstill at the absolute. The 
contradiction is to require of a person that he make the greatest possible 
sacrifice, dedicate his whole life to being sacrificed – and why? Well, 
there is no why (Kierkegaard, 1991, p. 120). 
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He continues in his journal: ‘At first sight the understanding says that this is madness. 
The understanding asks: What’s in it for me? The answer is: nothing’ (Kierkegaard, 
1970, p. 186).144 
Žižek concludes that there is but a fundamental practico-ethical decision about 
what kind of life one wants to commit oneself to. Thus the new community is called 
upon to repeat this fundamental shift in coordinates, the primordial choice made by 
Christ, for itself (Žižek, 2001b, pp. 14κ-149).  
Indeed, as Žižek’s engagement with theology develops it becomes ever more 
reliant on Kierkegaard. When discussing crucial questions such as the Law and 
transgression,145 love, the religious suspension of the ethical, the fundamental Christian 
break, he defers to Kierkegaard. For example, Žižek quotes from Works of Love: ‘We 
do not applaud the son who said “No”, but we endeavour to learn from the Gospel how 
dangerous it is to say, “Sir, I will”’ (Kierkegaard, 1λ62, p. 102 cf. Žižek, 2000b, 148). 
Kierkegaard’s comment here refers to Matthew 21:28-31, which he understands as the 
radical demand that requires one to give up everything in order to follow Christ. Žižek 
employs this thought when it comes to Luke 14:26 as a suggestion that one should in 
fact ‘hate the beloved out of love and in love’ (Kierkegaard, 1λ62, p. 114 cf. Žižek, 
2000b, 126). According to him, this is the work of love, comparable to Che Guevara’s 
or Lenin’s revolutionary violence (Žižek, 2003, p. 30) – not only love, but Christian 
love. Luke 14:26 then is to be read in the context of the following account in Matthew 
to highlight its intent of breaking down ideological constraints:  
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 This is my own translation of the German: ‘Auf den ersten Blick sagt der Verstand, daβ dies Wahnsinn 
ist. Der Verstand fragt: Was springt für mich dabei heraus? Die Antwort lautet: nichts’. 
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 In the idea of a subversive act as following the law to the letter (Žižek, 2000b, pp. 147-148).  
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While Jesus was still talking to the crowd, his mother and brothers stood 
outside, wanting to speak to him. Someone told him, ‘Your mother and 
brothers are standing outside, wanting to speak to you.’ He replied to 
him, ‘Who is my mother, and who are my brothers?’ Pointing to his 
disciples, he said, ‘Here are my mother and my brothers. For whoever 
does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother and sister and mother’ 
(Matthew 12:46-5-). 
 
When Jesus speaks of ‘hating’ one’s parents, he means in so far as they stand for the 
social hierarchy or system with its ideological structure, which the community of the 
Holy Spirit bypasses. It is with regards to the ideological constraints that the Christian 
love brings division rather than unity; it uncouples from the given ethnic and political 
identities and is redefined as a position of active engagement, a struggle.146  
2.8.2 The Other of the Neighbour 
The radicality of Galatians 3:28 is of course an implication or elaboration of Romans 
13:8, wherein Paul writes that ‘he who loves his neighbour has fulfilled the law’. The 
theological injunction to love one’s neighbour originates from the covenant at Sinai in 
the Old Testament: ‘Do not seek revenge or bear a grudge against anyone among your 
people, but love your neighbour as yourself’ (Leviticus 1λ:1κ). In the New Testament, 
however, the meaning of the concept of “neighbour” has been universally transformed, 
based on Christ’s teaching in the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37), 
where it is indifferent to social divisions and includes everyone.  
In his contribution to The Neighbour  (Žižek, 2013a, pp. 134-190), Žižek 
ponders what this call to love the neighbour as yourself reveals about subjectivity and 
argues that it stands as a challenge to the so-called ethical turn in contemporary thought, 
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 According to Žižek, this is also how one is to read the imperative to ‘turn the other cheek’, found in 
Matthew 5:38-40, as a subversive gesture which destabilises, rather than an act of obedience of either 
doing nothing or striking back. Again, the latter is really a constitutive exception. 
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a turn often linked to the thought of Emmanuel Levinas (Žižek, 2007, pp. 164-166). 
Žižek’s main target is what he characterizes as an ethics of the paradigmatic citizen of 
contemporary Western civilizations, who in his search for happiness without stress 
exhibits a fear of an excessive intensity of life that might disturb it. For Žižek, a whole 
series of contemporary commodities and phenomena embody this anxiety and 
vulnerability apropos of excess: coffee without caffeine, beer without alcohol, up to the 
desire to prosecute wars without casualties (Žižek, 2002a, p. 10). Žižek proposes that 
this fear of excess reveals not only that there is something more to the subject, but that 
this itself is the subject, and that this dimension is missed in the ethical turn in 
contemporary thought in general, and in the work of Levinas in particular (Žižek, 
2013a, pp. 159-169). Insisting upon it reveals the properly political potential of the 
Christian love of the neighbour.  
The attempt to account for oneself is always conducted within a certain 
intersubjective context and reveals our constitutive exposure to the Other (Žižek, 
2008b, p. 45). That also means that the Other is not or ought not to be recognised in an 
absolute manner,147 but to recognise its impenetrability. It is this exposure that grounds 
our ethical status, a solidarity of the vulnerable: ‘what makes an individual human and 
thus something for which we are responsible, toward whom we have a duty to help, is 
his/her very finitude and vulnerability’ (Žižek, 2013a, p. 138). 
Any type of the big Other, as the symbolic order, seeks to mediate and regulate 
our coexistence, but the excess or the Real cannot be gentrified and with it, reciprocal 
exchange is impossible (ibid., p. 143). In other words, our intersubjectivity depends on 
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 As in knowing who the subject really is. 
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the Symbolic order. The challenge posed by Christian love, Žižek argues, is to resist 
this gentrification of the neighbour, and instead accept its radical impenetrability. Thus 
a collective emerges, which no longer relies on an ethnic identity, but is instead 
struggling (ibid., p. 154). This love is thus not against the background of universal 
hatred, but of universal indifference, where one is indifferent toward all and in this way 
loves the individual. ‘There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor 
free, there is no male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (Galatians 3:2κ). 
 
2.8.2.1 A consideration of Žižek’s Holy Spirit community 
Given that the ultimate concern of Žižek is political, that might seem utopian or at best 
an idealistic hope for the political future, but Žižek argues that such a non-ideological 
social bond has been experienced after Apostle Paul as well. Examples include the 
Ancient Greek democracy, Lenin’s Bolshevik revolution, Eastern Europe’s 
undermining of Communism in the eighties, or indeed the recent Occupy movement 
against Capitalism (Christ is their precursor, a mythic form of something that reaches its 
true form in the logic of the emancipatory political collective).  
Žižek’s theoretical reasoning or argumentation itself is logically stronger than it 
might first appear. First, this kind of community is not maintained by the big Other, and 
therefore it does not parallel the contemporary fundamentalist perversions. Those are a 
mere mirror image and reaction against the current condition that has made them what 
they are, but still remain caught in the mirror.148 Second, following on from Žižek’s 
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 A horrific example of this is illustrated in the brutal act of execution of the Jordanian pilot by ISIS in 
early February 2015. Upon capturing the pilot, ISIS supporters launched a Twitter campaign (global 
neoliberalism?) calling for brutal execution suggestions, prompting numerous ideas, including the actual 
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insistence upon the contingency of materialist grace described above, he is clear that 
this new sociality is therefore capable of, but does not guarantee, a truly ethical or 
political act, outside of its ethico-legal entanglement. It represents only a possibility of 
something new; it is not ensured. Third, this form of sociality is also not united by the 
lack or absence of the big Other, as in that being the only thing that holds the 
community together.149 The dismantling of the big Other only marks the catalyst for a 
community which then develops, or is able to develop – a community of deference. In 
that sense it is not a negative community.150 Fourth, Žižek is quick to admit and deliver 
a warning that this form of social collective is inherently fragile. In the case of Lenin’s 
revolution, it led to the perverse ideology of Stalinism; likewise, the communality of the 
Arab Spring was taken over by religious fundamentalists151. Christianity also declined 
into perversion, when it transformed Christ’s sacrifice into an insurmountable debt and 
thus bound the subject, rather than setting him/her free (Žižek, 2003, p. 110). The big 
Other was thus resurrected and Christianity became a new kind of law, hiding the 
impotence of the big Other. Without the proper stance in relation to what happened on 
the Cross, its unique form of universal love collapsed in on itself. Christianity, then, has 
transformed its subversive kernel into its perverse core. Žižek argues that the only way 
for Christianity to discard the present perverse core is by returning to its founding 
moment – the death of God. What is needed is not only an atheist religion where 
                                                 
execution. Thus they used a ‘democratic’ method of deciding the pilot’s fate, which, however, with its 
determined outcome, was far from democratic, but merely an act of formal, rather than actual freedom.  
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 I.e.: the only thing we have in common is the missing other.  
150
 The Arab Spring protests were not merely negative in that they represented a reaction to the corruption 
and abuse by their government, but included an attempt towards or experiment in communality. 
151
 The student and academic protesters were then proclaimed as the enemies of the movement by the 
religious fundamentalists, whose dream was religiously fundamental and intolerant of any other vision. 
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subjects do not believe in God, but where God himself doesn’t believe in himself – he is 
an atheist. Žižek concludes The Puppet and the Dwarf in this way:  
In what is perhaps the highest example of Hegelian Aufhebung, it is 
possible today to redeem this core of Christianity only in the gesture of 
abandoning the shell of its institutional organisation (and even more so of 
its specific religious experience). The gap here is irreducible: either one 
drops the religious form, or one maintains the form, but loses the essence. 
That is the ultimate heroic gesture that awaits152 Christianity: in order to 
save its treasure, it has to sacrifice itself – like Christ, who had to die so 
that Christianity could emerge (Žižek, 2003, p. 171). 
  
However, recognising Žižek’s argumentations – that this kind of community is not held 
together by the big Other and is at the same time not negative, and qualifications of 
fragility and contingency –, the question remains whether such a community can be 
anything else than an event? It is well to point out its fragility; however, is it not more 
important to ask whether such a community of radical love can exist without the 
ideological support of the big Other? Even for the absence of the big Other, its 
existence is essential in the first place. In Žižek’s case, the death of God event is 
necessary and cannot be excluded since otherwise we would remain trapped in the 
system of debt – without God there is no death of God. If the Symbolic is just about 
everything that we call “reality”, will not the subject be eternally resurrecting the big 
Other – an arbitrary and changing chain of signifiers – be they God or “History” or 
“development” or something else? Following Žižek’s argument, was this not the case 
with Christianity and the Bolshevik revolution? After all, if we again follow Žižek, the 
subject exists on the borders of the Real and the Symbolic. The question then is: Do we 
need ideological support to ‘be’? It seems Žižek does not aim to present us with a 
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 Notice the word ‘awaits,’ which is here used not to announce what will necessarily happen in the 
future, but in order to emphasise the rightness of this gesture, and express a hopeful expectation. 
Otherwise it would be used in the spirit of the Stalinist big Other – the progress of history. 
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sustainable and resilient alternative, but rather a possibility of a break or radical change, 
which we have to continually repeat as a series of unplugging. What he proposes is not 
so much a thought of revolution, but ‘revolutions’ – as in the final instalment of the 
Matrix trilogy. To the earlier question Žižek would respond that with ideological 
support authentic being is perverted.  
Having explored the background, context and content of Žižek’s theological 
materialism, the second part of this thesis will engage it in a critical reading of 
Bonhoeffer’s Sanctorum Communio. Given that the work’s social theology arises 
through Bonhoeffer’s engagement with social philosophy, it is apposite to begin with a 
discussion of his intellectual background.  
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Chapter 3: Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Background  
 
3.1 Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Biography  
In this section I seek to provide a sort of intellectual biography of Bonhoeffer. I am not 
attempting to provide an account of his life. There are good works which pursue that 
particular goal, exemplified best by Eberhard Bethge, but also numerous other 
biographies, which make for valuable reading. Instead, I am merely providing a 
background which can shed further light upon his thought, both theological and 
philosophical. My aim is not to argue for a unity of Bonhoeffer’s life and work, or to 
construct an account of his thought as built upon life experience – the first would be 
outside the scope of this thesis, while the second would be inappropriate, as knowledge 
of Bonhoeffer’s biography alone is insufficient for understanding his intellectual 
contribution. Rather, the purpose of this section is restricted to demonstrating how 
certain biographical elements can further enlighten Bonhoeffer’s intellectual 
development and contribution. Like its counterpart in Žižek, this very brief and concise 
overview can serve to enlighten further some of the matters discussed in the section on 
the intellectual background of his thought, as well as providing a canvas on which his 
thinking can develop. 
3.1.1 From Berlin to Tübingen and back again 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer was born into an upper-middle class family with eight children in 
1λ06 in Breslau (today’s Wroclaw). His family moved to Berlin and settled there when 
he was six, for his father Karl, a prominent psychiatrist and neurologist, became a 
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Professor at the university and also the director of its associated Charité hospital. His 
mother, Paula von Hase, whose father and grandfather were both professors of theology, 
completed training as a teacher and instructed her children personally in particular 
subjects up to a certain age. Consequently, the children quickly jumped ahead in several 
classes when they entered the German Gymnasium.153 Dietrich excelled in the 
humanistic disciplines, studied Hebrew and read Friedrich Schleiermacher, while also 
becoming something of an accomplished pianist. When he announced his desire to 
study theology, his family, while sceptical of the value of theology, supported him and 
he entered the family favourite University in Tübingen to read theology at the age of 
seventeen. During his two semesters there his work encompassed logic, epistemology, 
music, political science and history of religion, in addition to biblical, church historical 
and dogmatic subjects. A year later he returned to Berlin due to rising cost of living 
away from home because of hyperinflation. However, before he returned, he spent a 
term in Rome, where he was especially enthralled by the Vatican as symbolizing the 
church as a tangible, universal entity with ancient roots and where he even had an 
audience with the Pope.  
Having returned to Berlin in 1924, he enrolled at the Friedrich Wilhelm 
University (later Humboldt University), where his main professor was Reinhold 
Seeberg in the area of systematic theology and ethics, together with Adolf von Harnack 
and Karl Holl in church history. Their work on Christian doctrine and Church history 
became a medium for Bonhoeffer’s knowledge of the classic theologians such as 
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 The Gymnasium is a humanities-oriented German secondary school that prepares students for 
University education. 
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Augustine, Aquinas, Luther and Schleiermacher. He concomitantly became acquainted 
with the thought of Barth and philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger 
and Dilthey. He graduated in 1927, completing his dissertation, entitled Sanctorum 
Communio: eine dogmatische Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Kirche [Sanctorum 
Communio: A Theological Study of the Sociology of the Church] (DBW 1, 2005/ 
DBWE 1, 2009). This theologico-sociological reflection brought together a Barthian 
theology of revelation and Hegel, Weber and Troeltsch, resulting in a ‘theology of 
sociality’ built upon a relational view of personhood. The social form of revelation, 
described as ‘Christ existing as community’, elevated interrelatedness between ‘I’ and 
‘Other’ to the highest importance, at the heart of the way one understands God, self and 
other.154 Yet, Bonhoeffer’s dissertation was far from a simple harmonization of 
theology with modern thought. More radically it explored the social intention of basic 
Christian concepts. It argued that insofar as the concept of God ought to be conceived as 
formed in relation to persons and community, the relationship between ‘I’ and ‘Other’ is 
to be understood as providing an ethical boundary for one another (DBWE 1, pp. 554-
57). A boundary where the other is encountered as a limit introduces a notion of sin as a 
breaking of that limit, whether the Other is God or a fellow being (see ‘Sin and Broken 
Community’ in DBWE 1: pp. 107-121). Sin thus denies the freedom of the other, 
turning them into an image of oneself. This is where Bonhoeffer introduced the concept 
of stellvertretung [vicarious representative action] as the willingness not merely to 
allow the other to exist, but to allow the other to place upon me the burden of their 
freedom to be who they are (DBWE 1: pp. 155ff, 293ff, 303f). For Bonhoeffer, this was 
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 As will be shown in Chapter 4, Bonhoeffer’s personalism and attention to interrelatedness is derived 
from the phenomenology of Max Scheler’s value personalism.  
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the essence of Christ’s messianic vocation and ethical challenge for humanity. Karl 
Barth described Sanctorum Communio as a ‘theological miracle’, finding it hard to 
believe it was written at the age of twenty-one (Barth, 2003, p. 4; 2010a, p. 533).  
3.1.2 Postdoctoral academic and pastoral activities 
Dietrich spent the following year as a pastor-in-training to the German community in 
Barcelona, mostly practicing youth care and preaching occasionally. While there, he 
complained about the lack of theological discussions with his supervising minister 
(Bethge, 1994, p. 106), but used the time to revise his dissertation for publication. He 
decided to engage in postdoctoral work, while remaining unsure about whether to 
pursue an academic or pastoral career in the long term. By 1929 he was back in Berlin 
at the University as an assistant to Wilhelm Lütgert, a specialist in German idealism in 
the Faculty of Theology, while working on his professorial dissertation Akt und Sein: 
Transzendentalphilosophie und Ontologie in der systematischen Theologie [Act and 
Being: Transcendental Philosophy and Ontology in Systematic Theology] (DBW 2, 
1988/DBWE 2, 1996). This study on theological anthropology explored the border area 
between theology and philosophy, again placing modern and contemporary thinkers into 
dialogue with one another and with theologians. Bonhoeffer further developed his 
theological category of revelation accentuating ‘Otherness’ which he considered as 
answered inadequately by idealist philosophy. To that end Luther, Barth and Bultmann 
were engaged with Hegel and Heidegger, resulting in a critique of the moral process of 
knowledge itself, where knowledge was accorded with an authentic otherness, beyond 
mere control and power of the subject. Re-visiting human sinfulness with the help of 
Luther’s cor corvum in se [the heart turned upon itself], Bonhoeffer elaborated further 
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that any attempt to define the being of the other is an imposition of one’s own totalizing 
desire (DBWE 2: p. 80). He submitted the dissertation and passed his second 
theological examinations in 1930.  
The same year, at the age of 24, Bonhoeffer received approbation as an assistant 
professor of theology and delivered his inaugural lecture, ‘The Anthropological 
Question in Contemporary Philosophy and Theology’, which explored the theological 
anthropology under development in his dissertations. Throughout this time he was 
active in the youth work of his Grunewald (locality of Berlin) congregation. It is 
important to add that this was a time of crisis for the Weimar Republic, whose 
foundations were being shaken by economic hardship and the electoral success of the 
National Socialists. Although Bonhoeffer’s resistance to the growing German 
nationalism was indicated by his occasional presence at the church of notorious pacifist 
Günther Dehn, he did not become directly engaged in politics. Rather, he threw himself 
into his academic, as well as youth work.  
3.1.3 Union theological seminary 
Very soon he embarked upon a ship to the United States, where he spent a sabbatical 
studying as a Sloane Fellow at the Union Theological Seminary in New York. The 
exposure to theology and philosophy of that institution had a marked impact on 
Bonhoeffer’s own thought, in particular visible or crucial for his later ethical writings. 
At that time, Union was the flagship of American divinity schools and a centre of liberal 
Christianity, but also of neo-orthodoxy and Black Liberation. Under the faculty’s 
prominent figures, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, John Baillie and Harry Emerson Fosdick, 
Bonhoeffer fostered a deep fascination with American philosophy, especially 
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pragmatism, its premise and socio-ethical theological import. At first he struggled with 
the lack of dogmatic and exegetical subjects (DBWE 10: pp. 265-266), which were 
replaced by topics such as ‘Church and Community: The Cooperation of the Church 
with Social and Character-Building Agencies’, ‘Ethical Issues in the Social Order’, and 
‘The Minister’s Work with Individuals.’ He described the students as ‘intoxicated with 
liberal and humanistic phrases’ (DBWE 10: p. 256). Having said that, it is important to 
note that Bonhoeffer struggled with the lack of theological rigour undergirding social 
action, rather than the action itself. The Marxist-Christian theologian Reinhold Niebuhr 
was an outspokenly public Christian intellectual and activist. He was a popular 
professor at Union during Bonhoeffer’s time there, and the latter took his classes on 
‘Ethical Interpretations’, ‘Ethical Viewpoints in Modern Literature’ and ‘Religion and 
Ethics’ (Bethge, 1λλ4, p. 15λ). Bonhoeffer described him as ‘one of the most significant 
and most creative of contemporary American theologians’, whose political theology 
was strongly active, making him ‘the sharpest critic of contemporary American 
Protestantism and the present social order’, and as understanding ‘the right way between 
neo-orthodoxy, for which Jesus Christ becomes the ground of human despair, and a true 
liberalism, for which Christ is the Lord, the norm, the ideal and the revelation of our 
essential being’ (Bonhoeffer, 1λ65, p. 116). Beyond Niebuhr, by the end of the semester 
Bonhoeffer had read ‘almost the entire philosophical works of William James, which 
really captivated me, then Dewey, Perry, Russell, and finally also J. B. Watson and the 
behaviourist literature’ (DBWE 10: p. 310). Indeed, he even requested an extension of 
his leave in order to engage with pragmatist thought in American theology and 
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philosophy (Bethge, 1994, p. 161).155 Union certainly proved to be very influential, for 
it provided Bonhoeffer with a broader intellectual context to engage in his theologico-
sociological reflection. 
Bonhoeffer’s time in the States proved as formative outside lecture halls as well. 
His fellow student Albert F. Fisher invited him to visit the Abyssinian Baptist Church in 
Harlem, where he was captivated by the emotional style of worship and powerful 
sermons of legendary preacher Adam Clayton Powell Sr. He became active in the 
ministry, by teaching Sunday school, Bible study and weekday church school, and by 
visiting parishioner’s homes. This experience was further bolstered by reading black 
literature, listening to recordings of Negro spirituals, and through Reinhold Niebuhr’s 
course ‘Ethical Viewpoint in Modern Literature’ (see Young, 200κ). It is fair to say that 
in less than a year Bonhoeffer experienced more of African American culture than most 
American whites did in a lifetime. He witnessed segregation first-hand on his train 
journey through the South and provided a poignant analysis of the church’s role in it 
(see ‘The Negro Church’ in Bonhoeffer, 1λ65, pp. 112-114, Young, 2006, pp. 293-294). 
Another fellow student – the French pacifist Jean Lassere, who accompanied him on his 
Cross-country drive to Mexico – challenged him with a perspective on the Sermon on 
the Mount that made Jesus’ peace commandment inescapable.156 In summary, 
Bonhoeffer was exploring American culture and academia, and through that becoming 
acquainted with its social gospel, which sought to combat the explosive issues of social 
injustice and racism on the grounds or basis of the Gospels. If at first he suspected that 
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 While Bonhoeffer never specified what drew him to James, Cahill draws attention to the similarities 
between them in matters of truth and ethics. See Cahill (2013), pp. 28-30.  
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 Rasmussen (1972) provides an account of the development of Bonhoeffer’s views on pacifism. For a 
discussion of Lassere’s influence, see in particular pp. λ4-126. 
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the political questions which captured the attention of American theology students were 
at the expense of theology, he eventually grasped its challenge personally, later 
observing ‘it was then that a turning from the phraseological to the real ensued’ (22 
April, 1944 in DBWE 8: p. 358). The American learning experience about the demands 
of the world on the life of the church was to be further stretched upon his return to 
Germany.157  
3.1.4 The socio-political dimension of his theology 
Upon his return to the University in Berlin in 1931, Bonhoeffer found Germany taken 
by the growing nationalism and his crowded systematic theology department with 
leanings toward National Socialism. He delivered lectures and seminars as an unpaid 
assistant lecturer and was gaining a following among students, particularly due to his 
approachability and engagement – meeting students for evening discussions and 
weekend getaways at his cottage (Bethge, 1994, pp. 204-205). His characteristically 
contemporary lectures, such as ‘orders of creation’, were challenging some of the 
underlying links of Nazism with God’s will. The four semesters at Berlin resulted in 
two of his courses being published – Schöpfung und Fall: Theologische Auslegung von 
Genesis 1-3 [Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3] (DBW 3, 
1988/DBWE 3, 2007) and Christ the Centre.158 In the latter Jesus was again understood 
as the person, the sought-for limit to human pretensions, or the centre of human 
                                                 
157
 In fact, the two were difficult to separate, as during his time at Union, Bonhoeffer was in demand to 
report or lecture on the current situation in Germany and the prospects for another war. While refusing to 
ignore the suffering brought on Germans by the Great War or the effects of the Versailles Treaty’s 
insistence on German ‘war guilt,’ Bonhoeffer emphasised the burgeoning aspirations for peace in his 
homeland. 
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 The latter was based on student notes from his 1933 lectures on Christology and published 
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existence, history, and nature. Best described as a messianic event, he brings into our 
midst God-who-is-our-boundary, the creative limit that allows humanity to be 
authentically human, rather than a mere usurper of divine power. God allows violence 
be done to God’s very self, so that an authentic limit or boundary might be encountered 
in all its concreteness. Bonhoeffer concluded that ‘if we speak of the human being Jesus 
Christ as we speak of God, we should not speak of him as representing an idea of God, 
that is, in his attributes as all-knowing and all-powerful, but rather speak of his 
weakness and manger’ (DBWE 12: p. 354). In Schöpfung und Sünde [Creation and Sin], 
as the original lectures were called, Bonhoeffer again took up interrelatedness or 
intersubjectivity, understanding creation in the image of God as an analogy of 
relationship with God’s own intertrinitarian relationship, rather than as an analogy of 
being, concluding that ‘the creatureliness of human beings […] can be defined in simply 
no other way than in terms of the existence of human beings over-against-one-another, 
with-one-another, and in-dependence-upon-one-another’ (DBWE 3: p. 64). The Fall 
was accordingly translated as an attempt to play God – eritis sicut Deus159 – and is 
defined by the violent transgression of the limit of the Other, as is evident in the story of 
Cain and Abel in Genesis 4. All this time then, Bonhoeffer’s theologico-sociological 
reflection continued. 
At the same time, he entered a new sphere of activity: ecumenical work. He was 
made part of the German youth delegation to the annual conference of the World 
Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches in Cambridge.160 
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While there, he was made honorary international youth secretary of the Alliance, thus 
becoming part of the organization’s circle. He was responsible for central and northern 
Europe and thus his work began to take him across many borders. However, in 
Germany there was a growing anti-internationalism, due to the progress of nationalism. 
Bonhoeffer spoke out against any nationalist theology and developed a driving concern 
for international peace. Together with Franz Hildebrandt he experimented with a 
catechism rejecting the church’s sanctioning of war. This was also expressed in his 
lecture ‘Christ and Peace’, in which he argued that any form of war service is forbidden 
for the Christian. A change in his thinking was becoming more and more apparent, 
compared to his 1λ2λ statement that ‘love for my people will sanctify murder, will 
sanctify war’ (DBWE 1: p. 11λ; DBWE 10: p. 372).161 After the Nazi revolution in 
Germany, Bonhoeffer’s ecumenical work thus took on a new dimension – publishing 
abroad the true nature of Nazism and securing the international community’s support in 
combating heresy within the German Church.  
3.1.5 Work in the Confessing Church and the letters from Tegel 
Bonhoeffer was clearly recognizing the Nazi threat. After Adolf Hitler became the 
Chancellor of Germany in January of 1930, he spoke out against the operation of the 
concept of the Führer as a Verführer [leader as misleader] (Bethge, 1994, p. 260). After 
the Reichstag fire Hitler sought to consolidate power through a series of acts and 
emergency decrees, such as the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil 
Service, which stated that non-Aryans could be dismissed from civil service, including 
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church ministry.162 In mid-April, Bonhoeffer spoke out against a campaign to include 
this ‘Aryan paragraph’ in the ecclesiastical realm, in an essay entitled ‘The Church and 
the Jewish Question’, wherein he asserted that the church can act toward the state when 
it fails to exercise its divine vocation (DBWE 12: pp. 361-370, particularly pp. 365-
366). What is more, he expressed concern for the fate of the German Jews as such, 
whether or not they happened to be members of the Christian community. In opposing 
German Christian attempts to bring the church into alignment with Nazi values, 
Bonhoeffer affiliated with a series of opposition groups active in the church struggle – 
the Young Reformation movement, the Pastors’ Emergency League163 and the 
Confessing Church. Ultimately none of them went far enough for Bonhoeffer, for they 
failed to recognise that application of the Aryan paragraph was not a matter of 
indifference, but a matter of heresy (Bethge, 1994, p. 315). In August 1933 he was sent 
to Bethel as part of a working group charged with drafting a confession that would 
detail the theological convictions of the church opposition. The Bethel confession 
claimed that the barrier between Jew and Gentile was removed by the crucifixion and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. However, after passing through several stages of the 
editorial process the Confession’s message of solidarity with Jews was so weakened that 
Bonhoeffer refused to sign the final draft. In September 1933 he attended the World 
Alliance conference in Sofia, Bulgaria, where he informed the organisation’s leadership 
about the anti-Jewish campaign in his country. The result was a resolution that decried 
‘state measures against the Jews in Germany and protested the church’s exclusion of 
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 Ministers of the German Evangelical Church were civil servants.  
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 Bonhoeffer helped form this group, together with his colleague Martin Niemöller. 
  152 
 
“non-Aryans” as “a denial of the explicit teaching and spirit of the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ”’ (Bethge, 1994, p. 315).  
When the Aryan paragraph was officially adopted in September 1933 at the 
general synod of the Evangelical Church of the Old Prussian Union, Bonhoeffer began 
to question seriously whether he could remain in it at all. This concern and frustration 
with the Church’s actions led him to accept a church position in London, in the German 
congregations at Forrest Hill and Sydenham (DBWE 13: p. 23). He assumed the role of 
de facto leader of German pastors in England, convincing them to join the Pastor’s 
Emergency League, supporting Jewish-Christian pastors. Together they sent telegrams 
of protest to the Reich Bishop Ludwig Müller in Berlin. When he was summoned to 
Berlin under suspicion, he used the opportunity to attend the first free synod of the 
church opposition, where the national ‘Confessing synod’ at Barmen was planned. After 
that, prominent Britons looked to him as a reliable interpreter of the church-political 
situation in Germany – Bonhoeffer became particularly close to George K.A. Bell, 
Bishop of Chichester. He influenced the latter’s pastoral letter that decried the abuses of 
state and church in Germany. At all times, Bonhoeffer called for a separation from what 
he regarded as an apostate church, no matter what the consequences (ibid., p. 56).  
In 1935 he was offered the directorship of the newly established Confessing 
Church seminary in Finkenwalde, after the Reich Bishop closed the preachers’ 
seminaries of the Old Prussian Union. It was an experimental non-state community and 
Bonhoeffer influenced or shaped it profoundly. It was during that time that he produced 
two further pieces of writing: in 1937 Nachfolge [Discipleship] (DBW 4, 1989/DBWE 
4, 2003) and in 1939 Gemeinsames Leben [Life Together] (DBW 5, 1987/ DBWE 5, 
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2004). The first was a series of lectures outlining the idea of ‘cheap grace’, the 
relationship between faith and obedience in dialogue with the Sermon on the Mount 
from the Gospel of Matthew. Bonhoeffer proposed that what is extraordinary about 
Christianity is Christ’s command to love one’s enemies. Rather than merely loving 
family and friends, Jesus defined love by ‘putting it into the clear-cut context of love for 
our enemies’ (DBWE 4: p. 137). Indeed, during the 1λ30s the theme of loving one’s 
enemies assumes a prominent role in Bonhoeffer’s writings. The second was a sort of 
experiment of life in this community of love, in which he proposed to start a more 
permanent, quasi-monastic community, where ordinands would remain after the 
completion of their training. More than that, it sought to provide a theology 
undergirding this community. This theology of sociality did not merely tolerate the 
freedom of the other, but delighted in it:  
God did not make others as I would have made them. God did not give 
them to me so that I could dominate and control them, but so that I might 
find the Creator by means of them […] God does not want me to mould 
others into the image that seems good to me, that is, into my own image. 
Instead, in their freedom from me God made other people in God’s own 
image (DBWE 5: p. 95). 
 
Life Together became Bonhoeffer’s most widely read text during his lifetime. Of course, 
in the eyes of the Reich Church, Finkenwalde was illegal; it was proclaimed as such 
through a decree in December of 1935 and finally shut down in September of 1937.  
While Bonhoeffer remained involved in the training of Confessing Church 
pastorates, he received a call-up for military service in May of 1939. At the same time 
an opportunity arose to again travel to the United States, with the prospect of a 
permanent teaching position at Union Theological Seminary. In this way he would 
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avoid the national service and through his father’s connections secured a one-year 
deferment. Leaving Germany had been on his mind for a while, he admitted in a letter to 
George Bell (see Bethge, 1994, p. 637) and he did so in June. However, upon arrival in 
America he felt that his place was in Germany and that he could not hope to partake in 
the reconstruction of Christian life in Germany after the war if he did not share its 
current trials (ibid., p. 655). He sailed home in July, returning to his ministry training 
duties. 
The state authorities kept a close eye on his ‘subversive’ activities and decided 
to prohibit him from speaking publicly, as well as requiring a report of his movements. 
His right to publish was rescinded in 1λ41 ‘due to lack of requisite political stability’ 
(DBWE 16: p. 181). Bonhoeffer rejected charges of subversion in a letter to the Reich 
Central Security Office (RHSA), even signing the letter with ‘Heil Hitler’ (ibid., p. 77). 
However, in reality he had already become allied with the anti-Nazi resistance. The 
resistance movement was far from unified, but shared the conviction of opposition to 
events in Germany. His chief contact was his sister Christine’s husband Hans von 
Dohnanyi, who in 1939 joined the Abwehr [Military Intelligence], an epi-centre of anti-
Hitler resistance headed by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. Bonhoeffer was assigned to the 
intelligence office, which was supposed to capitalise on his international connections, 
while in reality, those connections were utilised in the service of the resistance. He was 
exempt from military service and with a passport was able to travel freely during the 
war. Entering into a kind of double life, he continued to work for the Confessing Church 
and military intelligence, but in reality worked for and with those who enacted 
resistance within military intelligence and were making preparations for a putsch. 
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During travels to Switzerland, Scandinavia and Italy, Bonhoeffer attempted to use his 
ecumenical connections to inform the rest of the world about this organised military 
resistance and his own intentions. He began to write again, knowing full well that he 
was not allowed to write, beginning work on his Ethik [Ethics] (DBW 6, 1998/ DBWE 
6, 2008). A work that was never finished and remains a series of thirteen manuscripts, it 
represents another step in Bonhoeffer’s theologico-sociological reflection, an 
exploration of what constitutes responsible Christian action in the world. In it, Christ is 
portrayed as God’s embrace of the entire created-and-fallen reality and thus the utmost 
expression that we were created in and for relationship, with God and one another 
(DBWE 6: pp. 92ff). The church is thus to be the Stellvertreter, vicarious representative 
– the concept introduced in his first dissertation – whose denial of compassion to the 
outcast is a constitutional failure. Thus the church is understood as ‘that piece of 
humanity where Christ really has taken form’ (ibid., p. 97). It should be noted that 
Bonhoeffer conducted this exploration in the context of Nazi Germany, not as an 
academic exercise in abstraction and speculation, but out of concern for the future of the 
church, his country and humanity per se. 
Bonhoeffer was aware of the resistance’s realisation that a change in 
government must begin with Hitler’s assassination and he sympathised with various 
failed plots, but this was not the extent of his subversive activity. He used connections 
to obtain deferments for Confessing Church clergy, who were targeted for military or 
labour conscription, and sought to expose and undermine Nazi Jewish policy, even 
helping Jews out of the country to neutral Switzerland. In April 1943 he was arrested 
together with Hans and Christine von Dohnanyi in a concerted effort to bring down the 
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Abwehr, just months after he became engaged to Maria von Wedemeyer. He was 
charged with subversion through evading military service, circumventing the Gestapo 
ban on public speaking and continuing his church work. During his months in the 
military prison Tegel in Berlin, where he was questioned, he read voraciously on a 
variety of topics including early church history, contemporary science and philosophy 
and nineteenth-century German literature. During this time, he also exchanged letters 
with family and friends, discussed in the introduction to the thesis, which were first 
published by Bethge in 1951, under the title Widerstand und Ergebung [Resistance and 
Surrender or Letters and Papers from Prison] (DBW 8, 1998/DBWE 8, 2010).  
In late September 1944 the Gestapo uncovered a cache of incriminating secret 
documents containing plans for a coup d’état, references to secret discussions with the 
British government via the Vatican, excerpts from the diary of Admiral Canaris and 
correspondence related to Bonhoeffer’s resistance activities. This spelled the end not 
only for Bonhoeffer, but also for Dohnanyi and Canaris. He was transferred to the cellar 
of a Gestapo prison in central Berlin and spent the next four months there, losing 
contact with the outside world. In February 1945 he was sentenced to death, transferred 
to the concentration camp in Buchenwald and executed by hanging in Schönberg on 
April 9 in the final weeks of the war.  
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3.2 The context of Bonhoeffer’s thought: modern theology 
In this section I aim to contextualize Bonhoeffer’s thought as belonging to modern 
theology. As a modern theologian, Bonhoeffer carried out his intellectual reflection on 
faith in a modern world, seeking to exegete and apply the ethical and sociological 
potential of traditional theological concepts in this context.   
The church must get out of its stagnation. We must also get back out into 
the fresh air of intellectual discourse with the world. We also have to risk 
saying controversial things, if that will stir up the discussion of the 
important issues in life. As a ‘modern’ theologian who has nevertheless 
inherited the legacy of liberal theology, I feel responsible to address these 
questions (3 August 1944 in DBWE 8, pp. 498-499). 
 
If one defines theology as the intellectual reflection on the act, content and implications 
of the Christian faith, then that reflection is always carried out in a specific historic and 
cultural context. Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a theologian of the twentieth century and 
finds his place in the context of modern theology, a theology influenced and to some 
extent shaped by modernity. Modernity affected both the theological method and 
content, while, at the same time, theology critically evaluated and responded to 
modernity. Therefore, modern theology does not only denote a temporal category of 
theology, or indeed a theological character of modernity, but is also a term describing an 
engagement between theology and the modern. Insofar as it does not denote a mere 
persistence or reiteration of traditional theology in the modern era, nor an adaptation 
into the modern worldview, modern theology is rather to be considered as a particular 
example of the dialectical relationship between theology and its cultural context – the 
modern and theology.  
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Twentieth century thought represented an age of transition from the classical 
modernity of the nineteenth century to the postmodern culture of the twenty-first 
century. In theological circles, the historical milestone of the First World War (1914-
1918) could be considered as the threshold between the theology of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Therefore, understanding of twentieth century theology must be 
grounded in an understanding of its theological dialogical partner and predecessor.164  
Nineteenth century theological thought in Germany was characterized by a 
liberalism that developed as a consequence of the Enlightenment, embracing its aim of 
objectivity and methodologies of rationalism and empiricism rather than any 
preconceived notions of the authority of its sources. Thus, Friedrich Schleiermacher 
(1768-1834) considered belief as pre-moral and pre-cognitive and to be discussed in 
relation to other disciplines in order to work out the modern content of faith 
(Schleiermacher, 1928),165 while Kant’s account of knowledge excluded claims by 
natural theology or revelation (Kant, 17λ3). Kant’s own account was further challenged 
by Hegel’s notion of rationality as God (or the Absolute) realizing itself through a 
dialectical process in history.166 This initiated a historical and process-oriented way of 
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 For a comprehensive treatment of nineteenth century theology, the key text remains Ninian Smart’s 
three-volume Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West (1985). There is also a two-volume work 
by Claude Welch, entitled Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century (1974) that is also notable.  
165
 Bonhoeffer himself engaged with Schleiermacher’s work from the early stages of his theological 
formation, even reading his work while still in school (Bethge, 1994, p. 27), and a discussion of his work 
is found in both of his theses (DBWE 1, pp. 64, 113f., 132f., 193ff and DBWE 2, pp. 131, 154). 
Bonhoeffer rejects Schleiermacher’s ‘religious a priori’ and upholds the exclusivity of God’s revelation in 
Jesus Christ as the ground for theology and ethics. See also Bonhoeffer’s characterization of Seeberg’s 
position in DBWE 2, pp. 55-58. On the relationship between Schleiermacher and Bonhoeffer, see 
Christiane Tietz, ‘Friedrich Schleiermacher and Dietrich Bonhoeffer’ (Tietz in Frick, 2008, pp. 121-143). 
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 Twentieth century modern theologians have engaged with Hegel in diverse ways: Karl Barth in 
Prolegomena to Church Dogmatics (1975), Karl Rahner in The Trinity (1970), Wolfhart Pannenberg in 
Revelation as History (1968), while Jürgen Moltmann in The Trinity and the Kingdom (1981) considered 
his integration of history in the Trinity. Moltmann’s The Crucified God (1λ74) and Eberhard Jüngel’s 
God as the Mystery of the World (1983) and Unterwegs zur Sache (1972) engaged with Hegel’s death of 
God, Rahner’s (1λ76) affirmation of reality as rational, Hans Urs von Balthasar’s (1λ61, 1λ73-1982, 
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understanding reality, taken up by David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874) in his 
application of historical critical methods to the accounts of the life of Jesus (Strauss, 
1864) or indeed Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) and Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930), who 
investigated the socio-historical and cultural mechanisms that gave rise to theological 
ideas and will be explored in the next section on Bonhoeffer’s intellectual formation. 
For now, it is appropriate to note that Troeltsch, on the borders of the nineteenth and 
twentieth century, in a way summed up nineteenth century German theology.167  
The theological agendas of the nineteenth century were not only the background 
of their twentieth century counterparts, but, as indicated in Troeltsch, were their 
constituents. The attempt to integrate faith with modernity was either reacted against, as 
observed with Karl Barth’s stress on the wholly otherness of God in The Epistle to the 
Romans (1933, p. 315f), or explored so far as to claim the point of contact between 
them was ‘internal’, as in Paul Tillich’s ultimate concern observed in The Courage to 
Be (1952) or Dynamics of Faith (1957). The theological shift with its emphasis on the 
ethical or practical content of Christianity, which came about in no small part due to the 
                                                 
1985-1λκ7) genres of epic, lyric and drama, Pannenberg’s (1λ63) concepts of rationality and universal 
history or Hans Küng’s (1987) approach to incarnation.  
I will devote more attention to Bonhoeffer’s own engagement with Hegel in the next section in which I 
consider his intellectual formation at the University in Berlin, as well as in the final chapter of this thesis, 
where it will also enable a critical reading of his Sanctorum Communio. Suffice to say here that in 1933 
Bonhoeffer expressed appreciation of Hegel as a theologian (DBWE 1: p. 74; Tödt, 1988, p. 137) and in 
Act and Being read his own idea of Christian community against the latter’s. Charles Marsh examines this 
in ‘Christ as the Mediation of the Other’ in Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer: The Promise of his Theology 
(1994, pp. 81-10λ). See also his article ‘Human community and Divine Presence: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s 
Critique of Hegel’ (1λλ2, pp. 427-428). 
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 Perceiving comprehensive historical consciousness as the main development of the nineteenth century, 
Troeltsch advocated a more thoroughly historical method of theology. In analysing late nineteenth 
century history of religion and sociology, he wrestled with notions of the absoluteness of Christianity 
(Troeltsch, 1912), the role of the historical Jesus in the Christian faith (Troeltsch, 1911) and the 
inseparability of all religion from its social and historical context. Resisting naturalistic, reductionist 
explanations of religion, Troeltsch instead emphasized Christianity’s distinctive values worked out 
contextually through the centuries and called for a fresh, creative social embodiment of those values in 
twentieth century Europe (Troeltsch, 1923). 
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to the challenge posed by (modern) thinkers providing alternative accounts of religion, 
morality and values in general, was also carried through as a common characteristic to 
twentieth century theology, whether focusing on freedom and ethics such as with 
Bonhoeffer, or on social and political form as with someone like Jürgen Moltmann and 
his Theology of Hope (1967) and Gustavo Gutiérrez’s A Theology of Liberation (1974). 
All of these show how the main issues in twentieth century theology have developed 
from and revolved around the theological agendas of the nineteenth century, for both 
have found themselves in the context of modernity, faced with intrinsically intertwined 
challenges relating to matters of knowledge and rationality, historical consciousness 
and/or alternative explanations of religion. 
This engaging of modernity is also exemplified in an exchange of letters 
between two theologians, which took place at the time of Bonhoeffer’s enrolment at 
Tübingen in 1λ23. Both men would come to significantly influence Bonhoeffer’s 
thought: the liberal theologian Adolf von Harnack was engaging Karl Barth’s theology 
of crisis in the pages of the liberal journal, Die Christliche Welt (‘Ein Briefwechsel mit 
Adolf von Harnack’ in Barth, 1λ57, pp. 7-31). At the turn of the century, von Harnack 
claimed in his lectures Das Wesen des Christentums that ‘those of us who possess a 
more delicate and therefore more prophetic perception no longer regard the kingdom of 
love and peace as a mere Utopia’ (von Harnack, 1λ02, p. 123). While nineteenth century 
theological thought, exemplified by von Harnack, began the confrontation with issues of 
modernity, Barth called for a clear break with the theological development of the 
nineteenth century. He was just one of the theological students whose foundations had 
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been shaken by the First World War. The classic text denoting the move was Barth’s 
Epistle to the Romans:  
The more profoundly we become aware of the limited character of the 
possibilities which are open to us here and now, the more clear it is that 
we are farther from God, that our desertion of him is more complete… 
and the consequences of that desertion more vast […] than we had ever 
dreamed. Men are their own masters. Their union with God is shattered 
so completely that they cannot even conceive its restoration. Their sin is 
their guilt; their death is their destiny; their world is formless and 
tumultuous chaos, a chaos of forces of nature and of the human soul; 
their life is illusion. This is the situation in which we find ourselves 
(Barth, 1933, p. 37).  
 
Barth’s desire to break with nineteenth century optimism was due in part to the onset of 
two World Wars, which brought about a major crisis in European culture and society 
and arguably had the greatest impact on twentieth century thought in general – 
including theology. Giving rise to themes of doubt and radical critique, as opposed to 
the positivity of Enlightenment progress, the crisis launched a critical examination of 
questions about human progress and end. In the rising anxiety over humanity’s place in 
the universe, modern theology continued its pursuit of questions about God, the Trinity, 
revelation and Jesus Christ, but specifically and significantly in an exploration of their 
social and ethical dimension or application. This was certainly the case for Bonhoeffer, 
who discussed Christological concerns in light of their ontological and ethical import, 
succinctly revealed in the line from Letters and Papers: ‘What keeps gnawing at me is 
the question, what is Christianity, or who is Christ actually for us today?’ (30 April 
1944 in DBWE 8: p. 362). His Christology was the driving force of his ecclesiology, 
where the church as community was the locus of Christ’s presence, and the life of the 
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community revolved around imitating Christ as a vicarious representative.168 Thus 
Bonhoeffer exemplifies modern theology’s focus on matters of living in a century of 
crisis.  
This demonstration of Christianity’s socio-political potential was carried out as 
part of a larger engagement of theology with modernity. Within this context, twentieth 
century theology attempted to revise the optimistic liberalism of its nineteenth century 
counterpart, as well as address the gradual erosion and decline of modernity and its 
eventual transition into postmodernity. In so doing, it sought not only to recover and 
defend Christianity in the face of an unprecedented challenge, but more so to engage in 
a theological exegesis of modernity and demonstrate its own relevance. In Bonhoeffer’s 
case, this becomes most evident in Letters and Papers, but it began much earlier, with 
the phrases ‘cheap’ and ‘costly’ grace.169 The latter is what Luther uncovered when he 
returned from the cloister to the world, for he learned that ‘Jesus now had to be lived out 
in the midst of the world’ (DBWE 4: p. 4κ). This following of Jesus into the world 
became the central theme of Bonhoeffer’s Letters and Papers. In it one finds 
descriptions of a ‘world-come-of-age’, in which humans operate autonomously, without 
sensing a need to refer to either the divine grace or truth. In the world-come-of-age, 
people no longer require God as a working hypothesis, whether in science, in human 
affairs in general, or increasingly even in religion (8 June 1944 in DBWE 8: p. 267ff). 
The older view of God as God-of-the-Gaps was false and as man became more and 
more independent God was pushed out of increasingly larger dimensions of life, with 
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 ‘Cheap grace’, Bonhoeffer elaborates, ‘is preaching forgiveness without repentance, it is baptism 
without the discipline of the community; it is the Lord’s Supper without confession of sin, it is absolution 
without personal confession’ (DBWE 4: p. 44).  
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theology retreating to the inner world of man. Bonhoeffer sought to provide a response 
to the world-come-of-age and called for Christians to understand it better than it 
understands itself (8 June 1944 in DBWE 8: p. 269ff). This was a distinctly modern 
theology, attempting to come to terms with, orient and situate itself in a modern world, 
which seemed to operate without God’s involvement, observed in the scientific 
approach, but also in the terrors of both World Wars.  
3.2.1 Concluding thought 
In conclusion, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, as a theologian of the twentieth century, found his 
place in the context of modern theology. His theological thought was influenced and to 
some extent shaped by modernity, which affected his theological method, as well as the 
content of his thought. At the same time, he critically evaluated and responded to 
modernity. True to the character of modern theology, Bonhoeffer’s thought then 
represents an engagement with modernity and its challenges, in the dialectical 
relationship between Christianity and its cultural context. The next section will explore 
his intellectual formation in this context, specifically the influence of the Theological 
faculty at the University in Berlin upon Bonhoeffer’s theology of sociality and its 
engagement with philosophy.   
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3.3 Bonhoeffer’s intellectual formation 
This section will discuss Bonhoeffer’s intellectual formation with a specific interest. 
Rather than functioning as a general presentation of the various thinkers (or texts) which 
have shaped or driven his thought, it will focus on a selection of particular thinkers 
during his studies at the Friedrich Wilhelm University in Berlin who influenced 
Bonhoeffer’s sustained engagement with philosophy.  
I thus begin with a declaration that the selection of thinkers which I consider is 
purposefully limited, rather than extensive.170 To attempt a thorough discussion of 
Bonhoeffer’s intellectual grounding is beyond the scope of this thesis and also outside 
of its aim.171 The content of this consideration is thus limited and determined by its aim, 
which is to reflect upon the roots of Bonhoeffer’s theological exploration, appropriation 
and engagement with philosophy. It is further limited by its scope, insofar as the latter is 
undertaken alongside Žižek’s philosophical exploration, appropriation and engagement 
with theology, and as part of a critical reading of that engagement between them. Its 
consideration is thus properly restricted and stringent, in that it cannot provide a broader 
consideration of Bonhoeffer’s philosophical influences, as much as it may be required 
and desired.172 Instead, the discussion will focus on the influence of the key members of 
the theological faculty during his studies in Berlin, who shaped his philosophical 
concern, content and manner. These liberal theological thinkers – Ernst Toeltsch, 
Reinhold Seeberg, and Adolf von Harnack – introduced and in a way projected 
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approach by Peter Frick in the introduction to his Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation (2008, pp. 2-4).  
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 Frick himself finds the existing attempts to provide an account of Bonhoeffer’s philosophical (rather 
than theological) intellectual formation lacking (ibid., pp. 3-4). 
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Bonhoeffer into a dialectical engagement with philosophical thinkers, such as Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, which also distinguished him from Barth’s dogmatic 
perspective. Bonhoeffer’s engagement with Hegel in his Berlin dissertation Sanctorum 
Communio will be explored in the final chapter of this thesis, where it will also enable a 
critical reading of the work alongside Žižek’s thought.  
3.3.1 The philosophical influence of the theological faculty at the University of Berlin  
As observed in the previous section, the twentieth century was an age of transition from 
the classical modernity of the nineteenth century to the postmodern culture of the 
twenty-first century. At the time of Bonhoeffer’s arrival for his studies in Berlin, the 
University there was a stronghold of nineteenth century liberal theology. Its theological 
faculty boasted four prominent thinkers who were trained in the theology of Albrecht 
Ritschl and represented various reactions to or modifications of his thought – Ernst 
Troeltsch, Karl Holl, Reinhold Seeberg and Adolf von Harnack. They moved away 
from Ritschl’s disinterest in culture and the philosophy of religion and his isolation of 
theology from other intellectual disciplines (Mackintosh, 1937, pp. 181-183). For his 
understanding of the decline of religion, Troeltsch drew upon Max Weber’s conception 
of sociology and Neo-Kantian thought. By his concentration upon the church, the theme 
of the redemptive community and seeking a synthesis with Hegelian metaphysics, 
Seeberg placed a conservative view of church history at the service of the Liberal 
Spirit.173 Von Harnack, on the other hand, substituted Ritschl’s centrality of 
ecclesiology for a broad sweep of cultural interests and an individual spirit which drew 
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its strength from the heroic transcendence of history and nature. The thinking of all four 
of them influenced Bonhoeffer’s own intellectual development, its philosophical 
concern or orientation, content and manner, be it positively or negatively.  
3.3.1.1 Ernst Troeltsch 
It could be said that the systematic theologian of the History of Religions School174 
Ernst Troeltsch provided the most radical liberal reaction against Ritschl. Unlike von 
Harnack and Seeberg, he did not look for an irreducible essence or absolute principles 
of Christianity, but instead desired to complete the process initiated by Schleiermacher 
and construct a modern Christianity under the auspices of philosophy of religion, the 
psychological analysis of religious consciousness and the religious idea as it manifested 
itself in history (Troeltsch, 1911, p. 6). Deeply influenced by Hegel, he argued that even 
though Christianity is the highest religious form with its perfect expression of the unity 
of God with man, it must recognize that it is limited and conditioned, and that its idea 
can now maintain itself by means of its own intrinsic resources. Therefore, that idea 
must be guarded against any ecclesiastical or religious encroachments:  
If the absolute authority has fallen which, in its absoluteness, made the 
antithesis of the divine and human equally absolute, if in man an 
autonomous principle is recognized as the source of truth and moral 
conduct, then all conceptions of the world which were specially designed 
to maintain that gulf between the human and divine, fall along with it. 
With it falls the doctrine of the absolute corruption of mankind through 
original sin, and the transference of the ends of life to the heavenly world 
in which there will be deliverance from this corruption. In consequence, 
all the factors of this present life acquire an enhanced value and a higher 
impressiveness, and the ends of life fall more and more within the realms 
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 The term Religionsgeschichtliche Schule denoted a group of German Protestant theologians associated 
with the University of Göttingen in late nineteenth century.  
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of the present world with its ideal of transformation (Troeltsch, 1912, pp. 
22-23). 
The departure of this ‘absolute authority’ results in its place being taken by a ‘truth and 
morality producing autonomous principle’ in Man that is not in the possession of any 
religious or otherwise community. Troeltsch certainly had no illusions about the future 
course of world history, the outcome of the growth of what he called ‘militaristic, 
nationalistic bourgeois states’, but his emancipation rather recalls Žižek’s own 
negativity of the Cross. Given its Hegelian dialectical motor, it is of no surprise that 
Troeltsch’s argument here reminds one of Žižek’s own Hegelian model of religion, 
where Christianity represents the final stage in the autonomy of Man, resulting in the 
community of abandoned solidarity, without recourse to the big Other or indeed an 
afterlife. This emphasis on the present life of Man was at the forefront of Troeltsch’s 
sociological approach to the doctrine of the church presented in his Die Soziallehren der 
christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen [Social Teachings] (1923). 
Even though Troeltsch died before Bonhoeffer could attend his lectures, his 
thought very much pervaded the subjects on offer and influenced the topic and approach 
of Bonhoeffer’s own dissertation – to produce an understanding of the church outside 
the terms of general religious principles, setting forth its structure in terms of a 
sociological analysis carried into the service of dogmatics. While Troeltsch focused on 
the historico-sociological shapes and conditions of the church, ‘the intrinsic sociological 
idea of Christianity, and its structure and organization’ (Troeltsch, 1λ23, pp. 33-34), 
Bonhoeffer wished to present a genuinely theological concept of the church, all the 
while insisting that Troeltsch was correct in seeing the church as an empirical structure 
because ‘revelation means nothing beyond, but an entity in this historically and 
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sociologically shaped world’ (Bethge, 1λ63, p. 34). Taking over his sociological tools, 
Bonhoeffer examined the spatial question of faith in community, rather than engaging in 
discussion over the temporal problems of faith and history. Later, in Ethics and the 
Letters, he attempted to come to terms with the basic questions Troeltsch had raised. 
Thus in the letter on June 8th which outlines the implication of the world-come-of-age 
for Christianity, Bonhoeffer stated to Bethge that liberal theology began to apprehend it, 
specifically mentioning Troeltsch’s name in parenthesis (κ June, 1944 in DBWE 8: p. 
42κ). Thus Troeltsch’s influence on the development of Bonhoeffer’s thought is not to 
be overlooked and there are traces of it in all of his writings, but foremost in his 
sociological and modern qua  contemporary orientation.  
3.3.1.2 Reinhold Seeberg 
This sociological concern with the modern man was certainly also characteristic of 
Bonhoeffer’s dissertation supervisor and historian of dogma Reinhold Seeberg, who 
taught at the University from 1898 to 1927, and his Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte 
[Text-Book of the History of Doctrines] (1953). The work represented an argument 
against Ritschl’s dismissal of dogmatics, instead attempting to preserve the Christian 
faith by expressing it in a form intelligible to modern man, a sort of rewriting of dogma 
for a modern age.175 Yet what proved crucial for Bonhoeffer’s thought was Seeberg’s 
focus on the moral and social dimensions of theological reflection, grounded in his 
conviction that theology ought to be life-related and experience-focused rather than 
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 See Seeberg’s preface to the English translation of his Die Grundwahrheiten der christlichen Religion 
(1908, pp. v-viii). Seeberg’s task was rooted in an understanding of the mind as the contact point between 
man and God, a religious a priori possessing the intrinsic capacity for becoming aware of his being and 
activity, which Bonhoeffer challenged in Act and Being (1996). See also Seeberg, (1927a), p. 104 and 
Bethge (1994), pp. 87-89.  
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purely theoretical. He convinced Bonhoeffer about the social reality of existence, in 
history and community. The disciple attended all of his systematic theology seminars, 
where he observed his rigour and pursuit of knowledge, which led him to approach 
Seeberg about supervising his dissertation. This theme of sociality became Bonhoeffer’s 
lens through which he considered theology.176  
Seeberg and Bonhoefffer’s shared sociological conviction centred upon a 
particular field of theology – ecclesiology. Seeberg’s ecclesiology was part of his 
dialectical historical understanding of the Trinity, wherein the church was understood as 
the visible, tangible and incarnate Holy Spirit, and interpreted the social reality of 
existence (Seeberg, 1927b, p. 357f).177 It was in this context that Bonhoeffer proposed 
in his thesis a ‘Christian philosophy of spirit […] that will provide a direction for 
Christian philosophy’ (DBWE 1, pp. 43-44 [30]). This proposal is masterfully laid out 
in the prologue and deserving of a full quote: 
The goal of the following ecclesiological study is a dogmatic-theological 
reflection on the church in light of insights from social philosophy and 
sociology. Creating a real conceptual connection between theology and 
both social philosophy and sociology is the basic task and also the 
difficulty in this essay, whose concrete subject matter is the idea of the 
church as sanctorum communion. The dogmatic character of the work 
prevails; both disciplines of social science are to be made fruitful for 
theology.  
Thus the basic problem can be defined as the problem of a 
specifically Christian social philosophy and sociology. My intention is to 
discuss neither a general sociology of religion, nor genetic-sociological 
questions; rather, I intend to show that an inherently Christian social 
philosophy and sociology, arising essentially out of fundamental 
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 However, Green (1999, p. 24) is quick to rightly point out that the complex set of concepts Bonhoeffer 
uses to explicate sociality are not simply taken over from Seeberg, but in discussion with others.  
177
 This thoroughly Hegelian understanding of the church, in contrast to Žižek, results in Seeberg’s 
attempt to relate the significance of the church to history in general. 
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concepts of Christian theology, is most fully articulated in the concept of 
the church. 
          The more I have focused on this problem, the more clearly I have 
recognized the social intention of all fundamental Christian concepts. 
‘Person’, ‘primal state’, ‘sin’, and ‘revelation’ appeared fully 
understandable only in relation to sociality […].  
          I hope this study will be seen as a modest contribution to a 
‘philosophy of the church’ as was recently called for by Reinhold 
Seeberg in his Christliche Dogmatik [cf. Seeberg, Dogmatik, 2, 385], 
namely one which not only clarifies the nature of the church and of 
religious community, but which ‘would result in new understanding of 
the cohesion of the spirit of humanity […].  My […] wish in presenting 
this study is to contribute something to the understanding that our church, 
profoundly impoverished and helpless though it appears today, is 
nevertheless the sanctorum communion, the holy body of Christ, even 
Christ’s very presence in the world (DBWE 1, pp. 22-23 [5]). 
 
Bonhoeffer’s conviction regarding ‘the social intention of all fundamental Christian 
concepts’,178 as well as his desire to develop ‘a real conceptual connection between 
theology and both social philosophy and sociology’, speaks strongly of Seeberg’s 
influence upon the form of his thought and also his later explorations of questions about 
what it means to be human in the concrete contingencies of life.  
Following the completion of Sanctorum Communio, Seeberg suggested that 
Bonhoeffer proceed with a historical investigation of ethics, such as the ethics of 
Scholasticism, or to move onto discussing the method of interpretation of Scripture 
(Bethge, 1λ67, p. 132). Instead, Bonhoeffer’s Act and Being (1996) discussed God’s 
revelation epistemologically in light of the clash between the transcendental philosophy 
of liberal theology and Barth’s scepticism about its capacity for critical reflection (to be 
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 According to Richard Roberts (2005, pp. 375-377), it also qualifies Sanctorum Communio as a classic 
illuminating the relation between theology and the social sciences.  
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discussed later).179 Thus Bonhoeffer’s second dissertation was not supervised by 
Seeberg, but by his successor Wilhelm Lütgert. Bethge (1967, pp. 69-72) remarks that 
after 1933, when the national socialists made expansion of the German Reich their 
official policy and some of Seeberg’s thoughts on community appealed to values that 
nurtured nationalism, Bonhoeffer’s break with the latter became complete. Nonetheless, 
Seeberg’s influence upon the form and philosophical orientation of Bonhoeffer’s 
thought should not be overlooked.180  
3.3.1.3 Von Harnack 
Finally, and of no less importance, was the influence of the church historian Adolf von 
Harnack.181 Of Bonhoeffer’s Berlin professors, von Harnack alone had a personal 
relationship to his family – he was a friend of Bonhoeffer’s father and both families 
lived in Grunewald, which was a neighbourhood of academics.182 After retiring from 
teaching at Berlin (from 1888 until 1921), he personally chose Bonhoeffer as one of a 
handful of students who worked with him in his seminars on church history after 
retirement. The latter described the experience in a letter as ‘too closely associated with 
my whole personality for me to be able ever to forget it’ (Bethge, 1λ67, p. 34). It is 
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 A thorough presentation of Bonhoeffer’s second dissertation can be found in ‘Bonhoeffer's Act and 
Being: The Priority of the Other as Critique of Idealism’, in Floyd (1988). 
180
 Volume 17 of BDWE: Register und Ergänzungen, lists a total of 168 references to Seeberg, 134 of 
these before Act and Being. This goes to show the influence the latter has had on Bonhoeffer’s formation 
as a thinker, not only as a teacher, but also in Bonhoeffer’s challenge of or response to his thought. 
181
 Volume 17 of the German edition of BDWE: Register und Ergänzungen lists 134 references to 
Harnack. Unlike those to Seeberg, these appear throughout Bonhoeffer’s writings, after the publication of 
his second dissertation.  Certainly, he remains in Bonhoeffer’s view an influence of a much more positive 
disposition.  
182
 A description of the personal relationship between them is beyond the scope of this thesis. For an 
insight into that, see Bethge (1967, p. 72).  
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understandable, then, that von Harnack strongly influenced Bonhoeffer’s intellectual 
development. 
Von Harnack’s thought was characteristically liberal insofar as his thought in 
pursuit of knowledge was without limits and marked by a confidence in the human spirit 
and ability to pursue objectivity under the scrutiny of reason.183 In contrast to 
Troeltsch’s understanding of dogmatic theology as a possibility for neo-Protestantism, 
or Seebergs redrafting of dogma in modern metaphysical language, he adopted yet a 
different approach. His Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte [History of Dogma] (1890) 
narrated the history of dogma as an obscuration of the Gospel through Hellenization, 
concluding that the task of contemporary theology is to continue destroying dogma:  
Moving forward, Christianity must learn that even in religion the 
simplest is the hardest, and that everything that burdens religion only 
blunts its gravity. Therefore, the goal of all Christian work, even of all 
theological work, can only be this – to discern ever more distinctly the 
simplicity and the gravity of the Gospel, in order to become ever purer 
and livelier in spirit, and ever more loving and brotherly in action (von 
Harnack, 1890, p. 764).184 
 
With that conviction he founded in 1891 the Commission on the Church Fathers, 
intending to publish a critical edition of the Greco-Christian literature up to the year 
325,185 one which would instead focus on the way belief shapes one’s life. Bonhoeffer 
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 A good account of von Harnack’s liberal theology can be found in Rumscheidt’s Adolf von Harnack: 
Liberal Theology at its Height (1988).  
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 This is my own translation of the original German [Fortschreitend muss die Christenheit lernen, dass 
auch in der Religion das Einfachste das Schwerste ist, und dass Alles, was die Religion bela stet, ihren 
Ernst abstumpft. Darum kann das Ziel aller christlichen Arbeit, auch aller theologischen, nur das sein, 
immer sicherer die Schlichtheit und den Ernst des Evangeliums zu erkennen, um in der Gesinnung immer 
reiner und lebendiger, in der That immer liebevoller und brüderlicher zu warden.] For von Harnack, the 
archetypal hero was Luther, who discarded dogma and substituted it for an evangelical view (ibid., pp. 
691-764).  
185
 By 1924 forty-five volumes had appeared, most of them edited by von Harnack himself.  
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admired the epistemological rigour with which the church historian sought to engage or 
present theology to the modern man. Of particular influence was von Harnack’s positive 
perception of ‘the world’, compared to the isolationist attitude of his teachers – 
something he clearly expressed in the text of his address at von Harnack’s funeral 
(DBWE 10: pp. 379-381). 
While the influence of von Harnack on Bonhoeffer’s intellectual formation was 
immense and multifocal,186 it is within the remit of this section (as outlined above) to 
focus on the following areas of Bonhoeffer’s thought, which have been shaped by his 
teacher: his ethical concern oriented towards action, the maturity of the world come-of-
age, the notion of arcane discipline and the emphasis on Jesus’ humanity. 
The ethical orientation of Bonhoeffer’s thought was already visible (and will be 
discussed in Chapter 4) in Sanctorum Communio, where Christ existing as community 
poses the question of how the community should act.187 Later, at the end of his stay at 
Union Seminary, Bonhoeffer set out an understanding of the import of Christianity for 
the world as the deciding contribution of American Christianity: ‘Taking seriously the 
kingdom of God as a kingdom on earth is biblically sound and is justified compared to 
an understanding of the kingdom as one beyond’ (DBWE 12: p. 241). Indeed, in all 
Bonhoeffer’s works the ethical, and specifically questions of ethical implications of 
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 Rumscheidt delivers a glimpse into von Harnack’s influence in the formation of Bonhoeffer’s theology 
in the Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer  (Rumscheidt, 1999, pp. 50-70 at p. 54). A very 
helpful introduction to Harnackian characteristics of Bonhoeffer’s thought can be found in Kalternborn’s 
(1973) illuminating study of von Harnack as Bonhoeffer’s teacher. See in particular pp. 125-128 and the 
more detailed analysis that follows. Alternatively, Kaltenborn’s brief contribution to Klassen in English 
relies on that work. See ‘Adolf von Harnack and Bonhoeffer’ in Klassen (1981), pp. 48-57. 
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 For Bonhoeffer the emphasis lies on community, rather than von Harnack’s individual. That does not 
mean that Bonhoeffer ignores the individual, but rather that the two are inseparable.  
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Christianity, assume utmost importance. Bonhoeffer contemplates the gravity of the 
ethical in contrast to knowledge of good and bad in Ethik: 
The knowledge of good and evil appears to be the goal of all ethical 
reflection. The first task of Christian ethics is to supersede that 
knowledge. This attack on the presuppositions of all other ethics is so 
unique that it is questionable whether it even makes sense to speak of 
Christian ethics at all. If it is nevertheless done, then this can only mean 
that Christian ethics claims to articulate the origin of the whole ethical 
enterprise, and thus to be considered an ethic only as the critique of all 
ethics (DBWE 6: pp. 299-300).  
 
This understanding of Christianity’s subversion of the ethical preoccupation with the 
knowledge of good and evil lends itself to Žižek’s own reading of the atonement as an 
act suspending the Law, or in Bonhoeffer’s words, ‘a critique of all ethics’ (ibid.). 
Indeed, it can be read as a critique of modernity’s preoccupation with knowledge (as an 
act). 
 The described ethical orientation is situated within a world which, for both von 
Harnack and Bonhoeffer, is characterised by maturity or has come-of-age. In both of 
their thought, this concept of Mündigkeit, that is maturity or come-of-ageness, performs 
a crucial function in understanding Christianity today. Thus, in his Bericht über die 
Ausgabe der griechischen Kirchenväter der drei ersten Jahrhunderte, von Harnack 
argues that of all religions Christianity best expresses the Mündigkeit of the Greeks and 
Romans (1906c, p. 166). He also remarks that it is unworthy of a people come-of-age 
‘to be patronized and bound to the inner spheres of religion’ (ibid., pp. 89-90).188 For 
Bonhoeffer also the maturity of the world engages or co-determines the purpose of 
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 My own translation of the original German [‘auf dem innerlichsten gebiete, dem der Religion, 
bevormundet und gebunden zu werden’]. 
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ecclesiology, its role and identity today. The church, he contends in Ethik, can no longer 
be the purpose in and of itself, but exists for the world that has come-of-age.189 If it fails 
to do so, it also profanes the gospel, which itself has brought the world to maturity. Here 
is how he then expresses this again in The Letters:  
Thus our coming of age leads us to a truer recognition of our situation 
before God. God would have us know that we must live as men who 
manage their lives without him. The same God who is with us is the God 
who forsakes us (Mark 15:34!). The same God who makes us to live in 
the world without the working hypothesis of God is the God before 
whom we stand continually. Before God, and with God, we live without 
God. God consents to be pushed out of the world and onto the Cross; 
God is weak and powerless in the world and in precisely this way, and 
only so, is at our side and helps us. Matt. 8:17 makes it quite clear that 
Christ helps us not by virtue of his omnipotence but rather by virtue of 
his weakness and suffering! (16 July, 1944 in DBWE 8: pp. 478-479). 
 
Conviction about the Mündigkeit of the world plays a part in another sphere of von 
Harnack’s influence – Bonhoeffer’s concept of ‘arcane discipline’ protecting the riches 
of Christianity from profanation. Thus Bonhoeffer’s contention on 5 May 1λ44 that 
‘there are degrees of cognition and degrees of significance. That means, an “arcane 
discipline” must be re-established, through which the mysteries of the Christian faith are 
sheltered against profanation’ (5 May, 1944 in DBWE 8: p. 373)190 can be read 
alongside von Harnack’s contention that ‘what matters is not the form but the reverence 
with which one lays hold of the mystery of the person of Christ and then submits one’s 
life to the spirit of Christ’ (1λ06a, p. 2λ6).191 The parallelism in the wording is not 
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 See ‘Church and World I’ in DBWE 6, pp. 339-351, and ‘On the Possibility of the Church’s Message 
to the World’ in DBWE 6, pp. 352-362.  
190
 See also Staats (1981), p. 105. 
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 My own translation of the original German: [Nicht auf die Fassung kommt es an, sondern auf die 
Ehrfurcht, mit der man das Geheimnis der Person Christi umfasst und das eigene Leben unter den Geist 
Christi beugt]. 
  176 
 
coincidental, even though ‘profanation‘ is perceived differently – by Harnack in relation 
to those segments of the church that held to some form of untouchable orthodoxy (von 
Zahn-Harnack, 1951, p. 131), while Bonhoeffer argued for a protection from the 
assertions of German Christians that what was being carried out in Germany was the 
will of God. In light of this Bonhoeffer calls for an intellectual discussion that will 
challenge the world:  
It is not for us to predict the day – but the day will come – when people 
will once more be called to speak the word of God in such a way that the 
world is changed and renewed. It will be a new language, perhaps quite 
non-religious, but liberating and redeeming like Jesus’ language, so that 
people will be alarmed and yet overcome by its power – the language of 
a new righteousness and truth, a language proclaiming that God makes 
peace with humankind and that God’s kingdom is drawing near (18 May, 
1944 in DBWE 8: p. 390). 
 
Finally, Bonhoeffer’s thought reflects von Harnack’s emphasis on the humanity of 
Jesus. Admittedly, von Harnack prioritizes Christ’s human nature when he says:  
[T]he thesis: ‘the life of Jesus was not purely human’, can only mean: the 
life of Jesus offers brush-strokes, for which our history does not possess 
any analogies. Any other formulation is not permitted or possible for a 
scientific man […] (von Zahn-Harnack, 1951, p. 187) 192  
 
or indeed ‘If you are assuming that the life of Jesus was not purely human, you also 
deprive it of its peculiarity’ (von Harnack, 1906c, p. 223).193 In contrast, Bonhoeffer 
maintains that the humanity of Jesus cannot be separated from his divinity.194 
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 My own translation of the original German: [… die These: ‘das Leben Jesu war kein rein 
menschliches’ darf nur lauten: Das Leben Jesu bietet Züge, für die wir in der Geschichte Analogien nicht 
besitzen. Eine andere Formulierung kann und darf ein wissenchaftlicher Mann nicht brauchen…].  
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 My own translation of the original German: [Behauptest Du, das Leben Jesu sei kein rein 
menschliches, so entziehst Du auch dem Glauben sein Eigentümliches…] 
194
 See, for example, ‘The Image of Christ’ in DBWE 4, pp. 281-289.  
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Nonetheless, there remains an emphasis on the humanity of Jesus, fully expressed in the 
Letters, where he writes to Bethge:  
In the last few years I have come to know and understand more and more 
of the profound this-worldliness of Christianity. The Christian is not a 
homo religiosus, but simply a human being, in the same way that Jesus 
was a human being – in contrast, perhaps, to John the Baptist (21 July 
1944 DBWE 8, p. 541).  
 
By positioning the humanity of Jesus in contrast to the Baptist and designating the homo 
religiosus as negative, Bonhoeffer seeks to protect the humanity of Jesus against any 
‘religionalising’ imposition of religion. In other words, Christ’s humanity ought to be 
presented together with his divinity, whilst refusing to be overtaken by it, for it alone 
prevents any invocation of the ‘deus ex machina’:  
Human religiosity directs people in need to the power of God in the 
world: God as deus ex machina. The Bible directs people toward the 
powerlessness and suffering of God; only the suffering God can help (16 
July 1944 DBWE 8, p. 479).195 
 
What remains is the paradox of pointing at the man Jesus and proclaiming that this is 
God (DBWE 4: p. 225), the man existing for others, rather than man in himself. In 
Outline of a Book (3 August 1944 DBWE 8: pp. 499-504), Bonhoeffer writes under 
Chapter Three:  
The church […] must tell people in every calling what a life with Christ 
is, what it means ‘to be there for others’ […] It will have to see that it 
does not underestimate the significance of the human ‘example’ (which 
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 ‘The Incarnation, Jesus’ words and deeds, and his death on the Cross are integral elements of this 
image. It is an image different from the image of Adam in the original glory of paradise. It is the image of 
one who places himself in the very midst of the world of sin and death, who takes on the needs of human 
flesh, who humbly submits to God’s wrath and judgment over sinners, who remains obedient to God’s 
will in suffering and death; the one born in poverty, who befriended and sat at the table to eat with tax 
collectors and sinners, and who, on the Cross, was rejected and abandoned by God and human beings – 
this is God in human form, this is the human being who is the new image of God!’ (DBWE 4, p. 284) 
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has its origin in the humanity of Jesus and is so important in Paul’s 
writings!) (ibid., pp. 503-504). 
 
Another letter deserving of mention can be directly compared with the Das Wesen des 
Christentums, in which von Harnack wishes ‘to remind humanity over and again that a 
man named Jesus Christ was in their midst’ (von Harnack, 1λ02, p. 1). On 21 August 
1944 Bonhoeffer writes, ‘If this earth was deemed worthy to bear the human being 
Jesus Christ, if a human being like Jesus lived, then and only then does our life as 
human beings have meaning’ (21 August 1λ44 in DBWE κ: p. 515). Despite their 
differences in relation to the divine nature of Jesus, Bonhoeffer very much shared the 
emphasis on his humanity with von Harnack, both in implication and application.  
Perhaps their difference in relation to the divine is illuminated even further by 
Bonhoeffer’s criticism of von Harnack’s overt confidence in the human ability to 
comprehend. Rumscheidt describes this confidence as follows : ‘[In] liberal theology 
[…] the distance between the knower and the known […] is reduced to the extent that 
what is known cannot be a limit on the knower’ (Rumscheidt, 1λλλ, p. 54). Bonhoeffer, 
however, in his notion of sociality in Sanctorum Communio (DBWE 1: p. 51) and then 
again in Act and Being (DBWE 2: p. 88), argues for limits that are imposed by the other 
and are as such insurmountable methodologically and ethically. He concludes that when 
those limits are transgressed, as in the case of von Harnack’s confident liberal theology, 
it is revealed that the subject does not know the other – man or God – epistemologically 
at all, but knows only oneself. 
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 Bonhoeffer’s references to von Harnack began to recede with Karl Barth’s 
prominence in his thought from the late 1920s.196 However, as Bethge reports, in The 
Letters the references pick up again, due to Bonhoeffer’s desire ‘to become better 
acquainted with particular aspects of nineteenth-century literature and rehabilitate the 
tradition of the forefathers, from Keller to Harnack, from Pestalozzi to Dilthey, over 
against more modern existentialist tendencies’ (Bethge, 1λ67, pp. κ44-846). Amongst 
works of others, Bonhoeffer asked for Harnack’s Geschichte der Königlich 
Preussischen Akademie [The History of the Prussian Academy of Sciences] (1900)197 
and expressing a sadness that so few people appreciate the intellectual achievements of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (29-30 January, 2 March 1944, in DBW 8: p. 
279, p. 316). This comment reveals the continued influence and context of von Harnack 
within which Bonhoeffer developed the orientation, concern and emphasis of his own 
thought.  
3.3.2 Conclusion for the Berlin section 
It has hopefully become clear that Bonhoeffer’s Berlin faculty has left an immense 
intellectual imprint on the development, content and overall concern of his work. 
Bethge sums up the formative influences as follows: ‘Troeltsch’s interest in the 
sociological realities of Christianity, […] Harnack’s intellectual incorruptibility, and 
                                                 
196This was not solely down to Barth, but also due to the political circumstances, argues Bethge. (1967, p. 
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‘lectures on the History of twentieth-century systematic theology’ he devotes an entire chapter to ‘Wesen 
des Christentums’. 
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 Von Harnack was asked to write the work in connection with the celebration of its 200th anniversary 
in 1900, because of his contribution to the natural and medical sciences for the Prussian Academy of 
Sciences. He was a member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin, director of the Prussian State 
Library and president of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society (now the Max Planck Society for the Advancement 
of Science) after 1911. 
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Seeberg’s philosophical openness’ (Bethge, 1963, p. 28). As already acknowledged, my 
focus has been on their contribution to Bonhoeffer’s sustained engagement of theology 
with philosophy and his understanding of the church and sociological realities of 
Christianity in a mature modern world, including the corresponding interpretation of 
dogma. Bonhoeffer’s interest in philosophy, evident already at the time of his secondary 
education, was nurtured and developed further by the theological faculty in Berlin, 
embodying the period’s special relationship between philosophy and theology. I 
contend that an understanding of this background is necessary in order to fully 
appreciate the philosophical dimension of his thought, observed in statements such as 
‘The church is church only when it is there for others’ (3 August 1λ44 DBWE κ: p. 
503). Indeed, his intellectual formation at Berlin serves as the ground for his ‘Christ 
existing as church-community’ (DBWE 1: p. 121), the key principle around which his 
thought revolves. Thus, importantly, what started as a term in Hegelian dialectics under 
Seeberg, became an essential concept for Bonhoeffer’s growing understanding of 
sociality, first embodied in his dissertation Sanctorum Communio. This will be 
examined in Chapter 4, when his engagement with Hegel will also enable a critical 
reading of the work alongside Žižek’s thought. For now, however, a supplementary note 
on Hegel’s influence is in order, since he is not among the most common thinkers 
consulted in consideration of Bonhoeffer’s intellectual formation.  
3.3.3 Supplementary note on the influence of Hegel  
As already observed in Section 3.3.3 on Bonhoeffer’s context, Hegel shaped the 
intellectual modern theological environment and his idealist philosophy had an 
important part to play in the development and content of Bonhoeffer’s thought at 
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Berlin.198 Unfortunately, Hegel has not been given the appropriate attention in 
examinations of Bonhoeffer’s intellectual formation, something Jacob Holm links to an 
uncritical acceptance of the simplified opposition between Bonhoeffer and Hegel that 
persisted until the 1980s (Holm, 2002, pp. 64-65). Thus, for example, in his early 
account of Bonhoeffer’s intellectual biography, Bethge claims that Bonhoeffer’s second 
dissertation is ‘basically addressing philosophers, whom he schematically finds guilty of 
the original sin of idealism, namely imprisonment in the self’(Bethge, 1λ67, p. λ7).199 
Perhaps Bonhoeffer’s own early treatment of Hegel contributed to that insofar as 
Sanctorum Communio lacks most references to specific texts but also fails to 
substantiate his generalizations about Hegel and the diverse movement of German 
idealism (See Marsh, 1994, p. 89). Furthermore, an examination of his footnotes reveals 
that he mostly relies upon others’ presentation of Hegel.200 Possibly a combination of all 
these contributed to a lack of consideration of Hegel’s influence upon the development 
of Bonhoeffer’s thought.  
Change came about after the publication of Oswald Bayer’s article ‘Christus als 
Mitte: Ethik im Banne der Religionsphilosophie Hegels’ in 1λκ5 (later published as a 
chapter in his Leibliches Wort, 1992, pp. 245-260), evidenced by the publication of 
student notes from Bonhoeffer’s 1λ33 lectures on Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion in 
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 For an introduction to Hegel and Bonhoeffer see Floyd (2008), pp. 83-119.  
199
 Admittedly, Bethge goes on to say that the philosophers did not recognise themselves in this 
characterisation, and later sided with critics of Bonhoeffer’s conceptual oversimplifications (pp. 97-99).  
200
 For example, a heavy reliance upon Emmanuel Hirsch is observable in Bonhoeffer’s criticism of the 
idealist misconception of the subject, including a brief outline of the resulting distorted community in 
which individuals surrender absolutely and dissolve into it. DBWE 1: p. 193-198 cf. Hirsch (1926), p. 
66f.  
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1988 as Dietrich Bonhoeffers Hegel-Seminar (Tödt, 1988).201 Those very lectures reveal 
an appreciation for Hegel, whose thought is to be ‘judged as a whole’.202 After that, in 
the 90s, Charles Marsh examined the way Bonhoeffer read his own idea of Christian 
community in Akt und Sein against Hegel’s.203 Holm concluded his 2002 observation 
with the statement that Hegel’s positive impact upon Bonhoeffer is still not fully 
recognized or even acknowledged (Holm, 2002, p. 65).  
The final chapter of this thesis will thus highlight that rather than a matter of 
simple disagreement, Bonhoeffer’s treatment of Hegel in Sanctorum Communio is also 
an attempt to develop his thought.204 Marsh aptly observes that his approach is ‘less 
concerned with overcoming Hegel than in thinking along with the philosopher on the 
meaning of God’s presence in the complex drama of divine worldliness’ (Marsh, 1λλ4, 
p. λ1). Consequently, as will be observed, Bonhoeffer’s own thoughts are distinctly 
Hegelian and retain that form and dialectically tense content, even while being 
developed. Indeed, Bonhoeffer’s engagement with Hegel and the sociological structure 
of the church functions as a necessary social philosophical background of and formal 
model for his later thought, including The Letters.205 In a way, then, it is entirely 
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 These student notes reveal Bonhoeffer’s interest in the theological dimensions of Phenomenology of 
Spirit and Lectures in the Philosophy of Religion. 
202
 On an occasion when a student in Bonhoeffer’s class pointed out a passage in Hegel that he deemed as 
non-christian [nichtchristlich], and thus dismissing his Philosophy of Religion, Bonhoeffer responded: 
‘Man soll einen Autor nicht von einem negative Satz aus angreifen oder interpretieren; man soll fragen, 
was er mit dem Ganzen meint oder will’ [One ought not to attack or interpret an author solely on the basis 
of a negative sentence; but rather inquire about its meaning or purpose] (ibid., p. 137). 
203
 ‘Christ as the Mediation of the Other’ in Marsh (1994), pp. 81-110.  
204
 I am far from arguing that Bonhoeffer wasn’t critical of Hegel, but rather pointing out how Hegel still 
shapes his thought positively rather than merely negatively. For an example of a straightforward critique 
of Hegel, see The Letters 16 July 1944 in DBWE 8: p. 477, wherein Bonhoeffer accuses Hegel of 
pantheism (‘Kant is basically a deist; Fichte and Hegel are pantheists’). 
205
 Cf. Marsh (1994), p. 175, n. 11. 
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appropriate to at least discuss Bonhoeffer as a Hegelian,206 even though his 
development or appropriation of Hegel is creative and critical. Hopefully, the final 
chapter will contribute – albeit in a very limited way as this is not its primary aim – to 
the demonstration of the foundational role Hegel has played in the development of 
Bonhoeffer’s thought, for the latter’s engagement with Hegel’s communitarianism, be it 
in reaction to his understanding of the subject-object relationship or the utilization of the 
concept of objective spirit, is indispensable and highly formative.  
3.3.4 Addendum: the influence of Karl Barth 
While liberal theology had an immense impact on Bonhoeffer’s intellectual formation 
and his appreciation of it was clear, he also saw and challenged its shortcoming. 
Reflecting on his post-WW1 context, he disagreed with its anthropological optimism 
and reduction of religion to man at the expense of God, who was considered as 
ultimately unknowable. This he later clearly expressed in The Letters, stating that liberal 
theology was confined to the self, individualistic and inward, insofar as it attempted to 
preserve God’s place ‘at least in the realm of the “personal”, the “inner life”, the 
“private sphere”’ (κ July, 1λ44 in DBWE κ: p. 455). This was alarming for Bonhoeffer, 
as it implied spheres in life where God was absent or forced out. He was adamant that 
God, that is Christ, cannot be excluded from the world. The distance between him and 
Seeberg grew ever more decisive, leading to a ‘break’ in 1λ33. 
In response to this shift Bonhoeffer recognized the value of the Swiss pastor and 
theologian Karl Barth’s (1κκ6-1968) emphasis upon revelation as a way to maintain 
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 Marsh has observed ‘whether Bonhoeffer turns out to be a Hegelian by default is a question that must 
not be ignored’ (ibid., p. 80). 
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God as wholly Other.207 Thus, in his 1930s essay, ‘The Theology of Crisis and its 
Attitude Toward Philosophy and Science’ (DBWE 10: pp. 462-476), where he set forth 
Barth’s position against that of idealism, Bonhoeffer understood liberal theology’s 
idealist religious structures as mere attempts to avoid the embarrassment of revelation, 
by circumventing it philosophically and rendering it superfluous (ibid., pp. 464-465). 
This perception was shaped by Barth’s conviction that the starting point of theology was 
not human religious experience, but the Word of a transcendent God, marking a 
dialectical theology that emphasised the infinite distance between the human and the 
divine and making any understanding of our knowledge of God paradoxical in 
character, because it was self-authenticated through God’s revelation. Not only was God 
the object structuring man, Barth argued, but man was at the same time the subject 
directed by the recognition of faith in the objective reality of God (Barth, 1933, p. 
28).208 This inversion of the meaning of subject and object enabled the possibility of the 
dogmatic understanding, validating speech about God in his action (Barth, 1960, p. 
171). Barth was thus able to maintain both God’s objective reality as wholly Other and 
his communicability (Barth, 1933, pp. 6-11). This attracted the young Bonhoeffer, who 
was disillusioned with liberal theology’s placement of God’s transcendence under the 
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 Barth rebelled against nineteenth century liberal subjectivism and exegesis, its preoccupation with 
historical authenticity of texts and their cultural reinterpretation, as moralistic and individualistic 
reductionism, imprisoning God in man’s consciousness; see Barth (1933), pp. 6-10. The contentious 
relationship between the liberal theological faculty in Berlin and the upstart theology was on display in a 
public exchange of letters between Barth and Adolf von Harnack during 1923, as discussed in 3.2. on pp. 
160-161.  
208
 Having said that, for Barth God is also the subject who is revealed. For a helpful analysis of Barth’s 
use of subject-object terminology as applied to God, see Chapter VI of Brown’s Subject and Object in 
Modern Theology (1955). 
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control of the subject, who asserts its boundlessness and autonomy, making himself 
God and other men his creatures.  
The impact of Barth on Bonhoeffer’s thought began to be felt after the young 
student’s first semester in Berlin, even though Barth was absent from the curricula of 
his professors. In 1λ24 he discovered Barth’s Der Römerbrief [The Epistle to the 
Romans] (1933) and Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie [The Word of God and the 
Word of Man] (1925). Following that, he obtained notes from lectures Barth would 
publish as Prolegomena zur  Christlichen Dogmatik [Prolegomena to Christian 
Dogmatics] (1975). This encounter shaped the development of Bonhoeffer’s theological 
approach, as was expressed in a classroom discussion of Barth’s theology in which 
Bonhoeffer contradicted von Harnack ‘politely, but on objective theological grounds,’ 
(Bethge, 1994, p. 67), and in von Harnack’s warning to Bonhoeffer about the threat 
posed by ‘contempt for academic theology and by unscholarly theologies’ (DBWE 10: 
pp. 196-197). In 1928 Bonhoeffer offered a Barthian assessment of religion as sinful 
self-justification and the very antithesis of faith. ‘In this sense,’ he contended, ‘religion 
and morality can become the most dangerous enemy of God’s coming to human beings, 
the most dangerous enemy of the Christian message of good news’ (ibid., p. 353). Later, 
during his visit at Union Theological Seminary in New York, he became known as an 
apologist for Barth’s theology,209 and, upon his return in 1931, a personal relationship 
between them was established. Bonhoeffer travelled to Bonn and anonymously attended 
one of Barth’s lectures. Catching his attention with a quotation from Luther, Bonhoeffer 
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 This is exemplified in the above-mentioned seminar, ‘The Theology of Crisis and its Attitude to 
Philosophy and Science’. See DBWE 10, pp. 462-476.  
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was invited to Barth’s home for dinner and conversation, and what followed was a 
theological relationship of meetings and correspondence over the ensuing years. During 
that time Barth’s thought impacted Bonhoeffer significantly,210 as is clearly seen by his 
decision to include a detailed presentation of Barthian thought into his Berlin lectures 
on the history of 20th century systematic theology in early 1932.  
Yet, it is important to note that although Bonhoeffer was and still is referred to 
as a Barthian (e.g. by Pangritz, 2008), it is perhaps more accurate to see him as charting 
his own course in the charged space between liberalism and Barth’s own dialectical 
theology.211 Thus, while he accepted the basic outline of dialectical theology, he was 
highly critical with regards to its positive content, specifically the church. In Sanctorum 
Communio and then also in Act and Being, Bonhoeffer expressed a corrective of 
shortcomings in the dialectical method for failure to uphold the church as the 
‘community of revelation’, insofar as Christ exists as the church: 
When works on doctrinal theology end by presenting the concept of the 
church as a necessary consequence of the Protestant faith, this must not 
imply anything other than the inner connection between the reality of the 
church and the entire reality of revelation. Only if the concept of God is 
understood to be incomprehensible when exclusively connected to the 
concept of the church is it permitted, for technical reasons of 
presentation, to 'derive' the latter from the former. In order to establish 
clarity about the inner logic of theological construction, it would be good 
for once if a presentation of doctrinal theology were not to start with the 
doctrine of God but with the doctrine of the church (DBWE 1: p. 134). 
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 For a general discussion of Barth’s impact on Bonhoeffer see Pangritz’s Karl Barth in the Theology of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer  (2000). For examples of interpretations of the relationship between Barth and 
Bonhoeffer see Prenter’s ‘Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Karl Barth’s Positivism of Revelation’ (1967), pp. 93-
130, and Ott’s Reality and Faith (1972, pp. 58-61, 120-142).   
211
 Green’s Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality (1999) attempts to present Bonhoeffer’s sociality in 
contrast to Barth. 
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Bonhoeffer struggled with the appropriateness of Barth’s description of the church as an 
institution in which ‘human indifference, misunderstanding and opposition attain their 
most sublime and their most naïve form’ (Barth, 1λ33, p. 41κ). The cited criticism is far 
deeper than a mere defence of the church as the locus of revelation, for it highlights 
dialectical theology’s individualistic tendencies. While it did direct attention from man 
towards God, it did so at the expense of attention towards community within which this 
revelation takes place, despite its sinfulness (DBWE 1: p. 126). When Barth published 
his Die Kirchliche Dogmatik [Church Dogmatics], this became even clearer, for the 
church was presented as a parable which pointed to God’s action, but in no way 
participated in it.212 While Barth’s picture of God’s transcendence was formal and 
impersonal, where he is bound by nothing, utterly free and unconditioned, Bonhoeffer’s 
God was personal, not a formal construction, who offered himself to man – he revealed 
himself within a community of man through faith.213 God is indeed met in Christ, 
Bonhoeffer argued, but insofar as the church is the contemporary Christ, he is met in the 
church. That way revelation of the transcendent is concrete, not located in the 
transcendent, but in Christ who is met in the community.214 Far from a mere follower of 
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 Barth (2010b), p. 779: ‘To be sure, it [the Church] is not itself the Good Samaritan who has come into 
the world as the Saviour, active not for Himself but only for it in the manner and the power of God. And 
it [the Church] is well advised not to try to play this role. But it is gathered and upbuilt by this Good 
Samaritan for active service on His behalf, and it is actually sent out into the world in this service. If it 
cannot do what He does, and it should not pretend it can, it may and should follow Him in what He does. 
It may and should be obedient to His command’.  
213
 See ‘The Mode of Being of Revelation in the Church’ in DBWE 2: pp. 11-116. As we shall see in 4.1 
this is closer to a Hegelian understanding of the church.  
214
 Bonhoeffer also extrapolated this import of Barth’s claim that no finite historical moment is capable of 
the infinite. He wonders whether this contention does not rule out concrete ethics and proclamation, given 
that ‘empirical human activity – be it faith, obedience – is at best a reference to God’s activity and in its 
historicity can never be faith and obedience itself’. See Bethge (1994), p. 182. 
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Barth, Bonhoeffer outlined his own theological approach not only in reference to, but 
also against, the positive content of Barth’s dialectical theology. 
Bonhoeffer’s criticism points out the profoundly Christological disagreement 
with Barth, which became ever so clear in Bonhoeffer’s later writings, such as The 
Letters, where Christ exists solely for others, the suffering one who gives himself to the 
world.215 However, Bonhoeffer’s critical approach was evident already in his lecture at 
Union, where he attacked dialectical theology’s methodological problems inherent in a 
position that never portrays God as an object approachable through formal or cognitive 
presuppositions (Bethge, 1994, p. 114). Indeed, Barth rejected all theological, 
philosophical, cultural and especially ecclesiological structures which owed their 
conceptions to the positing of a continuity between God and man. Bonhoeffer, in turn, 
argued that some philosophical formulation is necessary in order to describe revelation, 
otherwise one risks losing touch with reality. Even Barth, he points out, in his 
description of revelation, used elements from ‘idealism [which] sees God as eternal 
subject, [and from] realism which sees reality as transcendent object’ (ibid., p. 123), 
thus enabling a convergence of essential subjectivity and the most objective reality. The 
lecture shows Bonhoeffer following the lines of Barthian dogmatic, but also reveals a 
concern that speech about God must be able to cope with philosophical questions about 
speech as such. This contention was further developed in The Letters, where Bonhoeffer 
wondered whether Barth’s positivism of revelation doesn’t ultimately end up in a purely 
detached speculative abstraction (DBWE 8: pp. 373, 428-431). If, as Barth indicated in 
Church Dogmatics, objective revelation becomes all-inclusive so that every biblical 
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 See DBWE 8: pp. 373, 501, 503-504.  
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passage has its own self-evident worth, it no longer has any verification in reality. 
Bonhoeffer instead wished to acknowledge theology’s dialogical relationship with the 
reality [Wirklichkeit] of the everyday world.216 As he wrote on 30 April 1λ44: ‘for the 
working person or any person who is without religion, nothing decisive has been gained 
here [positivism of revelation]’ (30 April 1λ44 in DBWE κ: p. 364).217  
To summarize Bonhoeffer’s criticism of Barth, it suffices to say that Bonhoeffer 
was disapproving of dialectical theology’s neglect of the critical questions posed by 
liberal theology, specifically the sociological dimensions of church, interaction with the 
world and other disciplines and interpretation of dogma – the very concerns of this 
thesis. Neglect of these resulted in an inability to ground an ontology in Christ, provide 
a dogmatic base for the empirical church and develop a concrete ethic. While 
Bonhoeffer did point out the shortcoming of his liberal Berlin professors as the 
reduction of God to man, he also criticized Barth for fixating his attention on the 
transcendent at the expense of revelation as concrete and apprehensible in its 
community – the church.  
3.3.4.1 Concluding thought 
It is thus appropriate to conclude this addendum by noting that Bonhoeffer was 
developing his own critical approach, one that appreciated the strengths of liberal 
theology or Barth, while also pointing out their errors. It will become abundantly clear 
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 Does Bonhoeffer’s position over against Barth not lead to what Žižek would call the Symbolic, 
comprehensive and self-contained, excluding the Real and as such merely attempting to smooth over its 
edges, or hide it? 
217
 For more on the origin of the concept positivism of revelation in Bonhoeffer’s thought, see also 
Wüstenberg (1998), pp. 60-65.  
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in the reading of Sanctorum Communio that in the development of his thought, recourse 
to both proved a crucial role.  
Having explored the emergence of Bonhoeffer’s social theology through engagement 
with social philosophy, the thesis now turns to an exploration of it through a critical 
Žižekian reading.  
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Chapter 4: Žižek in the Service of Critical Theology  
 
This chapter is the culmination of the thesis – a critical reading exercise in which 
Bonhoeffer’s Sanctorum Communio is read alongside Žižek, enabled by their mutual 
conviction about the sociological relevance of theology as they both search for an 
authentic form of community. How does Bonhoeffer’s transcendental personalist 
community and its ethic of universal love compare to Žižek’s materialist ontological 
community and its ethic of indifference? 
Similar to the section on Bonhoeffer’s intellectual formation, this chapter is 
selective in line with the scope of the whole thesis. It discusses only his first thesis 
where he lays out his conviction about the sociological import of theology and which 
serves as a point of departure for his further work. Therefore, rather than pursuing a 
comprehensive presentation of Bonhoeffer’s thought218 or even a straightforward 
presentation of his first dissertation, it focuses specifically on Hegel and Bonhoeffer’s 
understanding and development of his thought, particularly the concept of objective 
spirit. Hegel thus functions as a contact point with Žižek, enabling a critical 
examination of Bonhoeffer’s attempt to deal with sociological issues theologically from 
his perspective.   
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 For a thorough introduction to Bonhoeffer’s theology overall, a good place to start is Feil’s Die 
Theologie Dietrich Bonhoeffers (1991).  
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4.1. A Žižekian reading of Sanctorum Communio 
4.1.1 Introduction  
Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer’s first thesis, received the highest approbation from 
Seeberg and the Theological faculty in Berlin, but received little attention until after 
Bonhoeffer’s death, as part of a renewed interest in the body of his work.219 What set 
the work apart was its ambition to deal with sociological issues theologically or from a 
theological perspective. Bonhoeffer carried out his undertaking of a dialogue between 
theology and sociology with conviction and confidence aided by his liberal theological 
intellectual formation at Berlin and its own persuasion about the need for theology to 
engage other intellectual disciplines.220 
4.1.2 Theoretical grounding of the authentic form of community: Scheler’s collective 
person  
In the first chapter, after providing his definitions of social philosophy and sociology, 
Bonhoeffer reflects on the import of social philosophy and states that ‘the concern of 
sociology is to trace the many complex interactions back to certain constitutive acts of 
spirit that comprise the distinctive characteristic of the structure [of community]’ 
(DBWE 1: p. 30). His pursuit in Sanctorum Communio is, then, just that – a sociological 
attempt to locate the constitutive acts of a true community, which he considers is 
exclusively the structurally distinctive community of saints. Thus both Bonhoeffer and 
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 The work was first published only three years after his doctoral exam in 1927 but it was truncated and 
received only three reviews. In the 1960s, versions that included more of the original dissertation were 
published but it was not until 1986 when the full text was included as the first volume of the Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer Werke (DBW). The English translation part of the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (DBWE) is 
based on that edition. See the editor’s introduction to DBWE 1: pp. 9-13.  
220
 For a description of the original character of Sanctorum Communio in that respect, see Dramm (2001), 
pp. 67-70. 
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Žižek search for the structure of a genuine community and find its religious form 
enlightening, one from an ethical perspective that is distinctly religious and personalist, 
the other from one which is forthrightly materialist and ontological. 
In order to employ social philosophy and social theory in pursuit of a theology 
of sociality,221 Sanctorum Communio begins by engaging in a dialectical discussion of 
personhood as the foundation of sociality, but also as existing only in sociality. To 
denote this relational view of personhood, or interrelatedness, Bonhoeffer employs the 
term ‘collective person’ [Gesamtperson], a term originally used by the philosopher Max 
Scheler (1874 – 1928) in Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik 
(2005a). There the term describes the distinctive unity of the execution of social acts,222 
which are inherently directed at other persons and are only fully executed in relation to 
others, in contrast to the intimate or singularizing acts.223 Together these acts show that 
the person is both an individual and a member of a community or collectivist, and that 
the individual person is formed and realized only in the context of sharing the 
responsibility for community. Bonhoeffer agrees with this relational view of 
personhood – indeed, his use of the term ‘person’ is completely relational in statements 
such as ‘for the individual to “exist”, others must necessarily be there’, and therefore 
personhood is possible and real only in sociality, i.e. responsibility toward the other 
(DBWE 1: p. 51). This is what Green has in mind when he says that Bonhoeffer ‘insists 
equally on the irreducible, independent integrity of the individual person, and on the 
fact that this person exists essentially in relation to others’ (ibid., p. 30). Bonhoeffer’s 
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 As laid out in the work’s foreword; see DBWE 1: pp. 21-23. 
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 These include promising, commanding and obeying. 
223
 These are acts of self-consciousness, self-love and self-respect, directed at the self and fulfilled with 
reference only to the self (ibid., p. 511).  
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personalism is marked by the dialectic tension between individuality and communality, 
where one is not overtaken by the other.  
Bonhoeffer uses his personalist perspective of the collective person where ‘[t]he 
You sets the limit for the subject’ (ibid., p. 51) to challenge Hegel’s Idealist subject-
object relation. Hegel sought to overcome the conscious gap between the individual and 
the world, or the subject and the object, in Part A of Phenomenology of Spirit: 
‘Consciousness’224 and argued that perception of something as external is nothing but 
self-consciousness, our appropriation of the world around us. Thus the object cannot be 
considered as detached, apart from the subject, together with whom it forms a whole. 
Indeed, consciousness of self and the external world are part of a comprehensive, 
evolving, rational unity – the Absolute. Bonhoeffer considers that the Other is in 
Hegel’s talk of consciousness reduced to a mere object of the subject’s perception and is 
in that sense subsumed by it.225 In support of his argument, Bonhoeffer outlines four 
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 Part A (pp. 58-103) comprises three chapters: Chapter 1: Sense-Certainty: or the 'This' and 'Meaning', 
pp. 58-66; Chapter 2: Perception: or the Thing and Deception, pp. 67-78; Chapter 3: Force and the 
Understanding: Appearance and the Supersensible World, pp. 79-103. 
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 DBWE 1: p. 41 [20], p. 45. However, Bonhoeffer’s objection doesn’t seem to consider how Hegel’s 
thought develops from ‘consciousness’ to ‘self-consciousness’, which is the title of Part B. Thus in 
Chapter 4: The Truth of Self-Certainty (pp. 104-138), Hegel examines the intersubjective conditions of 
consciousness. Not only does the subject’s consciousness of the object as something distinct from oneself 
require awareness of self as a subject for whom something is distinct, but that itself depends on one’s 
recognition [Anerkennung] of other self-conscious subjects as such (as self-conscious subjects for whom 
any object of consciousness will be thought as also existing). This means that the subject’s self-
consciousness of the other depends on the other recognising themselves as a self-conscious subject. As 
we shall see later, this complex pattern of mutual recognition constitutes Hegel’s objective spirit. There is 
thus a notable change in Phenomenology, from consideration of individual (self)consciousness in earlier 
chapters, to an exploration of what grounds them – the patterns of intersubjectivity. To quote Žižek: ‘This 
seems to be the lesson of Hegel’s intersubjectivity – I am a free subject only through encountering 
another free subject – and the usual counterargument is here that, for Hegel, this dependence on the Other 
is just a mediating step/detour on the way toward full recognition of the subject in its Other, the full 
appropriation of the Other. But are things so simple? What if the Hegelian “recognition” means that I 
have to recognize in the impenetrable Other which appears as the obstacle to my freedom its positive-
enabling ground and condition? What if it is only in this sense is that the Other is “sublated”?’ See Žižek 
(2013a), p. 142. 
Bonhoeffer seems to have missed this topic in his consideration of the Phenomenology. Rather 
than boldly claiming that this is a sign of his secondary familiarity with Hegel, it should be noted that 
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conceptual models of social basic-relation which demonstrate that every concept of 
community is essentially related to a concept of person but which fail to maintain the 
dialectical tension between them (DBWE 1: pp. 34-57): Aristotle’s metaphysical 
ontological model, in which the essential being ‘lies beyond individual-personal being’; 
the Stoic school model, in which the human being becomes a person ‘by subordination 
to a higher imperative’ (ibid., p. 37) and which Bonhoeffer compares with the Christian 
concept of a person,226 although he still locates the essential being outside the 
individual; the Epicurean model, which he understands as mere individualism; and the 
Cartesian epistemological model, which remains in the subject-object relationship, 
where ‘the knowing I becomes the starting point of all philosophy’ (ibid., p. 40). 
Bonhoeffer observes that all four of these models are based upon sameness, not unity, 
where ‘it is the destiny of the human species to be absorbed into the realm of reason, 
perform a realm of completely similar and harmonious persons, defined by universal 
reason or by one spirit and separated only by the different activities’ (ibid., p. 43). 
Along parallel lines the idealist subject-object schema, he argues, ends up denying the 
community by overtaking or eradicating distinctiveness and resulting in sameness, 
leading Bonhoeffer to conclude that they do not result in true community (ibid., pp. 41-
43, 80), since they are merely epistemological rather than sociological concepts.  
                                                 
attention to Hegel’s intersubjective conditions of consciousness gathered momentum only with Kojève 
and onwards. However, it is this missed movement in Hegel’s thought that makes for an interesting 
comparison when Bonhoeffer claims that ‘there would be no self-consciousness without community – or 
better, that self-consciousness arises concurrently with the consciousness of existing in community’ 
(DBWE 1: p. 70). See also Marsh (1994), pp. 88-91. 
226
 In this conception the individual and universal are closely interconnected. The importance of this will 
become clearer later on.  
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Far from advocating a vulgar form of individualism, Bonhoeffer in turn insists 
upon intersubjectivity and is clear that personhood emerges and exists only in meeting 
with the Other:  
[T]he person ever and again arises and passes away in time. The person does 
not exist timelessly; a person is not static, but dynamic. The person exists 
always and only in ethical responsibility; the person is re-created again and 
again in the perpetual flux of life (ibid., p. 48). 
 
The theoretical framework and drive here is social rather than epistemological, hence 
the preference for the word ‘person’. This is the context of statements asserting that 
there is a ‘fundamental synthesis between social and individual being’ (ibid., p. 75), that 
the individual belongs with the other ‘even though, or precisely because, the one is 
completely separate from the other’ (ibid., p. 56)227 and that ‘social relations must be 
understood, then, as purely interpersonal and building on the uniqueness and 
separateness of persons’ (ibid., p. 55).  
How can Bonhoeffer’s understanding of intersubjectivity be compared to 
Žižek’s ontological assertion that any attempt to account for oneself is always 
conducted within a certain intersubjective context and reveals our constitutive exposure 
to the Other (Žižek, 200κb, p. 45)? The difference is made clear in the following 
paragraph from The Neighbour: 
My very status as a subject depends on its link to the substantial Other: 
not only the regulative-symbolic Other of the tradition in which I am 
embedded, but also the bodily-desiring substance of the Other, the fact 
that, in the core of my being, I am irreducibly vulnerable, exposed to 
Other(s). And far from limiting my ethical status (autonomy), this 
primordial vulnerability due to my constitutive exposure to the Other 
                                                 
227Bonhoeffer here, in footnote 12, refers back approvingly to Fichte’s recognition that persons cannot 
exist at all without others to spark their personhood-encounter. 
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grounds it: what makes an individual human and thus something for 
which we are responsible, toward whom we have a duty to help, is 
his/her very finitude and vulnerability. Far from undermining ethics […], 
this primordial exposure/dependency opens up the properly ethical 
relation of individuals who accept and respect each other’s vulnerability 
and limitation. Crucial here is the link between the impenetrability of the 
Other and my own impenetrability to myself: they are linked because my 
own being is grounded in the primordial exposure to the Other. 
Confronted with the Other, I never can fully account for myself (Žižek, 
2013a, p. 138).  
 
Bonhoeffer’s and Žižek’s intersubjectivity differs in its grounding – ethics as pre-
existing and grounding ontology for the first and ontology grounding ethics for the 
latter.  
For Bonhoeffer synthesis between social and individual being is based upon the 
‘concrete ethical barrier’ (DBWE 1: p. 50) that exists between persons. He asserts in a 
dialectical manner that while personhood emerges in sociality, this sociality is 
established upon the barrier between individuals. Therefore ‘only when my intellect is 
confronted by some fundamental barrier’ do I enter the social sphere (ibid., p. 45). What 
is this barrier? Following Scheler, who asserts that the core of the person, irreducible to 
any physical or psychic characteristics, is not given in perception by the Other (Scheler, 
2005b, p. 238), Bonhoeffer insists on the impossibility of knowing the Other as an 
independent subject in a cognitive way (DBWE 1: p. 45). If that is attempted, then the 
Other is no longer an independent subject but purely an object of the knowing mind, 
leaving the social sphere for the epistemological. Therefore, from page 45 onwards, 
Bonhoeffer argues that in order to avoid the Other becoming purely an object they must 
remain an ‘alien I’ (ibid., pp. 45, 52).  
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The use of the word “alien” lends itself nicely to a contrast with Žižek’s 
perspective which, concerned with the real of the subject or its core before and after 
symbolization, considers the Other as monstrous (Žižek, 2013a, p. 162). In comparison 
to Bonhoeffer’s Schelerian personalist theoretical apparatus, Žižek’s subjectivity is 
thoroughly Lacanian (as already noted in section 1.2 on his conceptual framework) for 
the subject is located on the borders of the Real and the Symbolic Order, with 
everything one can know about them being located in the Symbolic (Žižek, 1996, p. 43). 
However, besides the constant surplus of the subject of the other, Žižek insists upon the 
surplus of the subject itself. Furthermore, that which cannot be known directly is what 
the subject is in itself, therefore locating the subject in the lack. He speaks about the 
inhuman which makes the human human (Žižek, 2013a, pp. 159-160) and the hole in 
the order of being: I fully am not as an isolated Self, but in the thriving reality part of 
which I am.228 ‘I will never be able to account for myself in front of the Other, because I 
am already nontransparent to myself, and I will never get from the Other a full answer 
to “who are you?” because the Other is a mystery also for him/herself’ (ibid., p. 138). 
Not only is there more to the other subject than what I can know, but, what is more 
radical, the subject of the first or second person is that which cannot be known – the 
lack or gap itself. Bonhoeffer speaks of inability and impermissibility to recognise the 
other in an absolute manner, but for Žižek the absolute other and self are recognized, 
but is not known (ibid., p.143). Žižek’s impenetrability of the subject (whether I or the 
Other) is thus radically contrasted with Bonhoeffer’s mere impenetrability of the Other. 
                                                 
228
 Cf. Bonhoeffer in DBWE 1: p. κ0: ‘in relations with others, I do not merely satisfy one side of my 
structurally closed being as spirit; rather, only here do I discover my reality, i.e., my I-ness […] 
community and individual exist in the same moment and rest in one another. The collective unit and the 
individual unit have the same structure’. 
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The being’s ontological impenetrability of the former is completely distinct from the 
Other’s ethical impenetrability of the latter. 
Rather than merely a Bonhoefferian impenetrability of the Other, Žižek 
demonstrates that the Real of the subject is recognised only through the 
psychoanalytical introduction of the unconscious. On the other side, Bonhoeffer’s use of 
‘real’ in order to distinguish the ethical sphere from the epistemological when he says 
that ‘only the experience of the barrier as real is a specifically ethical experience’ is far 
from an ontological or psychoanalytic category (DBWE 1: p. 47). Therefore, while a 
cursory reading of the Sanctorum Communio would suggest that Bonhoeffer’s struggle 
of the epistemological with the ethical perception of the Other can be compared to 
Žižek’s struggle of the Symbolic and the Real of the subject, a closer reading shows a 
fundamental difference in the understanding of the subject. From Žižek’s perspective 
Bonhoeffer’s personalist consideration of the subject is limited or partial in its restricted 
ethical ruminations about the Other without a proper ontological foundation. It will be 
argued later that Bonhoeffer’s consideration ultimately results in a sociality of 
separation. 
4.1.2.1 Bonhoeffer’s subjectivization upon the concrete ethical barrier  
For Bonhoeffer the subject emerges in the ethical encounter with the Other or the 
experience of the ‘concrete ethical barrier’: ‘The You sets the limit for the subject and 
by its own accord activates a will that impinges upon the Other in such a way that this 
other will becomes a You for the I’ (ibid., p. 51).229 Yet this ethical ontology is in stark 
                                                 
229
 Cf. DBWE 1, p. 50: ‘One cannot even speak of the individual without at the same time necessarily 
thinking of the ‘other’ who moves the individual into the ethical sphere.’ 
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contrast to Žižek’s own ontological foundation for the relation of persons. Immediately 
the use of the word ‘you’ alerts the reader to a contrast of the subject knowing itself 
authentically but not the Other – it is an ontology based on separation. Here the Other 
addresses me with an unconditional transcendent (ibid., p. 52) call and constitutes me as 
an ethical subject: 
The I comes into being only in relation to the You; only in response to a 
demand does responsibility arise. ‘You’ says nothing about its own 
being, only about its demand. This demand is absolute. What does this 
mean? The whole person, who is totally claimless, is claimed by this 
absolute demand. But this seems to make one human being the creator of 
the ethical person of the other, which is an intolerable thought (ibid., p. 
54).   
 
Bonhoeffer’s insistence that the Other is a ‘person in concrete, living individuality’ 
(ibid., p. 48) is a sign that this is a completely heteronomous injunction, captivated 
within the symbolic rather than a recognition of the surplus which disrupts it. It is the 
ethical which calls the subject into being in a ‘concrete, living individuality’, rather than 
the subject in its intersubjective inhumanity grounding the (ethical) action. Far from an 
ontology, it is ethics: to the question about what constitutes being, Bonhoeffer answers 
ethics. But this ethic is completely external, an inescapable command coming from an 
entirely alien sphere, not from a solidarity of the vulnerable, but rather from the Other, 
who has now become the transcendent and ‘overcomes’ me, demanding obedience if I 
am to be constituted as a subject.230  
                                                 
230
 In that sense a Žižekian challenge to Bonhoeffer runs parallel to his challenge of the Levinasian 
account of the emergence of the Ethical. See Žižek (2013a), pp. 142-151. 
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Bonhoeffer theoretically analyses the time when faced with this ethical call as 
‘moment’ – a time dimension where the claim of ethics is effectual in concrete time and 
‘only when I am responsible am I fully conscious of being bound to time’ (ibid., p. 48). 
Bonhoeffer is not merely arguing against a sort of universally valid decision as coming 
from being in full possession of a rational mind, but rather reiterating his understanding 
of subjectivization or the emergence of the subject: ‘I enter the reality of time by 
relating my concrete person in time and all its particularities to this imperative – by 
making myself ethically responsible’ (ibid.). Bonhoeffer thus reconceives the relation 
between subjectivity and transcendence by advocating the existence of the subject as 
grounded in its openness to a transcendent Otherness. His understanding of ‘concrete’ 
and ‘moment’ denotes a particularity at the expense of any notion of universality, for 
any other concept of person fragments the fullness of life of the concrete person. Insofar 
as all that exists is an ethical call deciding the continual emergence or fading away of 
the subject, this moment knows nothing but the particular.  
How, then, does Bonhoeffer’s moment compare to Žižek’s ‘truth-event’? As 
explored in Chapter 2, in ‘The Politics of Truth, or, Alain Badiou as a Reader of St. 
Paul’ in The Ticklish Subject (1999a, pp. 127-170), Žižek proposes that revolutionary 
change only comes from an ‘event’ or location of the political act and subject, 
specifically the marginalised or excluded. This focus on the location and the 
marginalised is in contrast to Bonhoeffer’s focus on time and the concrete. Whereas 
Žižek focuses on the excluded, those unseen and barely discernible as a tic in the current 
order, Bonhoeffer focuses on the injunction of those temporally present. Bonhoeffer 
would no doubt dismiss Žižek’s reference to the universal as idealist aberration, yet 
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Žižek’s conception of universalism as being embodied in the excluded is in stark 
contrast to Bonhoeffer’s recognition of those presenting their particular interests (Žižek, 
2003, p. 112). What about those who cannot be seen because they are excluded, unseen 
or inhuman? Žižek adopts Agamben’s figure of the Muselmann231 – the living dead of 
the concentration camp – as someone ‘who fully witnessed the horror of the 
concentration camp and, for that very reason, is not able to bear witness to it’ (Žižek, 
2013a, p. 160).232 Such a subject, reduced to the inhuman, is not present in Bonhoeffer’s 
grounding of the subject temporally upon a response to the ethical demand of the 
present particular; neither can ‘I’ respond. It highlights Bonhoeffer’s temporal 
concreteness of particularity at the expense of universality. Žižek in turn grounds the 
subject spatially upon the recognition of the universal lack, of that very inhuman:  
What if it is precisely in the guise of […] a Muselmann that we encounter 
the Other’s call at its purest and most radical? What if, facing a 
Muselmann, one hits upon one’s responsibility toward the Other at its 
most traumatic? (ibid., p. 162) 
  
In Žižek’s understanding universalism is the result of a great process of struggle of the 
excluded that opens with an event. For him this is the ‘intrusion of the traumatic Real 
that shatters the predominant symbolic texture’ (Žižek, 1λλλa, p. 142). It is thus 
necessary to detach oneself from Bonhoeffer’s ‘concrete’ situation, for it is only through 
the murder of particularity that universality follows (Žižek, 2003, p. 17f). Anything else 
does not represent a meeting with the subject qua  the Real of the Subject. Does 
Bonhoeffer not advocate avoiding the troubling excess, rather than exposing the self to 
                                                 
231
 This slang term was used by prisoners and guards in Auschwitz to refer to a concentration camp 
prisoner who has been reduced to no more than a shadow by starvation, exhaustion and resignation. 
232
 Žižek here refers to Agamben (2002). 
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the real of the other (cf. Žižek, 2013a, p. 9)? This is the only way to meet the Real of the 
given order rather than merely its semblance, and as such a constitutive act of a ‘true 
community’ that Bonhoeffer and Žižek are searching for. This surplus, the Real, the 
inhuman, the alien or the monstrous, is what Žižek understands as the theological, and 
its recognition, concomitant with a detachment from that which is present, represented, 
included – or to use Bonhoeffer’s words, concrete and particular – represents an Event 
and breaking in or emergence of the true community. Much like in his understanding of 
the new community, recognition and detachment are the distinctive characteristics of the 
structure of genuine community. This tension between Bonhoeffer and Žižek will next 
be observed in Bonhoeffer’s grapple with Hegel’s concept of objective spirit. 
4.1.3 The dynamic of the authentic form of community: Hegel’s objective spirit  
In the final section of Chapter Three (DBWE 1: pp. 97-106), ‘The Primal State and the 
Problem of Community’, Bonhoeffer takes up a discussion of Hegel’s Objektiver Geist 
[objective spirit] from Phänomenologie des Geistes (see ‘der Objektiver Geist’ in 
Hegel, 1970c, pp. 554-654/1990, pp. 483f). Hegel proposed the concept as an 
embodiment of the Absolute in objective patterns of social interaction and the cultural 
institutions, the relational ties between individual wills conscious of their diversity and 
particularity, but beyond their individual control. As such it concerns philosophical 
questions of law, moral philosophy, political philosophy and history, in contrast to his 
philosophy of subjective spirit, which is a sort of philosophy of mind in the 
contemporary sense and deals with, among other things, anthropology and psychology. 
Bonhoeffer’s own understanding of the concept is guided by Seeberg’s Christliche 
Dogmatik (1λ27a, p. 505ff) and Freyer’s Theorie des objektiven Geistes (Freyer, 1923, 
  204 
 
53ff).233 He finds much value in the concept and its ‘monumental perception’ of the 
spirit of sociality extending beyond the individual (DBWE 1: p. 74),234 and adopts it in 
order to develop a dialectical understanding of the emergence of the communal subject:  
[W]here wills unite, a ‘structure’ is created – that is, a third entity, 
previously unknown, independent of being willed or not willed by the 
persons who are uniting. This general recognition of the nature of 
objective spirit was a discovery of the qualitative thinking that became 
dominant in romanticism and idealism […]. Two wills encountering one 
another form a structure. A third person joining them sees not just one 
person connected to the other; rather, the will of the structure, as a third 
factor, resists the newcomer with a resistance not identical with the wills 
of the two individuals. Sometimes this is even more forceful than that of 
either individual […]. Precisely this structure is objective spirit […] the 
persons themselves experience their community as something real 
outside themselves (DBWE 1, pp. 98-99). 
The objective spirit here is understood as the ineradicable core of the community – it 
enables and directs it and ‘to withdraw from it is to withdraw from the community. It 
wills historical continuity as well as the social realisation of its will’ (ibid., p. 100). This 
‘bond’ or entity of the objective spirit is already in place and is encountered by a person 
wishing to enter an already existing community, where members also interact with each 
other only by its means.235 The objective spirit is the heart of community.  
To distinguish his understanding of the spirit from that of Hegel, who proposes 
that the ‘spirit has reality, and individuals are its accidents’ (Hegel, 1λκ6, p. 506/1λλ5, 
p. 205), Bonhoeffer insists that it does not absorb the individual (DBWE 1: p. 103). His 
insistence is parallel to that which is observed in his critique in Chapter Two of the four 
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 For a valuable secondary insight into Bonhoeffer’s understanding and appropriation of the concept see 
Kotsko (2005) and Nowers (2013). 
234
 See also p. 102. 
235
 Language is one such means; see DBWE 1: p. 69.  
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models of social-basic relation as enforcing sameness and the rejection of the Hegelian 
subject-object model as considering the other as an object of the subject’s perception – 
it is based upon a conviction that each time the ethical boundary or limit of the 
relationship between ‘I’ and ‘Other’ has been transgressed. This is what he understands 
as sin (‘Sin and Broken Community’ in DBWE 1: pp. 107-121), as will be discussed 
later.  For now, it is appropriate to summarize by noting that for Bonhoeffer, objective 
spirit is the tension or meeting place between the individual and the community and it is 
within this tension that a person exists: 
Thus we are not dealing here with the conception of some spirit entity, 
called spirit of the people, that arises of its own natural strength from 
metaphysical depths. Rather, in the dialectical movement through which 
alone persons originate, individual collective persons come into being as 
well. Only with this insight does the richness of the monadic image of 
social life become clear. Collective persons are self-conscious and 
spontaneous (ibid., p. 103).  
 
Bonhoeffer is here pursuing a dialectical conception of the objective spirit and 
introduces the concept of ‘individual collective person’ as ‘one that transcends all 
individuals but would be incomprehensible without the correlate of personal, individual 
being’ (ibid., p. 77). It is thus a personalist description of interaction or the relationship 
between the individual and community, where the individual is ‘self-contained’ but 
discovering its being in the engagement and shaping of community (ibid., p. 79). This 
unity, Bonhoeffer contends,  
does not abolish the specific reciprocal movement of community. 
Individual persons remain completely separate from one another. The 
collective person is metaphysically autonomous in relation to the 
individuals, though at the same time genetically dependent (ibid., p. 105).  
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This contention is established upon the earlier presentation of basic relations given 
within the personhood of every human being – a net of sociality (ibid., pp. 65-80), 
which is characterised by openness on the one hand (the capacity and necessity of a 
person to participate in sociality with others), but also closedness on the other (the unity, 
integrity and irreducibility of the person) (ibid., p. 67). ‘The unity and closedness of the 
whole person is posited along with its sociality’ (ibid., p. 75), refuting the priority of 
either personal or social being.236  
 Bonhoeffer’s personalist rejection of Hegel’s universalism, or at least 
Bonhoeffer’s reading of it as already noted above, is that the latter is itself based on 
exclusion by destroying the particularity of the individual. In other words, its inclusion 
is achieved upon its exclusion. It resonates strongly with more current multi-cultural 
suspicion of suppression or exclusion of those that do not fit the notion of the universal. 
It is thus but a false solution. The history of the twentieth century has shown that 
underneath the concept of universality often lie instincts of domination, racism and 
sexism of a particular group at the expense of the other, who is effaced and suppressed 
(at any cost).  
The question then becomes whether the same criticism can be directed at Žižek 
and his argument for and conception of universality. Is it ultimately hiding the same 
exclusivism and an attempt at articulating the interests of a particular post-Marxist 
Eurocentric perspective when he calls for an undermining of globalisation from the 
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 See also DBWE 1, p. κ0: ‘God does not desire a history of individual human beings, but the history of 
the human community. However, God does not want a community that absorbs the individual into itself, 
but a community of human beings. In God’s eyes, community and individual exist in the same moment 
and rest in one another.’ 
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standpoint of universal Truth (Žižek, 1λλλa, p. 211)? Is this what is really at the heart of 
his materialist utilisation and interpretation of Christian theology in which the murder of 
Christ the particular enables the emergence of the universality of Galatians 3:22?237  
As I have demonstrated in Chapter 2, Žižek’s challenge is rather that 
universality is the very principle of negativity which drives these particularities in 
antagonism to prevent the notion of totality.238 According to his Lacanian understanding 
of Hegel, universality is this negativity or tension that prevents a certain particularity 
from ever achieving self-closure. Rather than abolishing differences it articulates them 
(Žižek, 2003, p. 112). He reminds us that this is why Hegel calls it ‘concrete 
universality’ (Žižek, 2006b, p. 30) – it is an awareness of the present state of affairs, 
revealing internally unsolvable conflicts and emerging at the point of exception or 
marginalization: ‘[T]he whole point of the Pauline notion of struggling universality is 
that true universality and partiality do not exclude each other, but universal Truth is 
accessible only from a partial engaged subjective position’ (ibid., p. 35).  
Bonhoeffer also speaks of the community as struggling. He recognises that the 
unification of will is constituted upon the ‘inner conflict of individual wills’ (DBWE 1: 
p. κ6) and observes ‘that strife [Kampf] is recognised as a fundamental sociological law 
and basically is sanctified […]. Genuine life arises only in the conflict of wills; strength 
unfolds only in strife’ (ibid., pp. 84-85).239 However, in the next sentence he qualifies 
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 Žižek (2003), p. 17f.; Žižek (1999a), p. 157. 
238
 A good and concise introduction to Žižek’s understanding of Hegelian universality can be found on 
pp. 28-36 in The Parallax View (2006b).  
239
 Bonhoeffer refers here to Hobbes as in all likelihood the first to articulate the purely social meaning of 
strife when talking about bellum omnium contra omnes. The reference is missing but the Latin phrase 
occurs in De Cive or The Citizen (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), pp. 13, 29, 104, while in 
Leviathan (Project Gutenberg, 2002) Hobbes speaks of ‘warre of every one against every one [or man]’ in 
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this with a statement that there has been no concrete and productive conflict in the 
genuine sense since the Fall, thus raising the problem of sin and pointing to the need for 
the community of ‘separate of persons’ (ibid., p. 83) to be maintained by someone else – 
God. The contrast becomes even more accentuated when Žižek distinguishes concrete 
universality from abstract universality, which is maintained by the big Other, be it the 
big Other of really existing Christianity (as in ‘real-socialism’) or capitalism. This 
abstract universality is mediated and regulated (Žižek, 2013a, p. 143) and remains 
trapped within particularity insofar as it disavows ‘the antagonism that inheres to the 
notion’ of ‘Christianity’ and ‘frees the universal notion of antagonisms [no more Greek, 
nor Jew etc.] of the way it is embedded in the system, by relegating this aspect to just 
one of its historical subspecies’ (i.e. they are now all Christian) (Žižek, 2006b, p. 34).240 
As we shall see later, this is indeed how Bonhoeffer reads Galatians 3:22. Here is how 
Žižek understands it:  
[T]he universal dimension he [Saint Paul] opened up is not the ‘neither 
Greek nor Jew but all Christians,’ which implicitly excludes non-
Christians; it is, rather, the difference Christians/non-Christians itself 
which, as a difference, is universal, that is to say, cuts across the entire 
social body, splitting, dividing from within every substantial ethnic (ibid., 
p. 35) 
 
Žižek’s materialist Christianity suspends the particular in its name along the line of 
Lenin’s repetition of the paradigmatic Christ-event in his advocation of actual freedom 
(Žižek, 2001b, p. 114). This is the ‘Christian experience’ to which Žižek refers as 
                                                 
Chapter XIII of the Naturall Condition of Mankind, pp. 94, 96 and XIV of the First and Second Naturall 
Lawes, pp. 98, 102.   
240
 This is slightly paraphrased and applied to real-existing Christianity, while in the work it serves to 
elucidate the abstract universality of ‘alternate’ modernities. 
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necessary for concrete universalism, the recognition or realisation that Christ stands for 
a break with all totalities and cosmic schemes and enables an unplugging from one’s 
symbolic community observed in Chapter 2. Instead of the indiscriminate, postmodern 
talk about differences, Christ divides between good and bad in accordance with the 
Gospel, saying, ‘Do you suppose that I came to grant peace on earth? I tell you, no, but 
rather division’ (Luke 12:51). Only in this way, Žižek argues, is the relationship 
between the universal and particular properly dialectical and the resulting universality 
concrete. As previously noted, according to him Christian love resists the gentrification 
of the neighbour and instead accepts its radical impenetrability. This kind of 
universality or a new collective no longer relies on an identity, but is instead struggling 
(Žižek, 2013a, p. 154). It is not against the background of universal hatred, but of 
universal indifference, where one is indifferent toward all and in this way loves the 
individual. ‘There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is no 
male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (Galatians 3:2κ). 
 No wonder Žižek interprets the resurrection in a Hegelian manner as the new 
community and identical with the Holy Spirit, for in doing so he avoids resurrection of 
the big Other and rests upon his absence. So, when Bonhoeffer writes that the essence 
of community is not commonality but rather reciprocal will, Žižek would respond that 
in this case the will is not their own but rather that of the big Other, who abstracts the 
community and prevents any ‘conflict of individual wills’. It seems that, from this 
perspective, Bonhoeffer’s drive to avoid a vulgar absorption of the individual by the 
community and to maintain separateness of persons solely by God results in the 
opposite – an abstraction of unity into particularisation. Instead, Žižek proposes that 
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only Christ-like unplugging or division is the constitutive act of the spirit of this new 
community. 
The difference between Bonhoeffer’s241 and Žižek’s understanding of Hegel is 
clear. While Žižek would consider Bonhoeffer’s understanding overly simplistic and 
restrained by Seeberg and Freyer, his own understanding of Hegel is particular and 
strongly Lacanian.242 Nonetheless, Bonhoeffer’s personalism, which he wishes to 
differentiate from the idealist universalism of exclusion, seems to result in an 
abstraction itself. This will be explored further in the next section, with reference to that 
section of his thesis in which he engages the thus far explored concepts of social 
philosophy with theology.  
4.1.4 The genuine form of community: community of saints 
In the major section of his thesis, that is, Chapter 5, entitled ‘Sanctorum Communio’, 
Bonhoeffer presents a case for this distinctly theological community of saints grounded 
in, established and governed by God. He does so by engaging the thus far developed 
personalist perception of community with theology, developed and aided by the 
Hegelian conception of objective spirit described above which is equipped with the 
Holy Spirit, and thereby demonstrates the structure of a genuine community in the 
community of saints. The reason for the engagement, Bonhoeffer argues, is because the 
personalist perception of community falls short – as does Hegel’s conception of 
objective spirit – for it rests upon an inadequate conception of person which ignores the 
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 In footnote 42 on p. 75 Bonhoeffer concludes: ‘Thus our turning against idealist theory is clear; 
equally clear, of course, is what we have to learn from it.’ 
242
 A similar difference can be observed by Žižek and by his fellow critical theorist Ernesto Laclau 
(2001), who, in contrast to Hegelian concrete universality which ‘sublates’ all antagonisms into a higher 
unity, prefers the logic of irreducible antagonsims. 
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fundamental ontological concept of sin (guilt) and God (DBWE 1: p. 48). Without 
treatment of these, any discussion of being oversteps the ethical barrier and plays God – 
again, as exemplified in the Idealist case where the subject subsumes the Other as an 
object.243 Bonhoeffer thus goes about engaging the idealist and personalist conceptions 
with these theological concepts in order to demonstrate how community is necessarily 
grounded in them.  
4.1.4.1 The theological concept of God  
For Bonhoeffer any form of community without the community with God is not 
authentic (DBWE 1: p. 157). The importance of including the conception of God lies in 
the origin of the incomprehensibility of the Other – it lies in God the ‘impenetrable 
You’ (ibid., p. 34). In other words the subject is grounded in the openness to the 
unfathomable and transcendent Otherness of God.244 Furthermore the concept must be 
in appropriate form, rather than what is observed in idealism’s consideration of the 
subject and community with its inappropriate ‘immanentist concept of God or the 
identification of human and divine spirit’ (DBWE 1: p. 1λ7), as Hegel’s understanding 
of the Absolute materialized in the historical community (Hegel, 2006, p. 470-489). 
Following Seeberg (1λ27a, pp. 73ff), Bonhoeffer calls for a ‘voluntarist’ concept of 
God, where the latter is the original will and in the encounter with which the human will 
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 In Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (2006, p. 442-445), Hegel understands the Fall primarily as 
self-consciousness. While the form of the Genesis narrative is but an image, the content communicates 
humanity achieving knowledge of good and evil – cognition (ibid., pp. 446-451). Being self-conscious, 
humanity is also self-estranged, aware of its good and evil. Evil is tendency to follow desires and remain 
within natural being as selfish, while good is reaching beyond natural towards infinitude of thought as 
social – spirit. Hegel’s interpretation of the Fall is thus much like Žižek’s positive, or at least that which 
enables self-cognition as the beginning of the sublation to the pure realm of the spirit – the subject must 
become social.  
244
 Cf. Žižek (2013), p. 138. 
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is subjected in the process to being grasped, first intuitively and then intellectually 
(DWE 1: p. 4λ [53]). In contrast to this, the immanentist drive of Hegel’s identification 
of the Holy Spirit with the corporate spirit of the community, where God’s will and 
human will are effectively collapsed into each other, ends up in a deprivation of a divine 
transcendence and an overbearing concept of unity (ibid., p. 198).245 Such a community 
is then broken insofar as it originates in its failure to recognise the human person in its 
‘creatureliness’, which rests only in relation to the Divine (DBWE 1: p. 49). Its conflict 
or tension or ‘meeting of wills’ is not a necessary part in maintaining the conditions of 
freedom of the individual, but rather a way of transgressing it, stemming from the 
original transgression of creatureliness – the Fall (ibid., pp. 84-85).246 For it is only in 
God that a true meeting of wills takes place and individuals are able to understand each 
other.247 Outside of God any conception of person and corresponding community is 
based on the ‘shared sinfulness’ of transgression (ibid., pp. 108-109).  
 Bonhoeffer thus maintains that the ‘conception’ of community rests not only 
upon an appropriate understanding of person but that they both depend on the 
conception of God – they are ‘inseparably and essentially interrelated’ (ibid., p. 34). 
Only within this model is the concrete character of the community and the individual 
present as ‘absolute and intended by God’ (ibid., p. 45). In other words, ‘only through 
God’s active working does the other become You to me from whom I arises’ and in this 
way ‘every human You is an image of the divine You’ (ibid., p. 54). God is here 
                                                 
245
 While Bonhoeffer does recognise that Hegel retains an emphasis on the concrete individual life, he 
mentions that the latter also ‘considers it to be merely a form of universal spirit’ (DBWE 1: p. 1λ7). 
246
 This is why Bonhoeffer earlier asserted that since the Fall, conflict of wills is not productive. 
247
 In offering this contention, Bonhoeffer shows some qualified appreciation of Fichte’s treatment of the 
problem of the synthesis of the World Spirits, wherein the latter enquires about the common origin of 
persons so as to enable their mutual understanding. See DBWE 1: pp. 43-44 [8].  
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conceived not merely as the transcendence that enables and maintains the relationship 
between the subjects, but as the integral part of the relationship itself.248  
According to this understanding the ethical barrier between persons comes from 
God, as well as the claim of the Other upon the subject and the latter’s ensuing ethical 
responsibility (ibid., pp. 36-37, 49). Bonhoeffer describes this moment in a 
Kierkegaardian manner as a ‘threat of absolute demand’ causing ‘infinite anxiety 
[Angst]’ (ibid., p. 49) and argues that it is missing in the idealist model insofar as the 
claim comes from below or within, rather than the divine which transcends the human 
person. Interestingly, in ‘Building Blocks for a Materialist Theology’ in Parallax View, 
Žižek instead appropriates Kierkegaard to argue for the suspension of the ethical 
(2006b, pp. 68-123).249 He reads the account of Abraham’s sacrifice as the subject’s 
overcoming of the ethical coordinates or the Symbolic Order by faith and standing in an 
absolute relation to the Absolute, by betraying the very ethical substance of their being 
(Žižek, 2001d, p. 14). Žižek and Bonhoeffer both focus on the threatening or terrible 
moment of the call to responsibility, but while Bonhoeffer insists that it needs to come 
from the transcendent, Žižek convincingly argues that with the suspension of the big 
Other the ‘ethical’ act is no longer transposed or sustained by it, but the responsibility is 
fully assumed by the subject (Žižek, 2010c, p. 134). Only here can a full understanding 
of humanity arise.  
                                                 
248
 DBWE 1: p. 55: ‘One might then speak here of the human being as the image of God with respect to 
the effect one person has on another.’ Bonhoeffer’s later description of how one person becomes Christ 
for the another builds on this. 
249
 See also the section 2.8.1 on Žižek’s Kierkegaardian suspension of the ethical. 
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The question is ultimately about which of the two proposed an authentic form of 
responsibility, not only with regards to its source but also its absolute value |r| – its real 
magnitude without regard to its sign. What is its distance from 0, if 0 is the signless 
pure act of will and distance the assumed responsibility, irrespective of its sign |r|= r 
sgn (r)? For the sign returns the sign only, irrespective of the absolute value of 
responsibility: sgn(r)= |�|�  (insofar as r≠0). The problem with Bonhoeffer’s assertion is 
that the sign – from the transcendent perspective – has no value and does not affect the 
absolute value of responsibility. The absolute value of responsibility |r| is determined 
only in the distance between absolute values of both  �ž and �� or their distance from 0. 
To include the divine in the determination of the absolute value of the difference of both 
responsibilities is – to use Žižek’s word – a perversion, for proper or true or thorough 
responsibility [qua] is ever only absolute, one that exclaims: we are alone. 
No doubt, Bonhoeffer would reply that the truth about things as such, 
particularly in relation to judgments about the value of responsibility, is perceived only 
in the eyes of God, therefore any talk of absolute value falls short or is incorrect. That is 
also the reasoning behind his claim that the community of saints can never be grasped 
with sociological insights and is only understandable from within – cum ira et studio250 
– with the eyes of (Christian) faith (DBWE 1: p. 33). In contrast to Žižek, the theology 
of Bonhoeffer in Sanctorum Communio is distinctively dogmatic and still Barthian, 
upholding the positivism of revelation by arguing that ‘faith is not a possible method by 
which to gain academic knowledge; rather, by acknowledging the claim of revelation, 
                                                 
250
 [with passionate zeal]. This is in contrast to Tacitus, Annals, 1,1: sine ira et studio [without passion 
and bias]. 
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faith is the given prerequisite for positive theological knowledge’ (ibid., p. 127). For 
Bonhoeffer there is no absolute value or knowledge apart from or outside God. 
However, does this restriction to God not functionally abstract its object, be it 
the ethical act or community? Does Bonhoeffer’s first and foremost ethical 
intersubjectivity, which is grounded and sustained by God, not characterise an abstract 
community insofar as it originates, is maintained and ends in the external? Is it true that 
a concept of person is misunderstood apart from God? Is it not rather that Bonhoeffer’s 
ethics is based on a God as a third agent who gentrifies the surplus or monstrous of the 
Other, the big Other anchoring, pacifying the monstrous and regulating any engagement 
with the Other (Žižek, 2013a, p. 144)? God functions as the ultimate authentic 
foundation for community which manages the terrifying real Other. However, the 
encounter of the Other through God is not experience of the real Other, but rather 
gentrified, for what is met in the encounter is God. Certainly, it might no longer be 
conducted as an ethnic encounter; it does raise a new identity of ‘Christian’, but it is far 
from a collective of the alien, what Žižek calls a struggling universality, where the 
Other is encountered as it is, ‘the ambiguity of the Real embodied, the 
extreme/impossible point at which opposites coincide, at which the innocence of the 
Other’s vulnerable nakedness overlaps with pure evil’ (ibid., p. 162). From a functional 
perspective Bonhoeffer’s community rests upon God’s obscuration of the neighbour by 
proclaiming it as the site from which the divine call to ethical responsibility emanates. 
His theological insistence upon the subject’s being ultimately residing in a voluntarist 
conception of God is conducted at the expense of the Other. Žižek proposes a 
conception of community that seemingly does not abstract, a ‘pure voluntarism’ (Žižek, 
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2016, p. 107), within which humanity is freed through Christ’s suspension of the ethical 
on the Cross and realization that the big Other does not exist, enabling the grasp of the 
human will and responsibility. The resulting terrible freedom is a refutation of 
Bonhoeffer’s claim that the idealist model has ‘no understanding of the moment in 
which the person feels the threat of absolute demand’ (DBWE 1: p. 4λ). Absolute 
demand is only such if its magnitude is perceived without regard to its sign.  
4.1.4.2 The theological concept of sin 
The other concept that Bonhoeffer deems as indispensable to any theory of the subject 
and community and which has specific implication is that of sin (ibid., p. 58). Here too 
idealism is accused of failing to give it due consideration and neglecting the impact of 
the Fall on the ‘primal state’ and consequent sociological structures of community 
(ibid., pp. 59-60). Sin or the Fall, then, has a real qualitative historical character and 
Bonhoeffer argues that ‘history in the true sense only begins with sin’ (ibid., p. 63). It 
isolates the individual from God and consequently the Other, but at the same time, since 
Adam’s Fall marks the Fall of the whole humanity, places them into the deepest, most 
immediate bond with humanity – a bond of culpability. This is where the communality 
of humanity resides for Bonhoeffer:  
Now since in the individual guilty act it is precisely the humanity of 
human beings that has been affirmed, humanity has to be considered a 
community. As such it is also a collective person that has the same nature 
as each of its members (ibid., p. 145). 
 
This nature of culpability places subjects in isolation from and in bondage to each other 
and into a constant overstepping of the borders between them, thus rupturing the 
community with God and the Other. The ‘sinful humanity’ which resides in each and 
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every individual and deserves condemnation is foundational to and indispensable in 
consideration of any community (ibid., p. 124).  
In Chapter 4, ‘Sin and Broken Community’ (ibid., pp. 107-122), Bonhoeffer 
engages in an exposition of the social basic-relations between I and You after the Fall, 
which replaced love with selfishness, obfuscated morality to the point that it is visible 
only in the structures of legal order and brought about consciousness (of good and evil). 
Thus when individuals hear the Law and recognize their guilt they emerge as ethical 
persons, albeit in isolation. Their sense of culpability only intensifies upon grasping that 
this is the status of whole humanity – sin is a ‘supra-individual deed’ (ibid., p. 108). Not 
that man sins because the first man sinned and they are of the same biological species; 
rather, they share ethical personhood, where the individual is part of the ethical 
intersubjective. Therefore, as an individual sins, they do so as a member of the human 
race, which means that ‘all humanity falls with each sin’ (ibid., p. 115). ‘Sin is the sign 
of belonging to the old humanity, to the first Adam; consciousness of guilt reveals to 
individuals their connection with all sinners’ (ibid., p. 121). Bonhoeffer asserts in a 
dialectical manner that ‘the experience of ethical solidarity is based upon the utmost 
singularity of the person’ (ibid., p. 117), concluding that humanity is therefore a 
[dialectically] comprehensive [ethical] community:  
The collective person of humanity has one heart. Participation in its 
ethical nature is demonstrated by individuals through every act of 
repentance and recognition of culpability. Wherever individuals 
recognize themselves both as individuals and as the human race, and 
submit to the demand of God, there beats the heart of the collective 
person (ibid., p. 121). 
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The concepts of sin, guilt and the Fall which form the distinctive foundation of the 
subject and community, Bonhoeffer claims, are overlooked by idealist philosophy:   
For idealism, origin and telos remain in unbroken connection and are 
brought to synthesis in the concept of ‘essence’. Nothing in between – 
sin, on the one hand, and Christ, on the other – can essentially break this 
eternal, necessary connection […]. Such a view of history as an unbroken 
straight line basically eliminates everything specifically Christian. In this 
view, neither sin nor redemption alters the essence of history (ibid., pp. 
59-60).251  
 
Is that also the case for Žižek? The latter considers the Fall as absolutely necessary, for 
it creates the conditions of ‘salvation’. However, there is a fundamental difference 
insofar as for him there is no state from which humanity falls or (original community), 
rather ‘the Fall creates that from which it is a Fall – or, in theological terms, God is not 
the Beginning’ (Žižek, 2010c, p. 93). It is then an Event which enables Adam and Eve 
to undergo a paradigm shift through which they realise what they already are or were – 
naked and mortal: 
So when God announces the punishment, he just spells out what Adam 
and Eve have already realized in noticing that they were naked, namely, 
their misery as two weak mortal beings […]. It is not that the Fall is 
followed by redemption; rather, the Fall is identical to Redemption, it is 
‘in itself’ already Redemption (Žižek, 2014, p. 127).  
 
This logic was already observed in Žižek’s reading of Romans 7 (Žižek, 1λλλa, pp. 147-
149), where, according to him, the Law is given to point out its inherent transgression 
and thereby leads to its suspension and assumption of the subject’s full responsibility in 
acting. It therefore contrasts Bonhoeffer’s move to incorporate the ethical into God by 
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 See also p. 62. 
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making him the origin of our morality.252 Bonhoeffer upholds the Law as holy and good 
due to its revealing the deficiency or brokenness of the community, and understands 
Christ’s redemptive role as fulfilling the Law by love (DBWE 1: pp. 14κ-151). On the 
other hand, Žižek asserts that Christ rather suspends the Law by love and abolishes its 
logic of sin and punishment by bringing it to the point of self-relating. For him also the 
Fall is foundational and indispensable in the formation of community but without regard 
for the ex post facto sign which abstracts community.  
Bonhoeffer insists upon a broken community where sin and guilt are 
fundamental elements of its ontology – no matter how much emphasis is laid on grace 
and the presence of God. That is why the first step towards a transcendental redeeming 
of such a dysfunctional community is a recognition of guilt and the resulting shame 
before God’s gaze. What happens to this guilt and shame if we accept Žižek’s 
suspension of the big Other? Does the guilt disappear? Žižek’s poignant observation is 
that this guilt or shame does not arise from ‘the Benthamic-Orwellian notion of the 
panopticon society in which we are (potentially) observed all the time and have no place 
to hide from the omnipresent gaze’, but rather from ‘the prospect of not being exposed 
to the Other’s gaze all the time, so that the subject needs the camera’s gaze as a kind of 
ontological guarantee of his or her being’ (Žižek, 2013a, p. 180). The terror for 
Bonhoeffer seems to be that there is only us, inconsistent, ambiguous and lacking, and 
therefore he grounds the subject and community in the redeeming big Other by the 
notion of sin and guilt. 
                                                 
252
 Cf. Žižek (2014), p. 130. 
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Is Bonhoeffer’s argument here not an example of Feuerbach’s false essence of 
Christianity that alienates man as himself and man from community and its own 
perfections? His famous dictum that in order ‘to enrich God, man must become poor; 
that God may be all, man must be nothing’ (Feuerbach, 1λκλ, p. 26)253 certainly seems 
to hold true with Bonhoeffer’s pecatorum communio [community of sinners], where not 
only is that which is attributed to God withheld from the community of man itself but 
the deprived state of humanity also forms the basis of sociality.254  
In the next section it will be described how, according to Bonhoeffer, God enters 
the broken community by revealing himself in and as Christ and redeems it by creating 
the church qua  a new community no longer grounded upon culpability – Christ existing 
as community. 
4.1.4.3 The theological concept of the church-community  
After considering the derivation of the social form derived from the idealist 
metaphysical as flawed due to its inappropriate conception of God and sin and therefore 
to be rejected (DBWE 1: p. 28), Bonhoeffer attempts to demonstrate the preferred and 
apposite social from the theological in the community of saints [sanctorum communio], 
where the conceptions of ‘person, community and God have an essential and 
indissoluble relation to one another’ (ibid., p. 22). This community of God – as in 
church of God – is presented as representing the source for any and all social 
considerations in theology (ibid., pp. 86, 122-123). 
                                                 
253
 Might one not understand the passage from the gospel of John Chapter 3, where John the Baptist meets 
Jesus at the baptism, in this way? In verse 20 John utters the following: ‘He must increase, but I must 
decrease!’, thus projecting the predicates of perfection onto Jesus and then pushing himself into obscurity. 
254
 DBWE 1: pp. 148-149 cf. Feuerbach (1989), p. 27.  
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 When Bonhoeffer writes about the ‘community of saints’, he has in mind the 
concrete or empirical255 church, not a ‘religious community, but the empirical church as 
the sanctorum communio present in its actual embodiment’ (ibid., p. 180). The term 
sanctorum communio, derived from the Apostles’ Creed and Augustine’s community of 
Christ, was brought to Bonhoeffer’s attention by his supervisor’s use of it in Textbooks 
of the History of Doctrines to portray the church as a distinctly visible social body in its 
worship and cooperation (ibid., p. 141). Bonhoeffer, however, wishes to highlight that 
the church is not isolated or secluded and focuses on its participation in the basic forms 
of society, such as the subject or sociality (ibid., p. 152). The full dialectical character of 
this participation is demonstrated in the observation that while these basic forms take on 
a new form they remain the same and are sublated upon encountering God. It is only 
through this interaction that the new basic relation of the church is constituted (ibid., p. 
261). For Bonhoeffer sanctorum communio or the empirical church thus represents a 
‘form of community sui generis’ (ibid., p. 266), a dialectically unique structure where 
the divine and human come together (ibid., p. 126).  
To elaborate and lay bare the existing sociality of the community of saints which 
is sublated through its encounter with God, Bonhoeffer adapts and appropriates Hegel’s 
sociological category of the objective spirit discussed earlier, by ‘equipping’ it with the 
Holy Spirit. Insofar as the human objective spirit is the ineradicable core and bond of 
the community that gets its character from the historical context, this very historicity 
‘implies that it is fallible and imperfect as far as its understanding and will are 
concerned’ (ibid., p. 215). It is therefore only through its meeting with the divine in the 
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 Empirical as in grounded in reality and thus suitable for deduction. See DBWE 1: p. 97. 
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Holy Spirit that it is aufgehoben to a building and bearing of the church (ibid., p. 152). 
Yet the objective spirit and Holy Spirit remain distinct as observed in their function 
(ibid., pp. 203-204, 214) and are not to be confused: while the function of the first is to 
enable a degree of continuity, the latter actualizes the church here and now (ibid., p. 
208).256 Thus both concepts bring about the two natures, or constituent elements of the 
church: while its actions are not simply those of the Holy Spirit (ibid., p. 214), the latter 
changes and influences the objective spirit, thus performing its redemptive role by 
impacting and maintaining it, lifting this fallible community into God’s community 
(ibid., pp. 126, 143, 280-281). Indeed, Bonhoeffer understands the objective spirit, as 
corrupt as it may be, as the Holy Spirit’s vehicle (ibid., p. 215) and explores the 
institutions of the church’s objective spirit along the lines of Hegel’s account of the 
spirit in the modern state (Hegel, 1986, pp. 579ff [1990, pp. 413ff]). To that end an 
individual congregation is contrasted with the universal church (DBWE 1: pp. 223-226), 
whereas Hegel contrasts the family and the state. To summarize, Bonhoeffer’s 
understanding of the church community form as distinctive from the basic forms of 
society and yet in dialectical relationship with them is in its foundation Hegelian, for it 
is founded upon the concept of objective spirit as objective patterns of social 
interaction.257  
                                                 
256
 From this page onwards Bonhoeffer engages in an exegesis of the role of the Holy Spirit in the 
establishment and continuation of the church community, thus also distinguishing his understanding of 
objective spirit from the idealist. Cf. DBWE 1: p. 145.  
257
 Even though the concept of the objective spirit is not mentioned specifically in most of the works that 
follow Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being, this Hegelian foundation of the dynamic of church-
community persists. Kotsko’s helpful article (2005) draws attention to its prominence in Bonhoeffer’s 
1933 lectures on Christology, Discipleship and The Letters, the first with regards to the presence of Christ 
in the human community, the second with regards to the church’s doctrine and, the latter, with regards to 
the changing form of the church, specifically religiosity.  
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 To the challenge that the basic sociological forms are merely overcome by God, 
Bonhoeffer responds that while this community is marked by ambiguity and the 
emphasis is on God as its sole source and maintainer (DBWE 1: p. 216), the community 
participates in those acts through its active being.258 This dialectic is best illustrated in 
Bonhoeffer’s concept of Stellvertretung, or vicarious representative action, denoting 
representation in place of another or intercession on behalf of another and originating in 
Christ who bore the sins of humanity and accepted the  punishment on Calvary.259 This 
fundamental theological concept throughout Bonhoeffer’s writings, which appears 
already in Sanctorum Communio rather than being a later development of Ethics,260 is 
achieved by transforming Hegel’s conception of the Spirit existing as community261 into 
‘Christ existing as church-community’.262 The line between human and divine agency is 
obscure here, fully expressed in the statement that ‘in our intercession we can become a 
Christ to our neighbour’ (DBWE 1: p. 1κ7).263 Insofar as Christ’s being-for-other is the 
experience of transcendence, the church participates in this being when it is there for 
others.264 Not only is Christ ‘at all times a real presence for the church’ (DBWE 1: p. 
139),265 but the church is the real presence of Christ, where ‘Christ truly is’ (ibid., pp. 
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 Also, the church is not a triumphalist community where sin is absent, but instead the bringing in of a 
divine reality. See Luca D’Isanto (1992), p. 143.  
259
 DBWE 1: pp. 79, 120, 146, 148, 155ff., 178, 184, 191.  
260
 Cf. DBWE 6: pp.  231, 235, 257-258, 288, 404. 
261
 ‘Die Idee im Element der Gemeinde: Das Reich des Geistes’ in Hegel (1971), Vorlesungen über die 
Philosophie der Religion 2: 443ff [‘The realization of the Spirituality of the Community’ in Hegel, 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion 3:339ff]. 
262
 DBWE 1: p. 121: ‘It is “Adam”, a collective person, who can only be superseded [abgelöst] by the 
collective person “Christ existing as church-community”’.  
263
 See also pp. 178-180. 
264
 Cf. DBWE 8: p. 501.  
265
 Bonhoeffer is here referring to 1 Corinthians 12:2ff and Romans 12:4ff.  
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140, 158).266 Bonhoeffer again highlights the dialectical participation between the 
divine and human agency of this community centred in the figure of Christ.   
Bonhoeffer’s upholding of the church as the presence of Christ can be compared 
to Žižek’s own upholding of Christ’s continued presence as the emancipatory collective 
of the Holy Spirit community (Žižek, 2012a, pp. κ5-86).  The latter explains this 
Christological aspect through the use of the folk song ‘Joe Hill’ about the murder of a 
trade union organiser. The song takes on the form of Joe’s post-mortem apparition to 
someone in a dream. To their insistence that Joe is dead, he responds, ‘What they forgot 
to kill went on to organize’ (quoted in Žižek, 2012a, p. 6κ). What survives, Žižek 
argues, is that which is more than the body – the excess or immortal part, the Real of the 
subject – and therefore not as the body or ghost but in the context of its intersubjective 
exposure, the ‘collective’. With regards to Christ, the body dies as the site of 
overcoming the law and any attempt to ‘resurrect’ it by looking for him outside the 
community is seen as a mistake ‘which Christ corrects with the famous words: “Where 
two or three are gathered in my name, I will be there”’ (ibid., p. 86). Could this not be 
read in parallel with Bonhoeffer’s assertion that ‘there is no relation to Christ in which 
the relation to the church is not necessarily established as well’ (DBWE 1: p. 127)? Of 
course, for Bonhoeffer the presence of Christ is only possible because resurrection 
actually occurred,267 whereas for Žižek it is the very absence of the resurrection that 
makes the presence of that which is more than the body of Christ possible in the Holy 
                                                 
266
 Likewise, Bonhoeffer asserts, the Holy Spirit also is ‘only in the church-community, and the church-
community is only in the spirit: “Ubi enim ecclesia ibi et spiritus; et ubi spiritus dei, illic ecclesia et omnis 
gratia” [for where the church is there is the Spirit; and where the spirit of God is, there is the church and 
every kind of grace]’ (DBWE 1, p. 144). 
267
 DBW 12: p. 312: ‘Only where the risen Christ is understood as the ground and the prerequisite for 
Christology is it possible to grasp his presence as person.’ Cf. pp. 330-331, 359. 
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Spirit community. However, it would be a mistake to consider Žižek’s understanding as 
some kind of a mystical power through memory. Instead, it is engagement with the Real 
Christ. Perhaps Bonhoeffer’s own understanding is also stretched further in the later 
stages of his thought (The Letters), when he wonders about the church, the ethical 
challenge to be a stellvertretender  [vicarious representative] with reference to God’s 
place in the world:  
Before God, and with God, we live without God. God consents to be 
pushed out of the world and onto the Cross; God is weak and powerless 
in the world and in precisely this way, and only so, is at our side and 
helps us. Matt. 8:17 makes it quite clear that Christ helps us not by virtue 
of his omnipotence but rather by virtue of his weakness and suffering! 
(16 July 1944 in DBWE 8: pp. 478-479) 
  
The import of Christ and his social embodiment is common and foundational to both 
Bonhoeffer268 and Žižek.269  
Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on Christ-existing-as-community, compared to Hegel’s 
God-existing-as-community, becomes of central importance in the preservation of 
divine transcendence and its relationship to man as the source of subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity: 
The cord between human beings and God that was cut by the first Adam 
is tied anew by God, by revealing God’s own love in Christ, by no longer 
approaching us in demand and summons, purely as You, but instead by 
giving God’s own self as an I, opening God’s own heart. The church is 
                                                 
268
 Bonhoeffer’s focus on the import of Christ for community is only further accentuated in Life Together 
(DBWE 5: p. 34.): ‘Our community consists solely in what Christ has done to both of us.’ Note the word 
‘to’ rather than ‘for’, denoting that Christ has done something to our sociality, rather than a mere punitive 
character.  
269
 Žižek agrees on the crucial role of Christ for the community as he calls for continual repetition of the 
act of Christ as a community (e.g. Žižek, 2001b, p. 105). Indeed, despite adopting Hegel’s focus on the 
Spirit and describing the new community as the Holy Spirit, he advocates the central role of Christ and 
the incarnation (Žižek, 2010c, pp. 371-375). 
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founded on the revelation of God’s heart. But since destroying the primal 
community with God also destroyed human community, so likewise 
when God restores community between human beings and God’s own 
self, community among us also is restored once again (DBWE 1: p. 
145).270 
The preservation of transcendence is what sets apart the church community as a model 
for any other community in the first place (ibid., pp. 103, 146). While the latter is a 
fallen community composed of individuals in sin and enmity with each other and God, 
the church is built upon Jesus as the essential difference who brought fallen humanity 
into community with God and thereby also re-established the community with one 
another. Bonhoeffer reiterates that ‘true’ community requires recognition of the fallen 
humanity in Adam: ‘the transformation into a new community-of-God is possible only 
if the deficiency of the old is recognised’ (ibid., pp. 148-149). This is not a simple 
recognition that mankind was wrong in ‘excluding’ God and ought now to ‘include’ 
him, but rather one of total depravity and the necessity of Christ’s soteriological death 
on the Cross (ibid., p. 124).271 Bonhoeffer then develops the implication of this for the 
action of this community: ‘what characterises the Christian notion of vicarious 
representative action is that it is vicariously representative strictly with respect to sin 
and punishment’ (ibid., p. 155). The authentic community and its life is for Bonhoeffer 
only possible within the framework of sin and punishment (Žižek, 2013a, p. 177). The 
church community’s difference from any other form of community, not only because of 
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 See also pp. 138-139. 
271
 That is why Bonhoeffer (DBWE 1: p. 155) also chastises Ritschl for his denial of the ‘punitive 
character of the suffering of Jesus’, when the latter argues that the notion of punishment originated in the 
context of a legal relationship and therefore ought to be rejected in the Christian religion. See Ritschl 
(1882), pp. 364f., 472ff. 
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its relationship with God but fundamentally because of its recognition of total depravity 
without him, qualifies it as a model to be followed.272  
The above observed problematic of guilt re-emerges in Bonhoeffer’s 
consideration of the church as a community-form paradigm and is again illuminated 
with reference to the law (ibid., pp. 148-151). Bonhoeffer describes or explains Christ 
and his vicarious representative action as fulfilling the Law. He upholds it as holy and 
good and concludes that Christ’s ‘love had to become complete by fulfilling the Law – 
that is, the claim of God and of human beings – even to death’ (ibid., p. 149). Žižek, as 
observed in the chapter on his theology, instead interprets Christ’s death as traumatizing 
the Law and suspending the logic of sin and punishment by committing a senseless act 
outside social convention – an act that overcomes the Law. Thus while Bonhoeffer 
considers the community itself as broken because of sin, Žižek considers the community 
as broken because of the utmost Symbolic Law and calls for its suspension. Rather than 
a person dying to sin (ibid., p. 123), Žižek speaks of the person dying to the Law or the 
Symbolic and coming to existence outside the Symbolic or the legal-ethical. The terror 
for Bonhoeffer again seems to be that there is only humanity, opaque and monstrous, 
and therefore he grounds the community in the constant and all-knowing gaze of the 
redeeming big Other.  
The church also becomes a model for any other community because of its 
preservation of the dialectical balance between the individual and community, which is 
only enabled by, in and through God, specifically through Christ who becomes the 
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paradigm for other communities reveals as Hegelian not only its form, founded upon the concept of 
objective spirit as objective patterns of social interaction, but also its function. 
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‘pioneer of a new humanity’ (ibid., p. 136). Christ’s action as a stellvertretender  then 
functions as a model for the vicarious representative action of the church in place of 
another, rather than merely on their behalf, where their fate is accepted as own.273 It is 
through this action that the true collectivity of the church emerges – ‘Christ existing as 
church-community’ (ibid., p. 190),274 where the individual and community are one 
(ibid., p. 165).275 Bonhoeffer makes it very clear that this unity is not established upon 
uniformity of will or shared purpose, but is brought about by God as the transcendent. 
In fact, it finds its embodiment 
precisely where the seemingly sharpest outward antitheses prevail, where 
each person really leads an individual life […] where wills clash […] it 
might very well lead them to remember the One who is over them both, 
and in whom both of them are one (ibid., p. 192f).   
 
It is only in communion with God that this clashing of wills manifests a single 
collective person [Gesamtperson] (ibid., p. 193), a unity rather than unanimity.276 
Specifically, the vicarious representative action, which is founded, grounded and takes 
place in Christ, characterises a collectivity from the perspective of Christ – not 
anthropocentric egalitarianism, but rather equal status in the eyes of God as described in 
Galatians 3:22 (ibid., pp. 204, 207).277 Bonhoeffer presents the New Testament view of 
the church arguing for its clear expression as a community transcending ‘all national 
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whole: ‘the church-community as a whole is real only in the individual congregation’ (DBWE 1: p. 135). 
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 ‘The Christian idea of equality does not allow for an egalitarianism’ (DBWE 1: p. 207). 
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 Insofar as the collectivity of the church is from the perspective of God, it therefore also depends and is 
acted upon in faith. See DBWE 1: p. 202. 
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and political boundaries’ (ibid., pp. 135-139 at p. 135).278 In being from the perspective 
of God, this act is directed toward the independent neighbour as ‘alien’ rather than the 
perception of the subject (ibid., p. 169). Insofar as it does not emerge from the subject it 
avoids the latter’s absolutization, maintaining the freedom of the other. At the same 
time the ability to assert oneself against the knowing subject is limited by the objective 
spirit, the collective person of the community of individuals, thus avoiding 
absolutization of the Other and maintaining the freedom of the subject and community. 
Together the independence of all three is preserved – the subject (and community), the 
Other and the ethical claim which remains regardless of whether the action is taken or 
not.279 Together with the neighbour, this claim and the act itself is grounded in God as 
the ultimate Other and seeks to establish God’s rule over humanity (ibid., p. 170). It is a 
love that is marked by surrender to the Other, neighbour and God, where ‘I love the You 
by placing myself, my entire will, in the service of the You’ (ibid., p. 169) because God 
unreservedly surrenders to me (ibid., pp. 173, 177).280 Bonhoeffer claims that taking 
part in Stellvertretung marks the form of community which does not create community 
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God for the sake of their people. This is considered as ‘the abyss into which intercession can lead the 
individual’ (p. 1κ5). 
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at the expense of the individual (ibid., pp. 203-204)281 but rather preserves the collective 
person and a true ethical encounter:  
Paul speaks of the church of God. As such it is God’s reality of 
revelation, and the individual is really only a part of it – a part, however, 
as a whole person, as someone elected by God within the church-
community […]. With the notion of the organism, therefore, Paul wants 
to express, on the one hand, that all belong to the body of Christ, who is 
the unity of all members; Paul wants to express belonging to God’s 
church community, in which alone the individual can live. But, on the 
other hand, from this membership there falls the demand, or rather the 
obvious consequence of operating with the whole (ibid., p. 138 [29]).282 
 
Yet Bonhoeffer’s claim that the grounding of the Other, ethical claim and act in God 
enables a true collectivity, where the individual is not overcome by community, is 
problematic from a Žižekian perspective.283 Insofar as the perspective is from God it 
does not represent an engagement with the monstrous Other but rather an abstraction or 
Symbolic image – as a sinner in need of redemption, brother/sister in faith or Christ – 
and therefore a distortion. It is not as if the subject catches a glimpse of the mysterious 
real Other through God – the Other exists only in its relation to the big Other rather than 
its constitutive exposure to the subject (Žižek, 2013a, pp. 146-147). This claim is thus 
heteronomous and from above, not only as a command from the neighbour, but further 
as a command from God. Consequently, the ethical is not genuine for it originates in 
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the immanentist metaphysician of the Spirit with an epistemological consciousness of religion (DBW 1: 
pp. 131-132). 
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for a paradoxical constitution of the subject, where God is not only the maintainer of community but its 
sole source, or embodiment. Žižek, in contrast, talks about the subject and the new revolutionary 
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Milbank, ‘The Double Glory, or Paradox versus Dialectics: On Not Quite Agreeing with Slavoj Žižek’ in 
Žižek and Milbank (2009), p. 110ff. 
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God rather than in the subject’s constitutive exposure to the Other. It is rather 
vulnerability or finitude and dependency as described earlier that makes one responsible 
towards the other (ibid., p. 13κ). Therefore Bonhoeffer’s collective person is but an 
abstraction and does not describe a properly ethical intersubjectivity. While it might 
overcome an ethnic collectivity (Gal 3:22) based in race, political status, even gender, it 
does not overcome God and remains abstract. While the big Other overcomes one set of 
symbolic differences it replaces them with a new set, where the Other is known only 
through and according to the big Other.  
Perhaps here again Bonhoeffer’s understanding regarding the ethical is stretched 
further during his stay in New York, when he describes something that is prima facie 
akin to Žižek’s suspension of the ethical:  
Christians stand in freedom, without any backing, before both God and 
the world; they alone bear the entire responsibility for how they will deal 
with this gift of freedom. Through precisely this freedom, however, 
Christians become creative in their ethical actions. Acting according to 
principles is unproductive and merely reflects or copies the law. Acting 
in freedom is creative. Christians draw the forms of their ethical activity 
out of eternity itself, as it were, put these forms with sovereignty in the 
world, as deed, as their own creations born of the freedom of God’s 
children. Christians create their own standards for good and evil; only 
Christians themselves provide the justification for their acts, just as they 
alone bear responsibility for them. Christians create new tablets, new 
decalogues, as Nietzsche said of the Overman. Indeed, Nietzsche’s 
overman is not, as he imagined, the opposite of the Christian; without 
realizing it, Nietzsche imbued the Overman with many of the features of 
the free Christian as described and conceived by both Paul and Luther 
(DBWE 10: pp. 366-367). 
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While the suspension of the ethical is comparable, Bonhoeffer still insists that 
suspension itself is from God and claims its exclusivity to the Christian identity.284 This 
is in clear contrast to Žižek, who understands the Christian core as subverting any 
identity, including and foremost the divine, and asserts that it is only from this 
standpoint that the ethical is suspended. The ethical is not truly suspended with 
Bonhoeffer, for his position remains identitarian. In that sense the difference between 
his own Christian identity and Nietzsche’s non-or-over-identiterian Übermensch is 
clear: while both can create new decalogues, only one does so by rising above the 
identitarian, while the other remains firmly within it.  
 Bonhoeffer’s problematic divine personalism is opposed by Žižek’s challenge to 
pursue a community without symbolic differences, including those imposed by God as 
the big Other, one that does not have to be contrasted with egalitarianism and within 
which unreserved surrender to each other takes place without an injunction, grounded 
upon respect and acceptance of each other’s vulnerability and limitation. In The 
Monstrosity of Christ (Žižek and Milbank, 200λ, pp. 301-303), Žižek describes such an 
ethical stance with the help of Agota Kristof’s The Notebook, which is the first volume 
of her trilogy entitled The Notebook – The Proof – The Third Lie (1997). The story 
revolves around young twins who live with their grandmother and stand for authentic 
ethical naivety at its purest, in that they are spontaneously and without empathy doing 
what needs to be done in order to meet their neighbours’ needs. ‘With more people like 
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this, the world would be a pleasant place in which sentimentality would be replaced by a 
cold and cruel passion’, Žižek concludes (ibid., p. 303).  
Such a community looks beyond Symbolic difference and is not identitarian; 
characterised by love or, as Žižek calls it, the ethics of indifference, it is a community:  
where I am indifferent toward all, the totality of the universe, and as 
such, I actually love you, the unique individual who stands/sticks out of 
this indifferent background. Love and hatred are thus not symmetrical: 
love emerges out of universal indifference, while hatred emerges out of 
universal love (Žižek, 2013a, p. 183).  
 
This kind of love is different from Bonhoeffer’s ‘universal’ love which is, as already 
observed, focused only on those present in the gaze of the big Other. Even if it is argued 
that all are present in this guise, it is still a love based on abstraction and furthermore 
allows for no existence of the subject outside of it. Love of universal indifference, on 
the other hand, is based on the constitutive exposure of the subject and its monstrous 
excess, a universality that does not exclude but is itself the excluded from the Symbolic 
– the sempiternally present inhuman human. This love is, according to Žižek, also 
exemplified in Christ’s injunction in Luke 14:26: ‘If anyone comes to me and does not 
hate his father and his mother, his wife and his children, his brothers and sisters – yes, 
even his own life – he cannot be my disciple.’285 Rather than being a love of Symbolic 
features it is obligatory indifference to those in preference to the existing excess and in 
that way a love of all. 
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4.1.5 Concluding thought 
While Bonhoeffer and Žižek agree on the sociality of theological concepts, as well as 
the theological essence of social concepts and therefore theology’s relevance in pursuit 
of community, they disagree on their form. For Bonhoeffer true community is possible 
only through, with and from God, whereas for Žižek the big Other abstracts it. This 
difference emerges from their respective understanding of theology. While Bonhoeffer 
considers it to be foremost the study of the divine grounding – study of God –, Žižek 
deems it as the study of the alien or monstrous, the Real. Whereas Bonhoeffer seeks to 
apply the theological concepts of God, sin and the church to demonstrate the shortfall of 
the social-philosophical concepts of person and community, Žižek also employs 
theological concepts of Christ, the Fall and the Holy Spirit community for sociological 
implication, but not to reveal the divine truth and instruction; rather, he does so to reveal 
the cracks and fissures of the current or given order, intimating the existence or 
presence of excess.  
From Žižek’s perspective Bonhoeffer’s Schelerian personalism betrays a very 
limited and second-hand understanding of Hegel’s subject-object relationship, where 
universality is reduced to totalitarianism of the subject. His alternative of the collective 
person rests upon an ethical barrier between persons, asserting the inability and 
impermissibility to recognise the Other but also placing them in a relationship of ethical 
responsibility. According to Žižek, this ethical constitution of the subject and 
impenetrability of the Other is partial for it lacks an ontological foundation of the 
subject itself as unknowable. Insofar as intersubjectivity is located in the unknowable 
excess of the subject (and the Other), he considers Bonhoeffer’s impenetrability 
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restricted to the Other as resulting in a sociality of separation, where the Other is always 
alien in their particularity and thus a source of heteronomous ethical demands. 
This tension is also observed in Bonhoeffer’s grapple with Hegel’s concept of 
objective spirit, which he uses to illustrate the dialectically tense spirit of sociality, 
within which community emerges. He wishes to preserve the individual in contrast to 
his understanding of Hegel’s transgression of the ethical boundary, where the particular 
individual is overcome by the universal. Žižek corrects Bonhoeffer’s understanding of 
universalism by pointing out that it should instead be conceived as struggling, a 
principle of negativity constantly driving particularities in antagonism to prevent the 
notion of totality. According to Žižek, Bonhoeffer’s sociality of separation seeks to 
preserve the individual but ends up sacrificing sociality.  
Of course, for Bonhoeffer this is only the foundation, for in the final chapter of 
the thesis he grounds the community in the divine by engaging the sociological concepts 
of community with theological concepts of God, sin and church. Thus God, the 
transcendent Other, becomes the Other that grounds the subject, its relationship to the 
Other and the ethical claim of the community. However, by doing this Bonhoeffer 
abstracts them, for the subject, its relationship to the Other and the community no longer 
have absolute value apart from God, who assigns identity and orders engagement. 
Furthermore, their first assigned value is that of total depravity, for the individual and 
the community needs to recognise itself as sinful and guilty, in need of redemption from 
God.  
Bonhoeffer then describes how God enters the broken community by revealing 
himself in and as Christ and redeems it by creating the church qua  a new community no 
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longer grounded upon culpability but in God – Christ existing as community. This 
community, where the subject, the Other and the ethical claim of the community are all 
maintained by God, is for him the true community and the source for any and all social 
considerations in theology.  
From Žižek’s perspective, however, Bonhoeffer’s attempt to escape the sinful 
totalitarianism of universality results in a total domination of the transcendent big Other, 
who abstracts all the concepts by assigning a new identity to the subject, the Other and 
the community. It does not represent an engagement with the Real but rather the 
construction of a new yet still Symbolic reality. The terror for Bonhoeffer seems to be 
that there is only us, inconsistent, ambiguous and lacking; therefore, he grounds the 
subject and community in the redeeming big Other by the notion of sin and guilt. Rather 
than grounding social forms and resolving their dialectical tensions in God, Žižek 
challenges Bonhoeffer to venture beyond the regulating of the big Other, where the 
latter’s role is suspended and the Real subject emerges, to embrace the inconsistent and 
lacking struggling universality, not only to contest the deus ex machina  as Bonhoeffer 
attempts in The Letters,286 but, from an ethical concern, to contest and surmount the 
deus superanus – the sovereign ordering the ‘reality’, including ‘sociological forms and 
relations’ – identity.  
The Žižekian reading of Bonhoeffer’s social theology of Sanctorum Communio 
thus highlights its problems. However, the reading also enables an application of 
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Bonhoeffer’s social forms in analysis of the contemporary struggle for social change 
located in the revolutionary body. This will be explored in the final section of the thesis. 
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4.2 Applying Bonhoeffer’s social typology to the struggle for change  
4.2.1 Introduction 
A people is ‘community’ in the specific sense, not something that has 
grown but only as something willed, namely willed-community – 
recognised as an end in itself, is a value, for all community is community 
of will (DBWE 1: p. 89). 
 
This short section demonstrates a potential application of Bonhoeffer’s thought, gleaned 
from the Žižekian reading of Sanctorum Communio, to a contemporary socio-political 
discussion. It is thus undertaken in dialogue with Žižek so as to demonstrate the further 
dimension of a successful critical theological engagement. Toward this end, 
Bonhoeffer’s discussion of the types of social forms is applied to Žižek’s analysis of the 
contemporary struggle for social change located in the revolutionary community/body. 
This not only produces insight into the character of capitalist society, the form and 
function of emerging movements such as Occupy and the nature and possibility of 
change, but also outlines the dialectical relationship between them. 
4.2.2 Bonhoeffer’s typology of social forms 
In Section C of Sanctorum Communio’s third chapter, entitled ‘The Sociological 
Problem’ (DBWE 1: pp. κ0-106), Bonhoeffer presents and discusses a typology of 
social forms through the lens of the objective spirit (ibid., pp. 86-97). In pursuit of an 
authentic form, he distinguishes between three types within which ‘wills unite’: society, 
the mass and community.287 He then proceeds to contrast the meeting of wills in each 
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type and argues that, while in society and the mass wills will beside each other, resting 
upon common interests or reaction respectively, it is only in community that wills will 
together, resting on purposeful acts of will (ibid., p. 83). Thus while the mass and 
society are temporary [innerzeitlich] and limited by time [zeitbegrenzt], insofar as they 
rest upon coincidence of wills and their rationale, the community exists at the limits of 
time [grenzzeitlich] (ibid., p. 96).  
The contrast Bonhoeffer draws between the forms of sociality reveals a 
dialectical tension between these forms and can be employed in a post-Marxist analysis 
of contemporary struggles for social change – their form and relation to the hoped-for 
goal – a new beginning. Therefore, first, the perversion of contemporary capitalist 
society will be discussed through the lens of Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the 
problems of the social form of society. Then the contemporary movement for social 
change Occupy will be explored through the lens of the social form of the mass, its 
response to society and its limits. Finally, its limits will enable us to draw attention to its 
dialectically tense relation with a new beginning through the lens of the social form of 
community. 
4.2.2.1 Society 
Bonhoeffer’s consideration of the form of society as ‘shallow, suspicious and egotistic’ 
(ibid., p. λ1) lends itself nicely to Žižek’s own view of the contemporary global neo-
liberal society as perverse and serving only the interests of capital.  
                                                 
identification with community or common interest. He also contends that the church is by far the most 
expansive collective person, including all finite persons – past, present and future. See ‘Unser 
Personbegriff im Werhältnis zu anderen Formen Personalistischer Ethik’ in Scheler (2005a), pp. 522-595. 
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Having no substance beyond its coming together in pursuit of a common goal, 
society needs to be tied together with written documents and agreements, which ensure 
society’s adherence to that goal. In that sense, Bonhoeffer argues, the society itself is 
used extensively in this pursuit and ‘the only reason this is not called unethical is that it 
is based on consent and applies equally to all’ (ibid., p. λ0). What Bonhoeffer’s acute 
observation conveys is the functional perversion of contemporary society’s legal 
framework in the service of particular interests. Even though the legal framework was 
originally set up as a tool to ensure society’s adherence to its stated purpose, it becomes 
the telos of society which itself serves the order – from serving the will of the people to 
people serving its will or the will of particular interests, to be precise. This is why Žižek 
describes the current global society as postpolitical, trapped in service to the legal 
philosophy of capitalism, ensuring that particular economic interests are set up as the 
legal order (Žižek, 2010c, pp. 118-119). Politics itself is in the service of the legal 
philosophy of the greater economic system. A double instrumentalisation is observed: of 
society in service to the legal system and of the legal system in the service of economic 
interests. Bonhoeffer’s remark about the form of society as shallow, suspicious and 
egotistical thus also holds for the contemporary global society.  
Bonhoeffer also asserts that any society is transitory (DBWE 1: p. 94), and this 
temporality has recently been shown in numerous calls for a change of the global order, 
such as the Occupy movement. In the discussion of these movements Žižek calls for a 
construction of new political subjects who break out of the legal entanglement and 
ground a new collective space. The Occupy movement will be explored next through 
the lens of Bonhoeffer’s form of the mass. 
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4.2.2.2 Mass 
In contrast to society as a rational willing of wills, Bonhoeffer uses the term “mass” to 
describe social bonding where wills come together as a mechanical response to certain 
stimuli (ibid., pp. 93-96). Given its purely mechanical nature, Bonhoeffer does not 
consider this form of sociality as genuine and only discusses it as human ‘because it is 
composed of conscious beings’ (ibid., p. 93). Furthermore, he infers that because of its 
mechanical nature any bonding is accidental and vanishes as soon as the stimuli 
disappear – it is temporary [innerzeitlich]. However, as this section will show, 
consideration of the function and form of mass is not to be abandoned too hastily, as 
Bonhoeffer’s insights will be applied to a post-Marxist analysis of Occupy. As a 
movement for social change it can be regarded as a response to the current socio-
political conditions, yet is far from purely mechanical and is full of potential for the 
emergence of an alternative – a new beginning.  
4.2.2.2.1 Occupy  
Occupy, the diverse and multifocal international movement against social inequality and 
economic injustice, could be considered as corresponding to Bonhoeffer’s social type of 
mass, for it emerged as a response to the external provocation of neoliberal conditions 
and infringement of social rights and well-being. The social movement derived from the 
protests against budget cuts imposed by the University of California in response to the 
post-2007 financial crisis, as students occupied campus buildings under the slogan 
‘Occupy Everything, Demand Nothing’.288 It first received widespread attention at the 
‘Occupy Wall Street’ protest in Zuccotti Park in September 2011 against the global 
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financial system and within a month had spread around the globe. Soon there were 
localised protests in cities in eighty-odd countries against the way in which national and 
international politics have been thwarted in their service to the interests of large 
corporations. Insofar as Occupy emerges in and embodies the response to a set of wider 
socio-political stimuli it can, according to Bonhoeffer, be considered as mass.  
 In agreement with Bonhoeffer, the structure of Occupy corresponds to the nature 
of its emergence,289 set-up and unfolding in response to the existing politics as 
democratically compromised. The individual protests function as a platform for 
participatory democracy, where anyone can contribute in leader-less discussions, 
analysing the local situation and issuing statements with alternatives in due time. There 
is no privileging and rushing of decisions. Thus, for example, the movement in London 
released a statement on corporations and called for an end to tax evasion by wealthy 
firms in late November 2011, after initial occupation outside St. Paul’s on October 15th 
(Occupy London, 2011).  Occupy’s anti-hierarchical structure, with direct access for all 
in its consensus-based decision-making process, is a response to the really existing 
hierarchical politics.  
Where the difference begins to emerge is with Bonhoeffer’s consideration that in 
the mass ‘the boundary of personhood is lost’ (DBWE 1: p. λ3) and the individual is no 
longer a person but an anonymous particle of the mass – ‘drawn into it and directed by 
it’ (ibid., p. λ4). However, is it true that the Occupy’s bonding ‘is not supported by the 
separateness of the person and thus cannot last’ (ibid.)? Is this observed in their slogan, 
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‘We are the λλ%’ – individuals morphed into a faceless mass? Quite the opposite, for 
the protests embody the individualisation of those considered faceless in the financial 
global order. Thus the slogan was originally launched as a Tumblr blog page in August 
2011, making visible individuals and their stories of social inequality and economic 
injustice. Furthermore, its participatory democracy is anything but totalitarian. Thus, 
even though Occupy is a movement of response, the emerging sociality is far from 
overcome by the mass. 
Interestingly, Bonhoeffer observes that the social form of mass ‘creates the most 
powerful experiences of unity’ (ibid., p. 94), but quickly notes that this perception is a 
confusion of mass-unity and comm-unity. While the former rests ‘on the parallel 
direction of the wills of a number of persons’ (ibid., p. 93), the latter rests upon a true 
meeting of wills. As such, Bonhoeffer argues, it is unable to create a social form 
[Sozialgebilde] (ibid., p. 88). As previously noted, Occupy’s unity is not a 
totalitarianism of mass (rather it is particularised); the question now is whether it is able 
to create a social form. However, it is important to stress that no social movement is the 
alternative or the hoped-for goal in itself. Therefore, the mass-unity of an emerging 
movement is such in the current condition/global order and the alternative will emerge 
only after the latter is subverted. While Occupy performs the role of a catalyst for social 
change, it is not the community yet. However, without it and its mass-unity change is 
impossible, for the overcoming of Capitalism as the big Other tying the people together 
must begin from the position of this recognition. Otherwise, any ‘alternative’ will 
remain part of this system or ‘society’. While the mass is not yet the alternative, it is its 
necessary and, as we shall see, potential catalyst.  
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It is with regards to its potential for an alternative that Occupy has been 
criticized for its lack of clearly defined goals. Thus the political theorist of non-violence 
Gene Sharp warned that ‘the protesters don’t have a clear objective, something they can 
actually achieve. If they think they will change the economic system by simply staying 
in a particular location, then they are likely to be very disappointed. Protest alone 
accomplishes very little’.290 Žižek, who himself addressed the protesters in Zuccotti 
Park in October 2011,291 in ‘Occupy Wall Street, Or, the Violent Silence of a New 
Beginning’ (2012b, pp. 77-89) warned against the protests ending in mere rejection of 
the current order and called for a start to the laborious task of imagining an alternative. 
However, Žižek at the same time defended the movement by affirming the essentiality 
of its initial pure negativity:   
[O]ne always has to begin this way, with a formal gesture of rejection 
that is initially more important than any positive content—only such a 
gesture opens up the space for a new content. In the psychoanalytic 
sense, the protesters are indeed hysterical actors, provoking the master, 
undermining his authority; and the question with which they were 
constantly bombarded, ‘But what do you want?’ aims precisely at 
precluding the true answer—its point is: ‘Say it in my terms or shut up!’ 
In this way, the process of translating an inchoate protest into a concrete 
project is blocked (ibid., p. 84). 
 
He thus dismissed the calls for a list of clear objectives and negotiations as compromise 
of the movement’s radical nature and potential and called for a thorough consideration 
in making ‘feasible and legitimate’ but ‘de facto impossible’ demands (ibid.), such as 
universal healthcare, which disturb the very core of the hegemonic ideology. The 
movement’s lack of clearly defined goals is thus not only due to its mechanical nature, 
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but represents the only way to avoid being subsumed within the current order and to 
subvert it.  
Far from an emerging movement such as Occupy representing merely a 
mechanical reaction to the neoliberal conditions, a sort of reflex which is unable to 
bring about anything concrete, it is rather where the emerging alternative is to be 
located. In other words, mass carries the potential to become a ‘critical mass’, reaching 
the point at which it converges into something more than a mechanical reaction – a 
community. It is to a discussion of the characteristics or parameters of this alternative in 
the social form of community that we turn next.  
4.2.2.3 Community 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Bonhoeffer regards community alone as an 
authentic social form, as its essence is not commonality but reciprocal will. 
Accordingly, its telos as the essence of community cannot be elaborated:  
A community may have a rational telos, but its very essence is not 
absorbed by that telos, nor identical with it. Instead, community as such 
is characterised by value, as is history, and, as value-bearing, transcends 
inner historical limitations (DBWE 1: p. 95 [114]).   
 
Rather than having a purpose/goal-oriented or applied essence, the community’s 
essence is completely objectless – that is its value. The community is an end in itself 
and thus pure will (ibid., p. 89). It is due to this grounding that it exists at the limits of 
time [grenzzeitlich] or outside time, manifesting in the present, the past and the future, 
and is therefore transcendental.292 That is why, Žižek observes, it ‘can’ (as in “has the 
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potential to”) manifest in various guises, Christianity, Ancient Greek democracy, 
Lenin’s Bolshevik revolution, Eastern Europe’s undermining of Communism in the 
1980s or indeed the Occupy movement against Capitalism.  
It is this transcendence that attracts Žižek to the theological considerations of the 
revolutionary moment of the community and informs his understanding of its pure 
externality ‘from above’ as ‘grace’.293 For both Bonhoeffer and Žižek, this formative 
‘moment’ is manifested in history but is not restricted to it or by it.  Rather, in contrast 
to the form of society which exists only within history coming ‘to an end with the 
satisfaction of the individual’s wishes’ (DBWE 1: pp. λ5, 101), the transcendent value 
itself breaks in and shapes history. This also means that community is not historically 
verifiable and is from that perspective invisible, even though it is always present and 
part of the historical community (ibid., pp. 216, 223-226):  
The empirical church lives in history. Just as the individual spirit, as a 
member of the church, has particular tasks at particular times, so the 
objective spirit of the church has an individual character; that is, it is 
different at any given time. It gets its character from the historical 
context. But the fact that the objective spirit is part of history necessarily 
implies that it is fallible and imperfect as far as its understanding and will 
are concerned (ibid., pp. 214-215).  
 
It is thus exactly in and through its particularity of understanding and will that 
community is transcendent.  
The transcendental of this form of community, which for Bonhoeffer and Žižek 
is a theological category, also means that it is only understood within its actuality, not 
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outside it. Bonhoeffer’s assertion that the church can be ‘understood fully only from 
within, on the basis of its own claim; only on this basis can we develop appropriately 
critical criteria for judging it’ (ibid., p. 127), can be compared with Žižek’s statement 
that it is cognitively accessible only from within (Žižek, 2001b, p. 105). Indeed, to an 
outsider, the community does not make sense and remains pure idealist utopia. That is 
why the radical demands of Occupy are perceived as impossible and why if an 
alternative is to emerge, it will have to be judged according to its own criteria, its radical 
core. 
Moreover, in keeping with its transcendent dialectical nature, this knowledge 
precedes it; community is established upon already existing knowledge and 
acknowledgement. Bonhoeffer thus highlights the necessity of faith, which, together 
with revelation, is ‘not a possible method by which to gain academic knowledge; rather, 
by acknowledging the claim of revelation, faith is given the prerequisite for positive 
theological language’ (DBWE 1: pp. 127, 133[23]). For Žižek, faith is the miracle 
(Žižek, 2001b, 14κ) that enables the traversing of fantasy by acknowledging revelation 
as the impossible becoming possible and thus enables a political act, which might seem 
impossible from the current coordinates, yet once it arrives, it always already was and 
becomes ‘routine’ (Žižek, 2010c, pp. 13-14).294 Žižek and Bonhoeffer contend that the 
community logically establishes its own foundation in itself. Thus when the ‘irrational’ 
demand of Occupy is met and the coordinates of the current situation overcome, it will 
be of the future perfect. 
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It is this impossibility of the authentic community that marks it as distinct to any 
other form. It is possible, Bonhoeffer argues, ‘to deduce certain impulses towards 
community that become visible in the empirical formation of community; but this still 
does not lead to the concept of the church’ (DBWE 1: p. 133). Accordingly, while it is 
possible to deduce certain impulses towards Žižek’s struggling community from various 
movements, including Occupy, it is important not to confuse the movement with 
community as such. They are but the necessary ‘place’ where the distinct community 
can emerge when revelation is believed or taken seriously.295 Thus any analysis of the 
Occupy movement as the end result ends in failure.  
The empirical form of the community has a will and life of its own. Bonhoeffer 
describes it as guided by the Spirit (ibid., p. 209),296 while Žižek presents this in Christ’s 
act which, while irrational, from within the existing coordinates, actually suspends them 
(Žižek, 2000b, pp. 133, 135, 143). This is what the breaking in of community does with 
the existing forms of sociality: it suspends them. Yes, within the realm of other forms of 
society the acts of the community are perceived as madness. Is this not also the case 
with Occupy, whose refusal to produce a clear list of goals is frowned upon from the 
perspective of the global political order? That is why the movement’s demands ought 
not to be ‘feasible’ and ‘legitimate’, but ‘de facto impossible’ in order to change the 
very coordinates of the situation. Failure to do so would be to remain within the 
particular capitalist world order.  
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This statement brings us to the final characteristic of the new community – its 
contingency. Despite its absolute necessity it is only a historical potentiality and even 
then incredibly fragile. Since, as already observed, for Žižek (2001b, p. 105) its 
emergence through various ‘new beginnings’ is only a possibility, the Occupy 
movement carries the potential to bear an alternative, but this is not ensured. 
Furthermore, the community is incredibly fragile. Bonhoeffer writes about it, saying 
that the church ‘continues to fall again and again, it comes into being anew, passes 
away, and comes into being once more’ (DBWE 1: p. 213).297 Just as Lenin’s revolution 
led to the perverse ideology of Stalinism, the communality of the Arab Spring was taken 
over by religious fundamentalists, so too the Occupy movement, without the proper 
stance in relation to what happened in Zuccotti Park, that is by accepting the rules of the 
game or the coordinates dictated by the system, can transform its radicality into 
perversion.  
4.2.3 Concluding thought 
This section has applied Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the sociological function of the 
forms of society, mass and community in analysis of the contemporary capitalist society 
as selfish and perverse, the responsive nature of challenges posed to it by emerging 
movements, such as Occupy, as well as the transcendence of the alternative social form. 
With the help of Žižek, contrasting the two revealed the dialectical tension between 
their sociological function – the necessary responsive-to-the-current-conditions-of-
society character of movements such as Occupy, their essentiality and potential, but also 
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their difference from the transcendent form of their hope for a new beginning – a new 
form of sociality. Far from them merely excluding each other, they instead embody a 
tense relationship where one emerges at the cracks of the other. To paraphrase 
Bonhoeffer, every society is limited by time, mass emerging on its borders temporarily, 
only in order for the possibility of transcendental community, which is, however, 
inherently fragile.  
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Conclusion  
 
Theology is always a form of criticism, a search for truth against all its 
ideological competitors (Floyd, 1991, p. 175).  
 
This thesis set out to explore the potential of theology’s engagement with critical theory 
– a critical theology. Specifically, it did so by observing Slovenian post-Marxist 
philosopher Slavoj Žižek’s appropriation of theology, the origin and context of this 
endeavour, as well as its result – a distinctly theological form of political thought. It 
briefly examined the theological responses to it and outlined the potential of 
engagement with his understanding of the exclusivity and necessity of theology for 
political thought in order to bring about change, whether actualized or prospective. To 
that end, an investigation of the grounds of this engagement was conducted in the form 
of a critical reading exercise, where the social theology of the modern theologian 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer expressed in his first dissertation Sanctorum Communio, after 
exploring the origin and context of his engagement with social philosophy, was read 
alongside and from the perspective of Žižek’s materialist political theology, to 
demonstrate the potential of Žižek’s political thought for engagement with Bonhoeffer’s 
manifestly social theological thought. The contact point between them was thus the 
shared conviction about not only the sociological potential of theology but its absolute 
necessity. In addition to this conviction, the intellectual formation of both and thus the 
form and content of their thought were influenced by G. W. F. Hegel’s philosophy of 
social relation. The exercise demonstrated ways in which Žižek’s thought can be 
appropriated as a resource in the service of theology, as well as how Bonhoeffer’s 
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thought can be appropriated in the service of critical theory, thus exhibiting how 
engagement with critical theory embodies the integral critical character of theology.  
Žižek’s utilisation of theology is part of the post-Marxist critical theoretical 
exploration of theological resources for the analysis and critique of contemporary 
society. This is rooted already in Marxist recognition of a revolutionary potential in 
theology, observed in the example of Thomas Müntzer, but liberated of orthodox 
Marxist preconceptions in Adorno and Horkheimer’s rejection of the dualism between 
myth and enlightenment. Žižek also considers the demarcation between the categories 
of religion and the secular an obfuscating myth. That is why he regards current 
discussions of the postsecular, in which religion functions in service to the political, as a 
myth. Even though his voice at time is heard within these discussions, he instead sees 
them as a continuation of that myth which he seeks to subvert. Thus Žižek is in the 
company of post-Marxist thinkers such as Alain Badiou and Giorgio Agamben in 
recognising theology as the grounding element of the socio-political and therefore 
necessary for illumination of faults and cracks in the capitalist political order, and 
foremost the emergence of an alternative.  
It is this decidedly Western Marxism which is the shaping force of Žižek’s life, 
from childhood in a non-aligned and culturally comparatively free Yugoslavia, where he 
began to build his encyclopaedic knowledge of Hollywood cinema, to the pivotal 
University teaching of Božidar Debenjak, who introduced him to the Frankfurt School 
and German idealism. Indeed, it was in Debenjak’s course that Žižek read Marx’s Das 
Kapital through the lens of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, an approach which 
persists in his contemporary writings. Unfortunately, the role of Debenjak in his 
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intellectual formation remains completely unresearched, as does the period of his 
studies at the University of Ljubljana (1967-1981) and academic productivity before his 
international establishment with publication of The Sublime Object of Ideology in 1989. 
It was this critical theoretical Western Marxism that brought Žižek’s attention to 
theology, be it through Hegel’s idealism or Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory – the more 
Žižek’s Marxist political thought developed, the more theologically pronounced it 
became.  
Certainly, it is the critical theoretical ‘engagement’ of these three theories – 
Hegel’s idealism, Lacan’s psychoanalysis and Marx’s political theory – that shapes 
Žižek’s multifarious and interdisciplinary thought. Marx provides the understanding of 
the mechanism by which the capitalist system perpetuates itself – ideology – and the 
motivation for Žižek’s critique of capitalist ideology – the hope of revolutionary 
change. Supplementing Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatuses, Žižek delivers a 
theory of the individual’s complicity in the function of ideology and its perpetuation, 
interpolating themselves through the desire to live in a consistent reality. This 
understanding is gained through Lacan, who provides Žižek with the psychoanalytic 
framework of ideology as the Symbolic and its critique as the disturbing emergence of 
the Real, with the subject existing on the borders of the two. Ideology works when the 
subject identifies with the Symbolic but when cracks appear the Real subject emerges 
and highlights the abstruse and arbitrary character of ideology.  It is thus in these 
instinctive and psychological processes, Žižek argues, that ideology functions. Finally, 
Hegel provides him with the methodology to carry out this analysis of the subject and 
its involvement in the understanding of the world – dialectics. Žižek’s understanding of 
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Hegel is marked by tension or negativity that stretches the ideological construction and 
becomes the location of possible change through a concretisation of contradiction – 
revolution. This excess or the Real disrupting the perception of reality as well-ordered is 
by Žižek understood as theological (in function).  
Žižek’s revolutionary political thought, then, is enabled by the theological, for it 
is only the latter as the excess which enables change and escape from the ideological 
sempiternal cycle. Even though reference to the theological dimension in his thought is 
always present, Žižek begins to articulate this critical and/or radical understanding of 
theology and its subversive political potential through engagement with Badiou. What 
they both observe in Paul is an example of ontological subversion of the existing order. 
Paul’s undermining of the Roman Imperial authority by bringing the excluded or 
unrepresented in that order to the fore thus becomes a model for that action in the global 
capitalist order. The excluded element represents the true universality and exposes the 
non-substantiality of the global capitalist order. This negativity is for Žižek the key, as 
only detachment from a given situation can bring about change. That is why Christ dies 
to the Law, rather than fulfilling it. This is the Christian experience that Žižek refers to 
as necessary for change, rather than it being a reference to actually existing Christianity, 
which is of course rejected as having reinstated the Law and thus perverse. This 
experience, already observed with Job in the Old Testament but fully realised by Christ, 
is characterised by doubt and resistance to meaning and realisation of the abstruseness 
and ambiguity of reality. Thus Christ’s realisation is that there is no God as the big 
Other maintaining and directing things. In other words, what dies on the Cross is God as 
the big Other. Indeed, it is not only that Job doubts God and Christ realises that where 
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there is supposed to be God there is nothing, but rather that with Job, God doubts 
himself and himself dies on the Cross. Whenever meaning is no longer searched for, 
ideology collapses. That avoidance of meaning is theological, Žižek argues, the true 
subversive core of theology as challenging the imposition of meaning by pointing out 
the excluded and thus creating tension, the place where an alternative can emerge. The 
alternative is the struggling universality, where community is no longer reliant on any 
ethnic or political identity or order but directly confronted with each other and self-
organising. This community is inherently fragile and thus far from stable, always more 
in need of emerging rather than existing. The question of whether community without 
the support of the big Other can persist should, from Žižek’s perspective, be 
reformulated into whether the community relying upon it is authentic. Rather than 
maintaining a community form and thus assuming a position, materialist theology 
challenges it by recognising the excluded within it.  
Therefore, what was pursued in the second part of this thesis was an application 
of the potential for engagement with Žižek’s radical political theology to the social 
theology of the modern theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s first dissertation Sanctorum 
Communio, wherein the latter engaged sociological analysis and church dogmatics in 
order to demonstrate theology’s sociological potential.  
Bonhoeffer’s engagement of theology with social philosophy was set in the 
context of his life and modern theology, specifically his intellectual formation during 
his studies at the University in Berlin. Raised in the years following World War I in a 
world concerned with the future of humanity and critical of its progress, he developed 
an interest in theology and philosophy and ventured into theological waters, finding 
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himself at the Friedrich Wilhelm University in Berlin, where the theological faculty 
cultivated the engagement between the two and also the general engagement of theology 
with other academic disciplines. It is within this context of situating theology in the 
modern world, built upon the foundations of nineteenth century figures like Kant, 
Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, Strauss and Hegel, that Bonhoeffer’s own endeavour to 
exegete and apply the ethical and sociological potential of traditional theological 
concepts should be understood. This was observed in particular with regards to three 
figures: the systematic theologian Ernst Troeltch and his interest in the sociological 
realities of theology, who, even though no longer alive during Bonhoeffer’s education, 
influenced the thought of his lecturers and inherently his own dissertation; the historian 
of dogma and his dissertation supervisor Reinhold Seeberg and his philosophical 
openness in terms of the focus on the moral and social dimensions of theological 
reflection; and the church historian Adolf von Harnack and his ethical concern oriented 
toward action and the maturity of the world come-of-age and the place of faith within it. 
As observed in 3.1 on Bonhoeffer’s intellectual biography, the social orientation, 
philosophical openness and ethical concern are distinct characteristics of the entirety of 
his works and indeed their application in life, be it in his ecumenical endeavours or 
work with the Confessing Church.  
However, Bonhoeffer’s distinctly modern sociological conviction of all 
theological concepts, in particular ecclesiology, which sets him apart from Barth’s 
fixation on the transcendent, stems not only from these theological thinkers but also 
from the influence of Hegel. In the past the influence of the latter on Bonhoeffer’s 
intellectual formation has been overlooked and has only begun to emerge over the last 
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thirty years. Thus Marsh’s recognition of Bonhoeffer’s appreciation and an attempt to 
develop Hegel’s thought needs to be explored further. Hopefully this thesis has 
contributed to that project, albeit in a limited manner, by demonstrating the foundational 
role of Hegel’s concept of objective spirit in the development of Bonhoeffer’s 
communitarianism.  
Attention then turned to a reading of Bonhoeffer’s argument about the 
sociological relevance of the theological concept of the church in Sanctorum Communio 
alongside Žižek in order to compare their understanding of the theological import for 
social organisation and explore the potential for engagement between them. This 
exercise proved very helpful, for in a way it contextualised Bonhoeffer in his attempt to 
deal with sociological issues theologically as a theological search for an authentic 
community and thus made his thought clearer. The contrasting of his transcendental 
personalist community and ethic of universal love with Žižek’s materialist ontological 
community and ethic of indifference revealed that while they both perceive their 
discipline to have a complex and interdisciplinary history and nature,298 and they agree 
that the essence of social concepts is theological and that theological concepts are 
social, they differ on the form that community takes. For Bonhoeffer an authentic form 
of community can only be grounded in and by God, while for Žižek it is grounded in the 
absence of God as the big Other. Thus, while the former sees a community without God 
as totalitarian, sinful, the latter sees the community with God as abstract. While the 
former employs theological concepts in order to ground his understanding as a sociality 
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of separation, the latter employs them to reveal the cracks and fissures of that imposed 
understanding. While the former wishes to preserve the individuality rooted in God, the 
latter deems that as sacrificing the sociality enabled by God’s absence. While the former 
holds that the community, individuality and their ethical claim are maintained and 
mediated by God, the latter argues that true engagement only occurs when these are left 
to their own devices. In summary, while Bonhoeffer and Žižek agree on the sociological 
import of theology, they differ on the resulting sociological form – a community reliant 
on God or one of his absence.  
The reading exercise indicated some ways in which Žižek’s thought can be 
appropriated as a resource in the service of theology, as well as how Bonhoeffer’s 
thought can be appropriated in the service of critical theory.  
First, Žižek’s struggling community can be appropriated in the service of 
theology to reveal the sociologically dangerous potential in Bonhoeffer’s transcendent 
community of saints – that of identity politics. His illuminating critique of the 
traditional and Bonhoeffer’s understanding of Galatians 3:28 as suspending identities 
only through the creation of a new one, hangs like a sword of Damocles, particularly in 
light of Bonhoeffer’s immediate context.299 The short-sightedness of his fellow German 
Christians to recognise the full problem of the Aryan paragraph and lack of concern for 
their neighbours, whether or not they are Christian, highlights this entrapment within the 
particular at the expense of the universality it excludes. Upon this consideration, it 
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seems that Žižek’s drawing of attention to the theological character as the excess or 
monstrous, transcendental, never submitting to an identity but rather blurring the 
hypostasized boundaries between them irrevocably, ought to be considered carefully. 
Indubitably, this confrontational character of theology is decidedly ‘queer’,300 horizontal 
rather than vertical, located in the excess of an identity, even its own, thus exercising its 
critical role in an inherent manner.  
Considered from the perspective of Milbank’s accusation, is such a character of 
theology as perspective, rather than position, heterodox? While it perhaps is not 
traditional or conventional, it cannot take a different form in its operation, for 
theology’s character has always been one of challenging narratives and revealing 
exceptions, as has been observed in the story of Job. Turning to the New Testament, are 
the gospel accounts not an embodiment of a challenge to the perceptions and 
expectations of those who meet Jesus? In the Sermon on the Mount he said to the 
disciples, ‘You are the salt of the earth; but if salt has lost its taste, how can its saltiness 
be restored? It is no longer good for anything, but is thrown out and trampled under 
foot’ (Matthew 5:13). The character of theology is necessarily critical or, to appropriate 
Ward, ‘a radicality inseparable from its orthodoxy’ (2005, p. 266).  
In order to remain true to this character, theology must remain critical. If it fails 
to do so, it becomes trapped in the magical circle of political theology of abstraction, 
where theology, rather than challenging a particular socio-political setup, surrenders its 
apocalyptic (i.e. revelatory) capacity and validates it.  Any yielding under the objection 
that this sounds too opaque and fails to offer an alternative, represents a compromise of 
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its radical nature and potential and results in service to that which it is supposed to 
challenge. This refusal means that theology is more a perspective than a position but the 
shift of perspective is necessary if an alternative is to emerge. To paraphrase the words 
of another critical philosopher, Étienne Balibar, the task of the theologian  
with respect to universality is precisely to understand the logic of these 
contradictions and, in a dialectical way, to investigate their dominant and 
subordinated aspects, to reveal how they work and how they can be 
shifted or twisted through the interaction of theory and practice or, if you 
prefer, discourse and politics (Balibar, 2007).   
 
Only in this way is theology understood as critical, self-critical and constructive 
reflection on faith and is its sanctity preserved. Thus, to paraphrase Kant (1998, p. 100 
(Axi)) and Raschke (2016, p. 10), not only do we live in the age of the critical, where 
theology must submit to it and be employed in its service, but theology always is 
essentially critical.  
Does that mean that the only advantage of theology is negative, continually 
challenging a position and not providing one? I argue that this negativity becomes 
positive when we perceive that its accession to a position leads inevitably, not to an 
expansion and implementation but, a narrowing and diminishing of its potential, 
threatening to supplant entirely its radical character in the service of a position. Critical 
theology then is no doubt characteristically negative – a critique rather than a doctrine, 
or, a canon rather than a new organon – but is for that reason functionally positive. 
Second, Bonhoeffer’s analysis of social forms in Sanctorum Communio can be 
appropriated in the service of critical theory. This was demonstrated in the final section 
4.2 where Bonhoeffer’s discussion of the types of social forms – society, the mass and 
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community – was applied in analysis of the contemporary struggle for social change 
located in the revolutionary community/body, together with Žižek’s own analysis. This 
produced insight into the character of the capitalist society as selfish and perverse, the 
responsive form and function of emerging movements, the possibility of change and the 
transcendent nature of a new form of sociality, and the dialectically tense relationship 
between them. Despite the difference in their understanding of theology – as the study 
of divine grounding or as the surplus or monstrous – this short section thus 
demonstrated a successful critical theological engagement.  
This thesis has thus demonstrated that when critical theory is engaged in 
theological reflection, it draws attention to and clarifies the full dimensionality of the 
necessary critical character of theology. Appropriated as a resource in reflection on the 
act, content and implications of the Christian faith, it serves to evaluate the positon, 
function and method of theology. It brings out its negative aspect and propaedeutic role, 
demonstrating its distinctly critical sociological potential. Therefore, engagement with 
critical theory is pertinent to the explication and enunciation of critical theology. 
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